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Abstract 
Although research on personality development has successfully determined patterns of 
both continuity and change across the life span, less is known about underlying factors and 
processes. To address these research gaps, the current dissertation examined two potentially 
relevant macro-analytical factors as well as a set of theoretically suggested micro-analytical 
processes. Regarding the first macro-analytical factor, previous research suggested that 
environmental factors and especially life transitions might substantially contribute to 
personality development. Less pronounced trait changes observed in older adults might 
consequently result from more stable environmental contexts (i.e., less life transitions). 
Accordingly, if younger and older adults experience a similar life transition, both age groups 
should exhibit comparable trait changes. However, such a strong test for the importance of 
environmental factors in personality development is still missing. Regarding the second 
macro-analytical factor, recent research has highlighted that people may volitionally 
contribute to their personality development by setting and pursuing goals to change traits. Yet, 
a comprehensive examination of factors that contribute to people’s change goals is currently 
missing. In addition, previous research provided contradicting results on whether change goals 
indeed manifest in actual trait changes and hardly examined goal properties (e.g., importance 
or feasibility) that may foster a successful goal pursuit. Finally, the recently proposed 
TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) provides specific suggestions on micro-
analytical processes of personality development. However, this framework is still awaiting a 
first empirical evaluation. 
To tackle this comprehensive agenda, a multi-method measurement burst study was 
conducted. Across a total of two years, 382 younger (n = 255, Mage = 21.57 years) and older 
adults (n = 127, Mage = 67.76) who partly engaged in the transition to college, completed up 
to four comprehensive assessments of self-rated, other-rated and implicitly measured Big Five 
  ix 
ix 
 
traits as well as self-rated change goals. In addition, in-between the first three assessments, 
momentary processes were assessed in multiple daily diary waves across up to 50 days.  
Results showed that, as expected, younger and older adults who experienced a similar 
life transition (i.e., the transition into college) hardly differed in the development of self-rated, 
other-rated or implicitly measured traits. In addition, findings indicated that older adults who 
engaged in college life experienced somewhat different patterns of personality development 
than people who did not engage in this transition. Moreover, trait changes were in part more 
pronounced at the beginning of a life transition (i.e., in freshmen). Regarding volitional 
personality development, results show that primarily current Big Five trait levels contributed 
to people’s change goals and that change goals were strongest when both self- and other-
ratings agreed on low current trait levels. Unexpectedly, findings suggested that change goals 
hardly manifest in actual changes in self-rated or implicitly measured traits. However, some 
support was found that higher importance and feasibility of change goals might indeed foster 
a successful goal pursuit. Finally, regarding micro-analytical processes of personality 
development, results showed that momentary processes can be generalized in terms of 
repeated sequences of triggering situations, expectancies, states, and reactions as suggested by 
the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In addition, self-rated and partly 
implicitly measured traits but hardly any change goals were linked with experiencing 
according momentary situations and states. Unexpectedly, merely momentary states but hardly 
any reflective or associative processes contributed to long-term trait development. 
The current findings underline the importance of environmental factors for personality 
development across the life span. Specifically, by requiring people to invest in new or altered 
social roles, the experience of usually age-graded life transitions (e.g., experiencing college in 
young adulthood) may underlie different patterns of personality development in younger and 
older adults. Furthermore, although change goals seem to reflect more than a response bias or 
  x 
x 
 
the mere desirability of higher trait levels, future research is needed to examine whether 
volitional personality development is possible without psychological assistance and which 
further conditions need to be met (e.g., goals specificity, goal commitment) for a successful 
goal pursuit. Finally, the current dissertation provides first but encouraging findings in support 
of central propositions of the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Yet future 
research is needed to further examine the relevance of reflective and associative processes in 
personality development.  
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„Es gab keine, keine, keine Pflicht für erwachte Menschen als die eine: sich selbst zu 
suchen, in sich fest zu werden, den eigenen Weg vorwärts zu tasten, einerlei wohin er führte 
[…] Ich war nicht da, um zu dichten, um zu predigen, um zu malen, weder ich noch sonst ein 
Mensch war dazu da. Das alles ergab sich nur nebenher. Wahrer Beruf für jeden war nur 
das eine: zu sich selbst zu kommen.“ (Hesse, 1919/1974, p. 150) 
 
Already a brief glance at the world literature reveals that the question of why and under 
which circumstances people develop their personality has been discussed with large interest 
for hundreds of years, especially in coming-of-age novels (see Hesse, 1919/1974; Keller 
1855/2008; Goethe, 1796/1986; Wieland, 1767/1986). For example, in Hermann Hesse’s 
narrative “Demian”, the personality development of his first-person narrator Emil Sinclair is 
stimulated by repeated encounters with his mentor and friend Max Demian who inter alia 
encourages Sinclair to perceive various transitions in his life (e.g., transition to secondary 
school, a romantic relationship or military service) as an opportunity for his own development. 
Demian also challenges Sinclair to self-regulate his development by independently forming 
ethical standards and living by his own convictions. Moreover, in his short story “die 
unwürdige Greisin”, Bertolt Brecht (1949) illustrates that personality development is still 
possible in older age. Having lived the first part of her life merely in the roles of being a 
daughter, wife and mother, his main character, the 72-year-old Madam B., actively decides to 
give her last years a completely different direction by engaging in new social and cultural 
activities after the death of her husband. 
However, taking a more systematic and empirical approach towards personality 
development, research nowadays has agreed that on average, personality development across 
the life-span follows somewhat universal patterns with changes in personality being most 
pronounced in younger age and less pronounced in older age (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; 
Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006a). Yet, little is known about both macro-analytical 
factors and micro-analytical processes that contribute to these patterns of personality 
development. Within the current dissertation, macro-analytical factors are understood as more 
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broad and long-term conditions under which personality development could be initiated or 
catalyzed (e.g., life transitions or goals to change one’s traits). In turn, micro-analytical 
processes are understood as sequences of more specific, short-term experiences (e.g., the 
experience of certain situations or states) that may finally manifest in continuity or change of 
personality (for discussions regarding macro- and micro-analytical perspectives on personality 
development, see Baumert et al., 2017; Geukes, van Zalk, & Back, 2017; Levinson, 1986; 
Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Specifically, as already suggested by Hermann Hesse and Bertolt 
Brecht, research on macro-analytical factors has repeatedly linked environmental factors and 
especially life transitions with personality development across the lifespan (for an overview, 
see Bleidorn, Hopwood, & Lucas, 2016). However, to determine whether the above described 
age differences in personality development result from a higher stability of context in older 
age (i.e., fewer experienced life transitions) or from a higher stability of personality per se, a 
similar life transition has to be compared in different age groups. In addition, just like Sinclair, 
people may want to actively take part in their own personality development, for example by 
setting goals to change themselves. With research on such volitional personality development 
being still in its infancy, it needs to be clarified why people want to change themselves and 
whether such change is indeed possible. Finally, it remains largely unclear which micro-
analytical processes underlie personality development. Although theoretical models like the 
TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) provide sensible suggestions on momentary 
processes of personality development, empirical research that actually tests these suggestions 
remains scarce.  
To provide an easier access to these different aspects of personality development, the 
following general introduction will first provide a brief introduction to personality traits and 
their assessment, and explain current knowledge on personality development across the 
lifespan. Then, the importance of environmental factors and volitional aspects for personality 
Chapter I: General Introduction  
   
4 
 
development will be highlighted. Thereafter, potentially relevant momentary processes of 
personality development as suggested by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) 
will be introduced. Finally, this dissertation’s research questions will be briefly summarized.  
1.1 Personality Traits and their Assessment 
At the heart of personality psychology stands the idea that people differ systematically 
in terms of personality traits (Cattell, 1943, 1946; Stern, 1911). Personality traits refer to an 
individual’s relatively enduring patterns of behavior, thoughts, and feelings (Allport, 1966; 
Kandler, Zimmermann, & McAdams, 2014; McCrae & Costa, 2008; Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 
2008). Although such patterns can cover more specific characteristic adaptations (e.g., 
attitudes, beliefs, values or self-concepts; DeYoung, 2015; Kandler et al., 2014; McAdams & 
Pals, 2006; McCrae & Costa, 2008), individual differences in personality are commonly 
described as more broad core characteristics like the Big Five traits (Costa & McCrae, 1985; 
Goldberg, 1990; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008; McCrae & Costa, 2008). Thus, the Big Five 
taxonomy does not consider to cover all differences in personality, but suggests superordinate 
levels of a personality hierarchy that can be further subdivided into more narrow and specific 
traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992; DeYoung, 2015; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007). 
Resulting from lexical studies and factor analysis, the Big Five taxonomy organizes people’s 
personality in terms of the five superordinate traits openness to experience (e.g., being 
inventive, widely interested), conscientiousness (e.g., being organized, efficient), extraversion 
(e.g., being outgoing, assertive), agreeableness (e.g., being empathic, cooperative) and 
emotional stability (i.e., the inverse of neuroticism, reflecting being calm, not easily upset; 
John et al., 2008, see also Costa & McCrae, 1992; John & Srivastava, 1999).  
Importantly, Big Five traits are not directly observable, but have to be inferred from 
different data sources like self- and other-ratings, implicit measures, behavioral observation 
or biological functioning (Rauthmann, 2017; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Wrzus, Quintus, & 
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Baumert, 2017b). The most common way to assess Big Five traits is to simply ask people to 
rate themselves (Back & Nestler, 2016; Wrzus et al., 2017b). Although such self-ratings are 
easy to implement and provide valid and unique information about people’s personalities (e.g., 
due to their access to many trait-relevant behavior, thoughts or feelings; McDonald, 2008; 
Paulhus & Vazire, 2007), they suffer from several drawbacks. For example, people’s self-
ratings may be biased by processes of self-enhancement, self-presentation or consistency 
seeking (Back & Vazire, 2012; Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; Paulhus & Vazire, 
2007). Also, self-ratings may suffer from people’s introspective limitations to access 
impulsive mental or behavioral facets of their personality (Back & Nestler, 2016; Rauthmann, 
2017). Other-ratings (i.e., people’s reputations) may now complement people’s self-ratings 
with unique, accurate, and incrementally useful information (Vazire, 2006; Vazire & Carlson, 
2011; Vazire & Mehl, 2008). However, other-ratings may be based on less information and 
may suffer from biases, too (e.g., enhancement bias, fundamental attribution error; McDonald, 
2008). Yet, collectively, both self- and other-ratings provide complementary insights into 
people’s explicit (i.e., conscious or controlled) representations of traits but they also suffer 
from similar drawbacks.  
In turn, implicit measures assess people’s automatic, impulsive, and less controlled 
representations of traits and should therefore be less prone to the above stated biases and blind 
spots (see also Back, Schmukle & Egloff, 2009; De Houwer, 2006; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Nonetheless, implicit measures still suffer from 
theoretical (e.g., uncertainty about the assessed content; De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, 
Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004; Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 
2005) and methodological (e.g., low retest-reliability and low convergent validity of different 
implicit measures; Rauthmann, 2017; Schnabel, Asendorpf, & Greenwald, 2008) drawbacks. 
However, implicit measures have shown to be incrementally useful in the prediction of 
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especially automatic or uncontrolled behavior (Back et al., 2009; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; 
Steffens & Schulze König, 2006), suggesting that implicit and explicit trait measures assess 
similar but distinct aspects of traits (Back & Nestler, 2016; Rauthmann, 2017).  
In conclusion, as there is no single measure of people’s “true” personality, researchers 
need to rely on various data sources (e.g., self-reports, other-reports, and implicit measures) 
to obtain a comprehensive picture of different manifestations of personality. Still, to date, 
research on personality and especially on personality development has primarily focused on 
self-rated Big Five traits. To allow for a better understanding of how personality develops 
across the lifespan, a brief overview on central conceptual ideas and the actual state of research 
will next be provided. 
1.2 Personality Development across the Lifespan 
For the conceptualization of personality development, a crucial point in the above 
stated definition of personality refers to one’s interpretation of the “relatively enduring”-aspect 
of traits. In the past, research often considered personality traits as nearly perfectly enduring 
after the age of 30, so that development of personality across the entire lifespan was somewhat 
neglected (i.e., plaster hypothesis; Costa & McCrae, 1994; McCrae et al., 2000; Terracciano, 
Costa, & McCrae, 2006). Nowadays, there are strong theoretical (see for example Caspi & 
Moffitt, 1993; Hennecke, Bleidorn, Denissen, & Wood, 2014; Roberts & Wood, 2006) and 
empirical (see for example Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a) arguments that 
point to a more sophisticated view on personality development and highlight the possibility 
for both change and continuity. In line with these research progresses, within this dissertation, 
personality development is understood as a comprehensive term covering both continuity and 
change (Allemand, Grunenfelder-Steiger, & Hill, 2013; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Roberts et al., 
2008; Wrzus & Lang, 2010; for a discussion of definitions, see Staudinger & Kunzmann, 
2005).  
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At first sight, the idea that personality traits, sometimes even simultaneously, show 
continuity and change seems contradictory. However, a closer look at different research 
interests and strategies helps to clarify this idea. For example, researchers may want to 
investigate whether a population on average increases, decreases or maintains a certain trait-
level across time (i.e., mean-level changes; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Denissen, van Aken, & 
Roberts, 2011; Roberts et al., 2008). Obviously, not all individuals are perfectly in line with a 
population’s average trait development, so that researchers may also be interested in the 
amount of individual differences within this trait development. Put differently, it is not only 
possible to examine a population’s average personality development, but also to investigate 
continuity and change in terms of the relative standing of individuals within a population 
across time (i.e., rank-order stability; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Denissen et al., 2011; Roberts 
et al., 2008). Importantly, continuity and change on the mean-level may be at least partly 
independent from continuity and change in the rank-order (Denissen et al., 2011; Roberts et 
al., 2008; Schwaba & Bleidorn, 2017). For example, on average, a populations’ 
conscientiousness may not change across the observed time (i.e., negligible mean-level change 
across all individuals), but there may be varying trajectories for conscientiousness with some 
individuals increasing and some decreasing in this trait (i.e., low rank-order stability).  
Mean-level changes in personality traits are commonly quantified in terms of 
standardized mean differences (e.g., Cohen’s d), average latent slopes (Bollen & Curran, 2006; 
Duncan, Duncan, & Strycker, 2006) or average latent changes (i.e., latent difference scores; 
McArdle & Hamagami, 2001; McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994; Steyer, Eid, & Schwenkmezger, 
1997) in longitudinal structural equation models (SEM; for advantages and non-technical 
comparisons of different SEMs, see Jackson & Allemand, 2014; Voelkle & Wagner, 2017). 
Meta-analytical findings suggest that, on average, conscientiousness, agreeableness and 
emotional stability increase across the lifespan (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts et al., 
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2006a). In addition, these increases are more pronounced in younger adulthood (Roberts et al., 
2006a). Such developmental patterns are often labeled as maturity principle, because increases 
in conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability may be functional to master 
developmental tasks and increasing adult responsibilities (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et 
al., 2008; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). However, in older adulthood, these traits seem to 
decrease again, for example due to physical constraints (Kandler, Kornadt, Hagemeyer, & 
Neyer, 2015; Mõttus, Johnson, & Deary, 2012; Wortman, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2012). 
Openness to experiences, however, exhibited a curvilinear pattern comprising increases in the 
emerging adulthood, followed by a period of stability and then decreases in older adulthood 
(Roberts et al., 2006a). Finally, two facets of extraversion seem to follow different trends. 
While social dominance (i.e., dominance and self-confidence in social contexts) increases until 
middle adulthood and stabilizes afterwards, social vitality (i.e., sociability, gregariousness, 
positive affect) increases in young adulthood and decreases in older adulthood (Berg & 
Johansson, 2014; Kandler et al., 2015; Mõttus et al., 2012; Roberts et al., 2006a).  
Individual differences in change are usually quantified in terms of rank-order stability 
(e.g., test-retest correlation) or in terms of variances of latent slopes or latent changes (see for 
example Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; Schwaba & Bleidorn, 
2017). Meta-analytical findings indicate that rank-order stabilities of Big Five traits follow an 
inverted U-shaped function (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; 
Wortman et al., 2012). As such, rank-order stability increases across young and middle 
adulthood and peaks at the age of 40 to 60. This pattern of increasing continuity is often 
referred to as the cumulative continuity principle (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 
2008). However, in older adulthood, rank-order stability seems to decline again, indicating 
that in older age, individual differences in change are again comparable with those in younger 
age (Ardelt, 2000; Kandler et al., 2015). In addition, findings from longitudinal SEMs suggest 
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that there are substantial individual differences (i.e., variances) in change across the entire life-
span (Bleidorn, Kandler, Riemann, Angleitner, & Spinath, 2009; Schwaba & Bleidorn, 2017). 
Supporting results on rank-order stability, individual differences in change were however 
more pronounced in younger age and somewhat lessened with increasing age (Bleidorn et al., 
2009; Schwaba & Bleidorn, 2017).  
In sum, there is broad evidence for both continuity and change in personality across 
the lifespan. However, both mean-level changes and individual differences in changes seem 
to be more pronounced in younger and older adulthood. Yet, less is known about more macro-
analytical factors that contribute to the observed patterns of personality development. Thus, 
two potentially relevant macro-analytical factors that are currently discussed to contribute to 
personality development will be outlined next. First, an explanation of the role of 
environmental factors and especially life transitions for personality development will be given 
followed by an illustration of the importance of volitional aspects for personality development 
and a brief review of recent findings therein. 
1.3 Environmental Factors may Contribute to Personality Development 
 As outlined above, in the past, researchers gave little leeway for personality 
development after the age of 30 (Costa & McCrae, 1994; Terracciano et al., 2006). Within this 
research tradition, personality development was thought to primarily result from intrinsic, 
biological maturation (Costa & McCrae, 1994; McCrae & Costa, 2008; McCrae et al., 2000). 
By now, however, there is a broad consensus in theory and empirical research that both 
biological and environmental factors contribute to continuity and change in personality 
(Bleidorn et al., 2016; Bleidorn, Kandler, & Caspi, 2014; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017). Put simply, biological factors (e.g., genes) seem to be most important in 
childhood and early adulthood, while the influence of environmental factors increases with 
age (Bleidorn et al., 2014; Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, Angleitner, & Spinath, 2012; Viken, 
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Rose, Kaprio, & Koskenvuo, 1994). Hence, to better understand personality development in 
adulthood, a closer look at environmental factors provides a promising perspective. 
Although environmental factors cover a broad range of potentially relevant variables 
like cultural (Bleidorn et al., 2013; Ward, Leong, & Low, 2004) or social contexts (Gerstorf 
et al., 2010; Hartup & Van Lieshout, 1995), especially life transitions seem to contribute to 
personality development (Bleidorn, 2015; Bleidorn et al., 2016; Hutteman, Hennecke, Orth, 
Reitz, & Specht, 2014; Roberts, Wood, & Smith, 2005). As such, life transitions refer to time-
discrete, but somewhat prolonged transitions that involve major changes in status and/or social 
roles and require new patterns of behavior, thoughts or feelings (Hopson & Adams, 1976; 
Luhmann, Hofmann, Eid, & Lucas, 2012; Luhmann, Orth, Specht, Kandler, & Lucas, 2014).1 
In addition, life transitions may offer benchmarks that shape and direct different aspects of 
people’s life (Danish, Smyer, & Nowak, 1980; see also Levinson, 1978). Specifically, life 
transitions often require people to invest in new social roles that are themselves associated 
with specific social expectations and behavioral demands (i.e., social investment principle; 
Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). Thus, such new social roles may provide a reward 
structure boosting increases in those traits that help to meet new requirements in people’s life 
(Roberts & Wood, 2006; D. Wood & Roberts, 2006). Consider, for example, the transition 
into college: To meet both social expectations (e.g., achieving good grades, and new 
behavioral demands (e.g., preparing courses and exams) linked with the new role of being a 
student, people may invest in conscientiousness-related behavior (e.g., preparing a work 
schedule, learn in the library) that in turn may condense in increases in conscientiousness.  
Yet, due to biological and/or social constraints, people may not engage in the same life 
transitions across different ages (J. Heckhausen, 2000; Roberts et al., 2005). Instead, most life 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, research does not clearly disentangle the terms life transitions and life events. However, within 
this dissertation, life transitions are understood as also covering life events but need somewhat longer time 
periods to unfold (but see, Bleidorn, 2012; Bleidorn et al., 2016; Luhmann et al., 2012). 
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transitions are tailored to be met within specific ages, requiring people to engage in age-graded 
social roles (J. Heckhausen, 2000; Roberts et al., 2005). For example, the life transition of 
entering the first job is expected to be done until the late twenties while people usually become 
parents before their forties (J. Heckhausen, 2000). Engaging in such normative life transitions 
and associated age-graded social roles may be one of the driving forces for the development 
of a mature personality (Bleidorn et al., 2013; Denissen, Ulferts, Lüdtke, Muck, & Gerstorf, 
2014; Helson, Mitchell, & Moane, 1984; Roberts et al., 2005). Keeping these social roles may 
now contribute to continuity in personality in middle and older adulthood (i.e., role continuity 
principle; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008). As especially normative life 
transitions are less prevalent in middle and older adulthood, people may more strongly invest 
in maintaining or deepening their prevailing traits (i.e., identity development principle, see 
also corresponsive principle; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008). 
Since changes in personality traits seem to be more pronounced in younger adulthood 
(i.e., larger mean-level changes, lower rank-order stability; see for example Lucas & 
Donnellan, 2011), research focused on life transitions during this life period to identify factors 
contributing to trait change (for a recent review, see Bleidorn et al., 2016). Thus, research for 
example showed that the transition to the first romantic partnership was associated with 
increases in emotional stability, extraversion, and, partly, conscientiousness (Lehnart, Neyer, 
& Eccles, 2010; Neyer & Lehnart, 2007; Wagner, Becker, Lüdtke, & Trautwein, 2015). 
Furthermore, when graduating from school or transitioning to college, young adults showed 
increases in openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability (Bleidorn, 
2012; Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011). Entering vocational training or the first job 
was in turn associated with increases in conscientiousness (Lüdtke et al., 2011; Specht, Egloff, 
& Schmukle, 2011). Research on life transitions in middle and older adulthood is less 
prominent, but indicates that life transitions still contribute to personality change (Bleidorn et 
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al., 2016). For example, research showed that retirement was associated with decreases in 
conscientiousness and extraversion as well as increases in agreeableness (Löckenhoff, 
Terracciano, & Costa, 2009; Specht et al., 2011). Taken together, these findings suggest that 
environmental factors, and especially life transitions, may indeed contribute to personality 
development across the entire lifespan (i.e., plasticity principle; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; 
Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008; see also Baltes, 1987). Certainly, life transitions 
seem to be not associated with changes in random traits, but indeed contribute to changes in 
traits that are helpful or functional to successfully master a life transition (e.g., 
conscientiousness is needed to master challenges at college; Denissen, van Aken, Penke, & 
Wood, 2013; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). 
However, previous studies on life transitions suffer from at least two drawbacks. First, 
it remains unclear whether life transitions do indeed trigger the observed personality changes 
or merely accompany them. For example, in young adulthood, the transition to college was 
linked with changes towards a more mature personality (see for example Lüdtke et al., 2011). 
But does personality really change due to new experiences and investment in new social roles 
made within the transition to college (e.g., due to responsible studying, cooperating with 
fellow students) or does this transition simply co-occur with normative personality changes 
(e.g., due to other experiences or age)? Put differently, if personality indeed changes in 
reaction to life transitions, one way to explain the above described more pronounced trait 
changes in younger adults (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a) would be that 
young adulthood reflects a life stage with an increased occurrence of life transitions (e.g., into 
college, a serious partnership). Consequently, if older adults experienced similar life 
transitions, they should again show more pronounced trait changes. One way to address this 
issue would be to investigate personality development within a similar life transition (i.e., the 
transition to college) in different age groups (for similar arguments, see Hutteman et al., 2014; 
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Luhmann et al., 2014). Second, preceding research on life transitions solely relied on self-
ratings and did not consider other-ratings or implicit measures. As first tentative evidence 
suggests that these three manifestations may change separately (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; Göllner et al., 2017), it is necessary to examine life transitions in more than just self-
ratings to gain a more comprehensive picture on the circumstances of personality development 
(but see also Baumert et al., 2017). 
1.4 Volitional Aspects of Personality Development 
 Although life transitions often already include some volitional aspects of personality 
development (e.g., by actively choosing a transition like university studies or a vocational 
training; see also Hennecke & Freund, 2017), they do not fully cover the direct influence 
people may have on their own personality development. That is, within biological, cultural 
and social restrictions, people may want to actively form various aspects of their personalities 
(Higgins, 1987; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Markus & Nurius, 1986; R. M. Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
and thus become agents of their own development (McAdams & Olson, 2010). A crucial 
means to achieve such volitional personality development may be to set and pursue goals to 
change or maintain one’s personality traits (Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Robinson, Noftle, Guo, 
Asadi, & Zhang, 2015).2 Broadly spoken, goals refer to “desired states that people seek to 
obtain, maintain, or avoid” (Emmons, 1996, p. 314; but see also R. M. Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, 
& Deci, 1996), albeit researchers interested in volitional personality development may put 
different emphasis on their conceptualization of goals to change traits (see for example 
Gollwitzer, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986). However, they converge on the idea that change 
goals should stimulate and guide people’s actions (see for example Hudson & Fraley, 2015; 
                                                 
2 In this dissertation, the terms change goals and goals to change are used interchangeably and refer to goals to 
change or maintain one’s personality traits. 
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Markus & Nurius, 1986; Pervin, 1982), thereby providing a meaningful framework to their 
lives (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Klinger, 1977).  
Yet, the idea that people may volitionally contribute to their own development received 
first reception not in personality but in developmental psychology (Brandtstädter, Wentura, & 
Rothermund, 1999; J. Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 
1981; Lewin, 1934, 1943). However, this research primarily focused on more narrow 
developmental goals that aimed at developmental processes (e.g., establishing a successful 
career) or developmental tasks (e.g., getting married; J. Heckhausen et al., 2010; see also 
Havighurst, 1953) but not on broader goals to change traits. Although already early research 
on personal strivings (Emmons, 1986), possible selves (Cross & Markus, 1991; King & Hicks, 
2007; Markus & Nurius, 1986), identity intentions (Gollwitzer, 1987) or self-discrepancies 
(Higgins, 1987) acknowledged aspects of volitional development in personality, only very 
recent approaches based on the Big Five taxonomy allowed for a more systematic investigation 
of such change goals (Baranski, Morse, & Dunlop, 2017; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Robinson 
et al., 2015). In general, studies using both questionnaires and open-ended answers 
demonstrated that change goals could be organized in terms of the broad Big Five domains 
(Baranski et al., 2017; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). Accordingly, people who, for example, 
wanted to increase their reliability were also likely to express change goals for other 
conscientiousness related attributes like perseverance or efficiency (Hudson & Roberts, 2014). 
This finding is in line with previous research on goal hierarchy (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Powers, 1973; Roberts & Wood, 2006), indicating that goals to change traits can be 
conceptualized as higher-order goals. Such higher-order goals on how to be (i.e., "be" goals; 
Powers, 1973) may in turn provide reference values for subordinate, smaller-scale goals on 
what to do in everyday life (i.e., "do" goals; Powers, 1973; see also Gollwitzer, 1996; Hoyle 
& Sherrill, 2006; Hudson & Fraley, 2015).  
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Note, however, that change goals can be both goals at the highest level in people’s goal 
hierarchy (e.g., forming an identity as part of the individuation process; Koepke & Denissen, 
2012) and means to even superordinate goals (e.g., becoming conscientious to graduate from 
university; Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Hennecke et al., 2014). In line with the latter 
suggestion, recent research takes a more functional perspective on volitional personality 
development (Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 2014; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). 
Specifically, as traits could serve as “useful means to desired ends” (D. Wood & Denissen, 
2015, p. 97) people may want to change their traits to meet superordinate goals like fulfilling 
their life goals (Bleidorn et al., 2010; Peters, 2015), social role expectations (D. Wood & 
Roberts, 2006) or broader needs (e.g., need for trust or status; Dweck, 2017). 
In the wake of growing interest in volitional personality development, current research 
showed that the vast majority of people wanted to increase in their traits, especially in 
conscientiousness and emotional stability (e.g., 92% of younger adults wanted to increase in 
conscientiousness; Hudson & Fraley, 2016b;  see also Hudson & Roberts, 2014). Importantly, 
goals to increase in traits were evident across the life-span with change goals being strongest 
in magnitude and prevalence in younger adults and, in general, somewhat weaker but still of 
considerable amount in older adults (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b). These findings highlight that 
people may want to actively take part in developing their personality, and especially want to 
increase in those traits that are socially desirable (Dunlop, Telford, & Morrison, 2012) and 
reflect maturity (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008). In addition, this research 
provides first hints on the importance of volitional aspects in the bigger picture of personality 
development across the entire life-span (for similar arguments on developmental goals, see 
Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Freund & Baltes, 2000; J. Heckhausen et al., 2010). 
However, by now, little is known on why people set such change goals. As already 
indicated by the above stated broad definition of goals, setting a goal to change requires that 
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such a change is considered desirable or necessary (Emmons, 1996; Hennecke et al., 2014; R. 
M. Ryan et al., 1996). Thus, in a first step, previous research examined whether people’s 
current standing in a trait is linked with their goals to change. As expected, change goals were 
stronger the lower people rated themselves in the corresponding trait (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 
2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). However, this research primarily investigated young college 
students, inviting the criticism that, especially in old age, this association could be weakened 
for example due to a more elaborated identity structure (for first hints in this direction, see 
Hudson & Fraley, 2016b). In addition, prior studies solely focused on self-rated traits. Hence, 
it remains an open question whether only people’s own trait ratings contribute to their change 
goals, or whether, for example, trait ratings of others play a role as well (e.g., by providing 
direct or indirect feedback on people’s trait levels). Furthermore, there is scarce knowledge on 
factors beyond the Big Five traits to predict change goals. First evidence merely indicated that 
change goals could additionally result from reduced satisfaction with life (Hudson & Fraley, 
2016a; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Kiecolt, 1994). Accordingly, a closer look at other 
characteristic adaptions (e.g., self-esteem, loneliness) could provide fruitful insights into why 
people set goals to change.  
 If change goals do indeed contribute to personality development across the life-span, 
they need to be translated into actual trait changes (Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 
2014). However, this translation may pose a particular challenge because change goals can be 
conceptualized as dynamic goals that imply no fixed end-point but require people to maintain 
certain trait related actions to keep up with their reference values as implied by their change 
goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973). Put differently, change goals do not only need 
to be implemented in one-time behavioral changes, but even more difficult, these changes have 
to become habitual (Hennecke et al., 2014; Magidson, Roberts, Collado-Rodriguez, & Lejuez, 
2014; W. Wood, 2017; W. Wood & Neal, 2007; for a more detailed introduction into relevant 
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processes, see section "1.5 Processes of Personality Development"). Nonetheless, there is first 
evidence that change goals may indeed boost trait development in the desired direction 
(Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a; see also Allan, Leeson & Martin, 2018; Martin, Oades, & 
Caputi, 2014). On the other hand, a more long-term study demonstrated that change goals did 
not foster trait changes, but even partly hindered such changes (Robinson et al., 2015). Thus, 
clarification on these mixed findings is needed. In addition, these first studies solely relied on 
student samples and self-rated traits, strongly limiting their generalizability. For example, it 
remains an open question whether goals to change can also be translated into changes in 
implicitly measured traits.  
Importantly, people may not pursue all of their change goals in equal measures. 
Instead, as already noted in classical models of motivation and planned action, people may 
assign different values and expectancies to their change goals (Atkinson, 1964; Eccles et al., 
1983; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; H. Heckhausen, 1977; Vroom, 
1964). In line with these models, a recent framework on self-regulated personality 
development suggests that change needs to be considered both desirable (i.e., higher valued) 
and feasible (i.e., expected to be within reach) to be successfully implemented (Hennecke et 
al., 2014; see also Peters, 2015). Thus, change goals with a higher importance (i.e., higher 
desirability) should benefit from a higher goal commitment and increased efforts for 
behavioral change (Hennecke et al., 2014; Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002, 2006), leading to 
more pronounced trait changes (for empirical research in favor of this idea, see Beattie, Hardy, 
& Woodman, 2015; Maier & Brunstein, 2001). In turn, change needs to be considered feasible 
(i.e., being not too difficult; Hennecke et al., 2014) so that people feel certain that success is 
possible (Eccles, 2009; Gollwitzer, 1990; Wigfield & Eccles, 1992). Too difficult goals may 
exceed people’s capabilities and undermine their motivation to take concrete steps in the 
desired direction (Hirst, 1988; Senko & Harackiewicz, 2005; see also Huber, 1985). Note, 
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however, that previous research has also shown that more difficult (i.e., less feasible) goals 
were linked with better performance, yet this research focused on maximal performance 
(Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002, 2006). As outlined above, change goals reflect dynamic goals 
that require to maintain performance (e.g., behavior) so that higher difficulty may indeed be 
obstructive (Carver & Scheier, 1998).3 Still, to date there is scarce empirical research to 
investigate the role of importance and feasibility for the successful implementation of change 
goals (for a recent exception focusing on the effects of an intervention, see Peters, 2015).  
In conclusion, although first evidence suggests that volitional aspects contribute to 
personality development across the life-span, at least two open questions need to be addressed. 
First, it remains largely unclear why people set goals to change. In particular, research needs 
to know whether setting goals to change is a purely subjective phenomenon and what factors 
beyond the Big Five traits contribute to people’s change goals. Second, clarification is needed 
on whether change goals do indeed affect change in different manifestations of traits (e.g., 
self-ratings and implicit measures) and which goal dimensions (e.g., importance, feasibility) 
foster or hinder the realization of change goals. Yet, these questions only address macro-
analytical factors of volitional personality development that are hardly able to provide in-depth 
explanations on how such development comes about. To provide a more fine-grained, micro-
analytical perspective, potential momentary processes that could contribute to both long-term 
personality development in general and volitional personality development in particular will 
be outlined next. 
  
                                                 
3 It is also possible that associations of feasibility and effective goal implementation are best described in terms 
of an inverted U-shaped function with a moderate feasibility providing the best success. However, in line with 
previous research (Hennecke et al., 2014) and for the sake of clarity, this dissertation assumes a linear association 
of higher feasibility and a more successful goal implementation. 
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1.5 Processes of Personality Development 
 As portrayed above, personality develops across the life-span and, in part, people may 
want to actively contribute to this development by setting change goals. However, the exact 
processes that underlie long-term personality development in general and volitional 
personality development in particular remain largely unclear. Basically, such processes refer 
to “a series of steps (elements, components, and actions) through which some phenomenon 
takes place or emerges” (Baumert et al., 2017, p. 527). In addition, processes imply a temporal 
perspective inasmuch as they require to classify development within a given referenced time-
period (Baumert et al., 2017). Thus, to explain personality development (i.e., the phenomenon 
taking place) on a micro-analytical level, research needs to determine short-term or smaller 
scaled (i.e., momentary) series of steps (i.e., processes) through which people’s trait-levels 
develop within a given time period. To address this complex task, a closer look at momentary 
manifestations of traits provides a promising starting point.  
 Although the Big Five taxonomy provides an elaborated and useful structural model 
of inter-individual differences, it has often been criticized to remain rather descriptive in 
explaining how these differences come into being and consequently, lack in-depth 
clarifications on how personality development may take place (Baumert et al., 2017; J. Block, 
1995; Denissen & Penke, 2008; Roberts, 2009). To move beyond merely describing inter-
individual differences on a superordinate trait level, more process-oriented models of 
personality emphasize that different trait levels manifest in different levels of trait-relevant 
momentary behaviors, thoughts, and feelings (i.e., momentary states; Cervone, 2005; Denissen 
& Penke, 2008; DeYoung, 2015; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015). Put 
differently, momentary states can be understood as occurrences of behavioral, cognitive and 
affective components (e.g., preparing a to-do list, staying focused on a paper) that closely 
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correspond to underlying dispositions (i.e., traits like conscientiousness), but refer to a shorter 
time period (e.g., minutes or hours; Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002; Fridhandler, 1986).  
Importantly, however, the association of traits and momentary states is frequently 
assumed to be bidirectional inasmuch as people may rely on their experienced momentary 
states to infer their latent trait levels (Back & Vazire, 2012; Buss & Craik, 1983; Fleeson & 
Gallagher, 2009). Hence, the vast majority of current frameworks conceptualizes repeated 
momentary states as the building blocks of long-term personality development (Back et al., 
2011; Dweck, 2017; Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 2017; Roberts & 
Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Although these frameworks differ in scope and focus, 
they generally agree that trait changes come about due to prolonged changes in momentary 
states that become habitual and, consequently, get ingrained into people’s underlying trait-
levels (Back et al., 2011; Dweck, 2017; Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 
2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Albeit repeated momentary states hold a key position in the above stated frameworks 
on personality development, they only qualify as single components of personality 
development (i.e., a step; Baumert et al., 2017), but not as processes per se. To form a series 
of steps (i.e., processes; Baumert et al., 2017) through which personality development may 
finally emerge, momentary states need to be further embedded into preceding and subsequent 
momentary experiences. Yet, most of the above-cited frameworks do not provide such an in-
depth consideration of the organization of momentary processes.  
The generic TESSERA model (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), however, addresses this issue 
by suggesting that momentary processes can be generalized as recursive sequences of 
Triggering situations, Expectancies, States & State Expressions (i.e., momentary states), and 
ReActions (i.e., TESSERA sequences, for a detailed description of TESSERA components 
and their associations, see Chapter IV). For example, due to the TESSERA framework, 
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experiencing a triggering situation (e.g., entering one’s office in the morning) may elicit a 
clear expectation on one’s behavior (e.g., need to organize one’s daily tasks) that is succeeded 
by a specific state or state expression (e.g., preparing a to-to list) finally leading to a reaction 
(e.g., starting the day with confidence; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thus, within the TESSERA 
framework, momentary states do not simply stand for themselves, but are conceptualized to 
be embedded in cascades of further momentary experiences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Moreover, environmental (e.g., physical surroundings, cultural contexts) or individual factors 
(e.g., traits, goals) should foster but also constrain the experience of both triggering situations 
and states and state expressions (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In turn, long-term personality 
development is conceptualized to be the result of the repeated experience of TESSERA 
sequences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Importantly, the TESSERA framework accounts in a 
unique way for development in different manifestations of traits with reflective processes (e.g., 
conscious remembering or reappraising) translating TESSERA sequences into long-term 
development of explicit representations of traits whereas associative processes (e.g., implicit 
or reinforcement learning) underlie the development of implicit representations of traits 
(Wrzus & Roberts, 2017, see Chapter IV). Due to its explicitness, the TESSERA framework 
is also able to specify barriers of personality change (e.g., TESSERA sequences are not 
repeated, TESSERA sequences are reinterpreted to fit existing trait perceptions; Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017).  
Yet, the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) still lacks empirical 
investigation, especially regarding the generalizability of momentary processes within 
TESSERA sequences. In addition, although there is sophisticated evidence that people’s trait 
levels are indeed linked with subsequent experiences of trait-relevant situations (e.g., 
Rauthmann, Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2015b; Wrzus, Wagner, & Riediger, 2016) and states 
(e.g., Back et al., 2009; Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006), there are only scarce hints on 
Chapter I: General Introduction  
   
22 
 
the importance of states for subsequent trait changes (Hutteman, Nestler, Wagner, Egloff, & 
Back, 2015; Wrzus, Luong, Wagner, & Riediger, 2018a). It also needs to be clarified whether 
reflective processes do indeed translate TESSERA sequences into development of explicit 
representations of traits (but see Pals, 2006). Furthermore, previous research exclusively 
focused on development of explicit representations of traits, so that knowledge on the 
development of implicit representations of traits and its underlying processes is still lacking.  
Importantly, the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) also acknowledges 
volitional aspects of personality development by specifying how people’s change goals may 
affect their experiences of specific TESSERA components. In particular, the TESSERA 
framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) assumes that change goals foster the selection of such 
situations that facilitate the experience of goal-relevant states. In addition, change goals should 
directly encourage people to show goal-relevant behavior, thoughts and feelings (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017; but see also Carver & Scheier, 2014; T. A. Ryan, 1970). Both pathways are 
consistent with a self-regulatory perspective on personality development suggesting that, to 
achieve self-regulated (i.e., volitional) trait change, people need to invest self-control or 
willpower to engage in goal relevant situations in which they replace their now unwanted 
behavior, thoughts and feelings with more desired states (Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et 
al., 2014; Hoyle & Sherrill, 2006; Morf, 2006). In this sense, change goals (e.g., becoming 
more reliable) may offer reference values for subordinate goals that cover situation selection 
and desired behavior (e.g., “do”- goals like not joining a party in order to finish a seminar 
paper before a due date; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Pervin, 
1982; Carver & Scheier, 1998). These reference values may then be recursively compared to 
inputs (e.g., perceived progress of a seminar paper; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2003). As long 
as this comparison indicates discrepancy between the reference value and the input, people 
should invest behavioral resources, time and skill (e.g., hitting the library to accelerate one’s 
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progress) to get closer to this reference value (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Carver & 
Scheier, 1998, 2003; J. Heckhausen et al., 2010).  
However, there is still little research that links change goals with the experience of goal 
relevant situations (but see Stevenson & Clegg, 2011) or states (for somewhat inconclusive 
findings compare Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; for research focusing on 
effects of an intervention, see Peters, 2015) as proposed by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus 
& Roberts, 2017). In addition, it remains an open question whether more important and more 
feasible change goals are accompanied by increased efforts for their implementation (e.g., by 
experiencing goal relevant situations and states; Hennecke et al., 2014; D. Wood & Denissen, 
2015). 
1.6 Research Questions and Dissertation Outline 
 Broadly spoken, this dissertation aims to fill research gaps regarding both macro-
analytical factors (i.e., environmental factors and volitional aspects) and micro-analytical 
processes of personality development. As outlined above, research on macro-analytical factors 
of personality development needs to be extended in at least three domains.  
First, it remains unclear whether age differences in personality development diminish 
under similar contextual (i.e., environmental) conditions. To tackle this question, Chapter II 
examines developmental trajectories in younger and older adults who engaged in a comparable 
life transition, namely academic studies. In addition, students who have just started to engage 
in this life transition (i.e., freshmen) are expected to show stronger trait changes than more 
advanced students. Furthermore, trait changes in general are suggested to be more pronounced 
in students compared to non-students. Finally, previous research on life transitions merely 
relied on self-rated traits, leaving open the question how other manifestations of personality 
(e.g., other-rated or implicitly measured traits) develop over the course of a life transition.  
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Second, a comprehensive examination of factors that contribute to people’s 
engagement in volitional personality development is still missing. Specifically and in line with 
previous research, Chapter III investigates whether lower current trait levels would be 
associated with stronger change goals in both younger and older adults. In addition, 
clarification is needed on whether people’s change goals also depend on whether their self-
rated traits agree with ratings provided by meaningful others (i.e., their reputation), and 
particularly if change goals are strongest when both perspectives agree on lower current trait 
levels. Finally, this dissertation extends previous research by examining characteristic 
adaptations beyond the Big Five traits (e.g., self-esteem, loneliness) to predict change goals. 
Third, in the light of previous inconsistent findings, research needs to know if people 
are indeed able to change their personality as desired, if potential changes can be observed in 
different manifestations of traits (e.g., self-ratings, implicitly measured traits) and what factors 
(e.g., importance, feasibility) foster the implementation of such change goals (see Chapter IV).  
As empirical research on micro-analytical processes of personality development is yet 
at an early stage, recent theoretical suggestions still await empirical examination. As such, in 
line with suggestions made by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), Chapter 
IV first investigates whether momentary processes can be generalized as TESSERA 
sequences. Moreover, both people’s current traits and change goals should be linked with 
experiencing trait-relevant momentary situations and states. Finally, research has yet to clarify 
whether momentary experiences (e.g., states) contribute to subsequent trait development and 
how these experiences are translated into development in different representations of traits 
(e.g., self-rated or implicitly measured traits). 
To investigate the outlined research questions, a multi-method, longitudinal 
measurement burst study was conducted that included two age groups of education-matched 
younger and older adults who partly engaged in the transition to college. Over a period of two 
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years, participants answered four extensive personality assessments (T1-T4) with T1, T2 and 
T3 being placed six months apart, and T3 and T4 being placed twelve months apart. 
Momentary processes of personality development were assessed by five daily diary phases of 
10 days each (D1-D5).  
In line with the above stated research questions, the remainder of this dissertation 
comprises four chapters with Chapter II and III focusing on macro-analytical factors of 
personality development. Specifically, Chapter II investigates personality development in 
similar contextual conditions (i.e., environments) while Chapter III comprehensively 
examines predictors of volitional personality development (i.e., change goals). In turn, Chapter 
IV combines a macro- and a micro-analytical perspective to investigate whether people can 
change their personality as desired and which processes contribute to personality development 
in general and volitional personality development in particular. Finally, Chapter V provides 
an integration and general discussion of this dissertation’s findings. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II: 
Do Age Differences in Personality Development Diminish Under Similar Contextual 
Conditions? Longitudinal Evidence from Self-Ratings, Other-Ratings, and Implicit 
Measures in Younger and Older Students4 
 
                                                 
4 This chapter is based on the following manuscript: 
 
Wrzus, C., Quintus, M., & Egloff, B. (2018). Do age differences in personality development diminish under 
similar contextual conditions? Longitudinal evidence from self-ratings, other-ratings, and implicit measures in 
younger and older students. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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2.1. Introduction 
The most pronounced personality trait development occurs in young adulthood 
compared with later periods in adult life (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a). 
Part of the increases in emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness have been 
linked to the experience of life transitions that typically occur during young adulthood, such 
as engaging in a serious romantic relationship (Finn, Mitte, & Neyer, 2015; Neyer & 
Asendorpf, 2001) or entering college or the workforce (Bleidorn et al., 2016; Lüdtke et al., 
2011). However, research has yet to identify whether personality development is less 
pronounced after young adulthood (a) because greater environmental stability contributes to 
smaller mean-level changes among older adults (Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Hutteman et al., 
2014; Reitz & Staudinger, 2017) or (b) because older adults’ personality is more established 
(i.e., less malleable; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Costa, Herbst, McCrae, & Siegler, 2000). 
To test these competing but not exclusive explanations of greater context stability or 
greater trait stability with older age, we applied a quasi-experimental design to examine 
whether age differences in personality change would be less pronounced when younger and 
older people experienced a similar life transition such as college. In addition, because nearly 
all longitudinal studies on adult personality development only have used self-ratings of 
personality traits (i.e., focused on personality as perceived by the person him- or herself), we 
investigated whether personality development would follow the same trajectories when other 
perspectives were considered (e.g., ratings from knowledgeable others, implicit 
representations). The results should help clarify whether trait development is mainly explicit 
and subjective or also perceived by others and/or apparent in implicit representations of traits. 
Next, we briefly describe how Big Five traits develop with respect to mean-level 
changes from emerging adulthood to old age, and subsequently address the role of life 
transitions for personality development. We then highlight the scarce findings on longitudinal 
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personality development from the perspective of others and refer to implicit representations 
of personality traits as an interesting additional route for studying personality development. 
2.1.1 Big Five Development across Adulthood. 
Over the last decade, researchers have accumulated empirical evidence that during 
young adulthood, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness increase on 
average (Bleidorn & Schwaba, 2017; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). 
By contrast, during middle and later adulthood, most Big Five traits show little mean-level 
change (Costa et al., 2000; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). Only in old 
age, that is, in people’s late 70s and beyond, most Big Five traits seem to decrease again (Lucas 
& Donnellan, 2011; Mueller, Wagner, & Gerstorf, 2017; Wagner, Ram, Smith, & Gerstorf, 
2016; Wortman et al., 2012). 
The differential patterns of change and continuity during young, middle, and later 
adulthood have been attributed to biological and contextual changes and continuity, 
respectively (Bleidorn, 2015; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Specifically, 
it has been argued that the general development of Big Five traits toward greater maturity in 
young adulthood largely results from mastering age-normative transitions and investing in 
age-normative roles, such as stable romantic partnerships and work responsibilities (Bleidorn, 
2015; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). By contrast, little mean-level change during middle and later 
adulthood may result from personality traits becoming more consolidated—as increases in 
rank-order stability have also suggested (Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; 
Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).  
Still, greater rank-order stability does not equal greater trait stability because rank-
order and mean-level changes can be largely independent, and more important, the stability of 
the context is not controlled for in these kinds of studies. Yet, family and work environments 
have been discussed as remaining rather steady over the years of middle and later adulthood, 
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suggesting greater context stability with age (Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Hutteman et al., 2014; 
Reitz & Staudinger, 2017), which could contribute to greater mean-level and rank-order 
stability. Indeed, the majority of life transitions occur in young adulthood, whereas a relative 
continuity in context and social relationships characterizes middle adulthood (Hutteman et al., 
2014; Specht et al., 2011). 
2.1.2 Life transitions as catalysts of Big Five development. 
Personality development has been repeatedly and reliably linked to life transitions, 
such as engaging in a serious relationship and starting college or work (Bleidorn & Schwaba, 
2017; Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007). For example, engaging in a serious partnership in young 
adulthood triggers or co-occurs with increases in emotional stability (Costa et al., 2000; Finn 
et al., 2015; Neyer & Asendorpf, 2001; Wagner et al., 2015). Although engaging in a first 
serious partnership has been studied repeatedly, this transition is not well-suited for comparing 
different age groups due to its strong normative timing (Havighurst, 1967; Lehnart et al., 
2010). The transition from school to college is another important transition in young adulthood 
(Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011). Given the demands of lifelong learning and the 
substantial number of people older than 50 engaging in various extension studies or training 
(41% in Germany; Adults Education Survey, 2016), college is a context that is well-suited for 
studying personality development in different age groups. 
Among young adults, the transition to college and the experiences people have during 
their college years seem to trigger or co-occur with personality development, that is, increases 
in agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience (Table 1; see Bleidorn et al., 
2016 for a review). In addition, the increases in agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
openness to experience seem to be more pronounced at the beginning of college compared 
with the later college years (Lüdtke et al., 2011). Increases in emotional stability also occur 
during this time (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998; Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Robins, 
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Noftle, Trzesniewski, & Roberts, 2005). Yet, this increase may be typical for young adulthood 
in general and might thus not be closely tied to experiences in college because same-age people 
who enter the workforce also experience similar increases in emotional stability (Lüdtke et al., 
2011). Increases in emotional stability may also be attributable to engaging in a serious 
partnership, which most people also experience at this time (Neyer & Asendorpf, 2001). 
Extraversion seems to be stable when people enter college (Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 
2011; Robins et al., 2005), although one study observed general increases in extraversion, 
decreases in shyness, and increases in sociability, all of which were related to the amount of 
interaction with peers during the first months of college (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Due to 
the differences between the studies regarding the time between assessments, the amount of 
standardized mean-level changes has been found to vary. Still, most studies indicated that 
openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness increase when young adults 
enter college (Table 1). 
The transition to college seems to provide a context that fosters increases in openness, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness through specific behavioral opportunities and demands, 
such as meeting new people, learning new things, and completing college tasks. For example, 
the more students studied and the better grades they got (i.e., perhaps due to studying), the 
more conscientiousness increased in previous studies (Bleidorn, 2012; Robins et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the more students interacted with other students and had good friends, the more 
extraversion, specifically sociability, increased (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998; Robins et al., 
2005). Typically, intensive learning and getting along with new people may occur less often 
in middle adulthood, but when they occur, they may nonetheless result in increases in 
openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Thus, the transition to college seems well-
suited for studying whether age per se or also the context matters for personality development. 
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Table 1 
Overview of Previous Findings on Personality Development During the Transition to College 
(Mean-Level Change in Cohen’s d) 
Source Sample Time C A O E ES 
Asendorpf 
& Wilpers, 
1998 
N = 237 
Mage = 20.1 yrs 
73% women,  
T1 1995:  
2nd college week, 
duration: 1.5 years 
-.11 .04 -.10 .17* .38* 
Bleidorn, 
2012 
Sample 2, N = 360,  
Mage = 20.4 yrs 
66% women 
T1 2009: 
last high school year 
duration: 1 year 
.34* .24* .25* -.05 .06 
Lüdtke et 
al., 2011a 
N = 1,908 
Mage = 19.5 yrs 
62% women,  
T1 2002:  
last high school year 
duration: 2 years  
(+ 2yrs) 
.32* 
(.18*) 
.32* 
(.16*) 
.20* 
(.02) 
.08 
(.01) 
.27* 
(-.03) 
Robins et 
al., 2005 
N = 295 
59% women 
T1 1992:  
1st college week 
duration: 4 years 
.27* .44* .22* .03 .49* 
Note. C = conscientiousness, A = agreeableness, O = openness to experience, E = extraversion, 
ES = emotional stability. Coefficients are longitudinal mean-level changes in Cohen’s d. a 
Lüdtke et al. (2011) examined change over two consecutive 2-year periods. The coefficients 
in the table refer to the change that occurred during the transition to college, whereas the 
coefficients in parentheses refer to change during the later 2 years of college.  
 
2.1.3 Different manifestations of traits: Self-ratings, other-ratings, and implicit 
measures. 
So far, personality development when entering college has been examined only with 
self-ratings, that is, by focusing on the propositional representations people consciously hold 
about their traits (Back et al., 2009). Yet, personality traits are often conceptualized as latent 
factors that manifest in different ways: (a) propositional self-knowledge, (b) associative, 
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implicit self-knowledge, (c) momentary behavior, thoughts, and feelings, (d) others’ 
knowledge about a person’s past behavior, thoughts, and feelings (i.e., a person’s reputation), 
and (e) physiological changes associated with behavior, thoughts, and feelings (Allport, 1961; 
Back & Vazire, 2012; Rauthmann, 2017).  
Studies on age differences in personality traits, which have examined manifestations 
other than propositional self-knowledge, are rare, and usually these studies have not taken life 
transitions into account. For example, in line with self-ratings of Big Five traits, other-ratings 
have revealed similar age-related differences in the Big Five when young and middle-aged 
adults have been compared (McCrae et al., 2004; McCrae & Terracciano, 2005). Also, among 
adolescents and young adults, age differences in personality traits were generally similar for 
self- and other-ratings with small divergences regarding timing or magnitude (Rohrer, Egloff, 
Kosinski, Stillwell, & Schmukle, 2017).  
A few longitudinal studies have examined personality development during adolescence 
from the perspective of the adolescents and their families (Branje, van Lieshout, & Gerris, 
2007; Göllner et al., 2017; Luan, Hutteman, Denissen, Asendorpf, & van Aken, 2017). 
Although these studies covered similar age ranges (12-16 years), results were mixed, and in 
general, adolescents (i.e., self-ratings) and their parents (i.e., other-ratings) disagreed about 
whether certain Big Five traits increased, decreased, or remained unchanged. For example, 
adolescents perceived themselves as stable in emotional stability, whereas parents perceived 
an increase (Göllner et al., 2017; Luan et al., 2017). Such results indicate that at least the 
parents of adolescents may perceive personality development differently than the adolescents 
do themselves. It remains an open question whether the deviation stems from the specifics of 
parent-child dyads or from adolescence or whether other-ratings generally reveal longitudinal 
patterns that diverge from those identified with self-ratings. 
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To our knowledge, associative or implicit representations of Big Five traits have not 
yet been examined longitudinally. The small number of previous longitudinal studies 
employing implicit measures have focused on implicit attitudes (Colder et al., 2014; Field, 
Lawson, & Banerjee, 2008; Ramsey & Sekaquaptewa, 2011; van Ryn et al., 2015) or other 
implicit representations of the self (e.g., self-esteem, van Tuijl, de Jong, Sportel, de Hullu, & 
Nauta, 2014; being depressed, Elgersma, Glashouwer, Bockting, Penninx, & de Jong, 2013; 
tendencies to injure the self, Glenn, Kleiman, Cha, Nock, & Prinstein, 2016). Furthermore, 
these studies did not examine whether propositional and implicit representations of attitudes, 
self-esteem, or being depressed tend to change in the same direction. 
Previous work on short-term changes in attitudes, often in single laboratory sessions, 
has suggested that explicit and implicit attitudes often change separately, and corresponding 
change occurs only under specific conditions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Gawronski 
& LeBel, 2008). For example, when implicit attitudes are altered experimentally through 
repeated exposure during unintentional learning, explicit attitudes can remain unaffected 
(Gawronski & LeBel, 2008). By contrast, when people focus on their feelings, correspondence 
between implicit and explicit representations of attitudes or personality traits can be enhanced 
(Egloff, Weck, & Schmukle, 2008; Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Hofmann, Gschwendner, & 
Schmitt, 2005b). Yet, such research has generally examined attitude change over a few 
minutes (i.e., within an experimental session), and therefore, the generalizability to implicit 
and explicit personality change over several months and years remains open. 
2.1.4 Current research. 
In this longitudinal multi-method study, we contrasted for the first time the effects of 
age and context on personality development. Since previous studies reported generally 
consistent patterns of trait changes during the transition to college during young adulthood 
(i.e., increases in conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness, and emotional stability, Table 
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1), we formulated trait-general instead of trait-specific hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that 
age differences in personality trait changes would be less pronounced when younger and older 
people experienced a similar life transition such as college and thereby experienced similar 
contextual conditions (H1). In line with the study on young adults that reported stronger 
increases in Big Five traits during the first two years of college compared to the next two 
college years (Lüdtke et al., 2011), we hypothesized that personality change is more 
pronounced for freshmen compared to more advanced students (H2). In addition and hardly 
ever accomplished in research on personality development, we included age- and education-
matched control groups to distinguish change associated with the life transition from 
normative change, which typically occurs in the respective age periods in control groups. 
Thus, we further hypothesized that personality trait changes are more positive among students 
compared age- and education matched people who do not enter college (H3). To summarize, 
the more younger and older students differ in personality traits changes, the more the trait-
stability explanation is favored; the more older students differ from older control group 
participants in trait changes, the more the context explanation is favored.  
Second, we examined whether previously observed increases in self-ratings of 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience, and emotional stability (Bleidorn, 
2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Robins et al., 2005) would manifest in implicit representations and 
reputations (i.e., how knowledgeable others rate the person) of these traits in a similar way. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous longitudinal study on personality development in 
adulthood has employed implicit measures or other-ratings. Nonetheless, other-ratings and 
implicit measures have been successfully and validly used in age-heterogeneous samples 
(Allik, de Vries, & Realo, 2016; McCrae & Terracciano, 2005; Wrzus, Egloff, & Riediger, 
2017a).  
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To address these hypotheses, we conducted a longitudinal study with three assessments 
each spaced half a year apart. Although generally, personality change is more pronounced 
after more time has passed (Roberts et al., 2006a), previous panel studies, which could only 
assess trait changes every four or five years, typically called for shorter assessment intervals 
to obtain better knowledge on the timing and shape of change (Luhmann et al., 2014). In 
addition, earlier studies examining Big Five changes among young adults during the transition 
to college observed significant mean-level changes after one to two years (Asendorpf & 
Wilpers, 1998; Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011). A total of 380 younger and older 
participants had just entered college, had been engaged in college studies for some time, or 
belonged to the age- and education-matched control groups. In contrast to previous studies on 
personality development in adulthood, we employed other-ratings and implicit measures in 
addition to self-ratings to examine the generalizability of personality development to different 
manifestations or measures of personality traits. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants. 
The present longitudinal study included 380 participants5 from five subgroups: 
younger freshmen (n = 114; Mage = 21.1 years, SD = 1.8; 76% female), younger advanced 
students (n = 112; Mage = 22.2, SD = 1.7; 76% female), younger controls (i.e., nonstudents; n 
= 27; Mage = 23.3, SD = 3.9; 70% female), older students (n = 64; Mage = 67.5, SD = 4.5; 64% 
female), and older controls (i.e., nonstudents; n = 63; Mage = 68.0, SD = 6.1; 73% female). To 
compare age-differential effects of the transition to college, we aimed to compare younger and 
older freshmen with younger and older advanced students as well as with younger and older 
nonstudents, that is, we intended to apply a 2 (age) by 3 (student status) factorial design. 
                                                 
5 During recruitment, freshmen were not invited if they had begun studying a different subject before (i.e., already 
experienced the transition to college). However, two freshmen with previous college education took part 
inadvertently and were excluded from the current sample. 
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However, for older students, a categorization into freshmen and advanced students was not 
available because students did not follow a strict curriculum. Hence, we combined the older 
students into one group and used the number of semesters as a control variable.  
Before and during the first few weeks of the fall semester 2015, we recruited 
participants via local newspapers, flyers in public places (cafés, drug stores), university 
mailing lists, and from nonpsychology introductory courses for younger and older students at 
the University of Mainz. The University of Mainz offers a program for adults older than 50 
years with several lectures and courses from different disciplines. The courses are highly 
similar to the regular courses taken by younger students, and often taught by the same 
professors. We specifically recruited younger and older students from the same faculties and 
fields (e.g., philology, social sciences, see below). All participants had to have completed their 
secondary school education (German Abitur) to ensure a similar educational background. As 
a consequence, the younger control group of people with secondary school education (i.e., 
Abitur), who do not enter college, was smaller than the other groups because most young 
people with Abitur enter college nowadays, as we discuss in section “2.4.3 Limitations and 
future directions.”. In addition, the younger freshmen were required to have entered college 
for the first time, and the older participants had to be retired from their previous job to 
eliminate influences of work experiences on personality development.  
The younger students were primarily studying for a Bachelor of Arts degree (e.g., 37% 
philology or philosophy; 22% social sciences; 11% history or cultural studies; 6% law and 
economics). Most of the younger advanced students were in their third semester (78%; 13% 
second semester; 9% fourth or fifth semester). Most of the older students were attending 
courses on philology and philosophy (45%), history and cultural studies (25%), or law and 
economics (5%). Among the older students, 27% were in their first or second semester, 39% 
in their third to sixth semester, and 34% in their seventh to eleventh semester. Based on a 
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priori power analyses to detect longitudinal changes of d = 0.2 and differences in change 
between the two age groups of d = 0.10 with an intended power of .95, and an anticipated 
attrition rate of 10%, we aimed at 200 to 250 participants per age group. We reached this 
number for young adults, but had to stop recruitment for logistic reasons among older students 
and the control groups (i.e., despite much effort during the weeks before and during the 
semester started, the number of interested people among the target groups was very low). 
2.2.2 Procedure. 
T1 to T3 assessments. The present study consisted of three assessment periods that 
were conducted at the beginning of the fall semester 2015 (Time 1 = T1), at the beginning of 
the spring semester 2016 (Time 2 = T2), and at the beginning of the fall semester 2016 (Time 
3 = T3). At T1, participants provided informed consent, answered online questionnaires on 
personality traits at home, and came to the laboratory over the next few days to complete 
further questionnaires and tests (e.g., Big Five Implicit Association Tests). The assessments 
were part of a larger study (see also Quintus, Egloff, & Wrzus, 2017) and a complete list of 
measures is available at osf.io/qp4az/?view_only=d1374fa304924303899c13709e4aea3e. At 
T2, all assessments were conducted in the laboratory. All laboratory assessments were 
administered in small age-homogeneous group sessions on personal computers. T3 took place 
at home as an online assessment because participants were familiar with the procedure and the 
instruments at that point. Participants received a reimbursement of 53€ for completing T1 to 
T3 and partial reimbursement if they left the study early. The ethics committee at the 
University of Mainz approved the study (approval #2015-JGU-psychEK-012).  
Obtaining other-ratings. At the end of the laboratory assessment at T1, participants 
named up to two persons (e.g., spouses, friends, or family members) who could provide ratings 
of the participants’ personality at each wave. Other-ratings were obtained using online 
questionnaires or paper-pencil questionnaires if no Internet access was available. At T1, a total 
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of 612 other people provided personality ratings of 106 younger freshmen, 107 younger 
advanced students, 22 younger nonstudents, 53 older students, and 51 older nonstudents. Thus, 
at T1, of 380 participants, 73% were rated by two other persons, 17% were rated by only one 
person, and 10% were not rated by other persons. The mean age of the raters was 28.1 years 
(SD = 13.6) for younger freshmen, 27.6 years (SD = 11.1) for younger advanced students, 31.0 
years (SD = 12.5) for younger nonstudents, 60.2 years (SD = 14.1) for older students, and 58.6 
years (SD = 14.4) for older nonstudents. Most of the raters were friends (45%), family 
members (30%), or spouses (15%). The five study groups did not differ in the types of 
relationships, χ²(8, 544) = 6.35, p = .61. Participants and raters had usually (i.e., 80% of raters) 
been acquainted for more than 3 years. Participants could nominate new raters at T2 or T3 if 
previous raters were no longer available, yet, out of 612 raters at T1, 85% participated at T2 
and 71% participated at T3. At each time point T1, T2 or T3, we averaged the other-ratings if 
two ratings were available to form a composite score for each participant. All raters provided 
informed consent at T1 and received a compensation of 10€ for each rating at T1, T2, and T3.  
2.2.3 Measures. 
Explicit self-ratings of Big Five personality traits. Participants answered the German 
version of the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999; Lang, Lüdtke, & 
Asendorpf, 2001) to provide self-ratings of the personality traits conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, openness to experience, extraversion, and emotional stability. Agreement with 
items was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The scale reliabilities were satisfactory at all assessments: T1 (average α = .83, range α = .73 
to .89, average ω = .88, range ω = .81 to .93), T2 (average α = .81, range α = .72 to .88, average 
ω = .86, range ω = .79 to .91), and T3 (average α = .82, range α = .75 to .88, average ω = .87, 
range ω = .81 to .92). 
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Other-ratings of Big Five personality traits. Participants’ acquaintances and family 
members also answered the German version of the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & 
Srivastava, 1999; Lang et al., 2001) using a 7-point scale ranging from a 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). For the other-rated traits, the scale reliabilities were also satisfactory at 
all assessments: T1 (average α = .85, range α = .81 to .87, average ω = .90, range ω = .87 to 
.92), T2 (average α = .86, range α = .81 to .87, average ω = .90, range ω = .87 to .92), and T3 
(average α = .85, range α = .84 to .87, average ω = .91, range ω = .90 to .92). The agreement 
between the two other-raters ranged from ICC(1,2) = .30 (agreeableness) to .46 
(conscientiousness) at T1, from ICC(1,2) = .19 (emotional stability) to .42 (openness) at T2, 
and from ICC(1,2) = .25 (agreeableness) to .41 (extraversion) at T3. 
Implicit Big Five personality traits. To measure participants’ implicit Big Five 
personality traits, we applied a Big Five Implicit Association Test (i.e., IAT; Schmukle, Back, 
& Egloff, 2008). Following standard IAT procedures (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Richetin, Costantini, Perugini, & Schönbrodt, 2015), the Big Five IAT 
consisted of five blocks of 20 trials each in Practice Blocks 1, 2, and 4, and 60 trials in the 
combined Test Blocks 3 and 5. To lower the burden on participants, we presented Practice 
Block 1 for only the first personality trait (Schmukle et al., 2008). Target categories labeled 
me and others consisted of five stimuli each (e.g., I, myself, their, your) and were identical for 
each personality trait. Attribute categories also contained five stimuli each and were labeled 
differently for each Big Five trait. For example, the labels for extraversion were extraversion 
versus introversion (e.g., stimuli: talkative, outgoing, passive, shy), and the labels for openness 
were openness versus narrow-mindedness (e.g., stimuli: imaginative, interested, limited, 
indifferent; Schmukle et al., 2008). Within each block, stimuli were presented in a randomized 
order in the center of the screen and repeated when all stimuli had been displayed (i.e., repeated 
sampling without replacement). In the combined Test Blocks 3 and 5, the target and the 
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attribute stimuli alternated. Participants sorted the stimuli to the left or right categories using 
the answer keys “D” and “K,” which are on the left and right sides of the German keyboard, 
respectively. For the whole task, participants were instructed to leave their left and right index 
fingers on the keys. When participants made a mistake, a red “X” appeared on the center of 
the screen, and the next item appeared only after participants pressed the correct key. Split-
half reliabilities were mostly satisfactory at T1 (average α = .74, range α = .68 to .79), T2 
(average α = .75, range α = .71 to .80), and T3 (average α = .73, range α = .65 to .83). 
Life events. At each time point, participants indicated whether certain life events (e.g., 
new relationship, new job, death of family member) had occurred (0 = no, 1 = within the last 
3 months, 2 = within the last 4 to 6 months), and if yes, how pleasant or unpleasant the event 
was (1 = very negative to 7 = very positive). The list consisted of 21 events, which were 
adapted from Lüdtke et al. (2011) and Sarason, Johnson, and Siegel (1978). 
2.2.4 Attrition analyses. 
To assess sample selectivity due to attrition, we compared T1 participants who also 
completed T2 and T3 (n = 325) with those who participated at only one or two assessments (n 
= 55). Participants who remained in the study did not differ from participants who dropped 
out with respect to gender, χ²(1, 380) = 0.17, p = .68, self-rated Big Five traits (range ds -0.25 
to 0.33, all ps > .07), other-rated Big Five traits (range ds: -0.06 to 0.26, ps > .16), or implicit 
Big Five traits (range ds: -0.26 to 0.34, all ps > .06) with two exceptions: Participants who 
remained in the study were rated by others as significantly more conscientious than 
participants who dropped out after T1, d = 0.59, p < .01, or after T2, d = 0.57, p = .011, and 
showed lower implicit extraversion than participants who dropped out after T1, d = -0.31, p = 
.05. Also, participants who remained in the study were somewhat older than participants who 
dropped out, d = 0.29, p = .03. In addition, drop-out differed across the study groups, χ²(4, 
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380) = 10.36, p = .03, with participants in the younger control group being slightly more likely 
to drop out than expected (z = 2.07). 
We also tested whether the assumption that data were missing at random and not related to 
participant characteristics was generally supported (MCAR = missing completely at random; 
Little, 1988). Using all items of every assessment from T1 to T3 used in the analyses, we found 
that the MCAR assumption was supported because the test for “nonrandomness” was not 
significant, Χ²(15682) = 15629.19, p = .62. Accordingly, we applied the full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation in the analyses (see section “2.2.5 Analytic 
strategy.”). 
2.2.5 Analytic strategy. 
IAT scoring algorithm. To assess implicit personality traits at each time point, we 
computed D2 scores according to current guidelines (Greenwald et al., 2003; Richetin et al., 
2015; Wrzus et al., 2017a). We used built-in error penalties so that we assessed the reaction 
time for each trial until the correct key was pressed, and we winsorized the reaction times that 
were < 300 ms and > 10,000 ms. Then each participant’s mean reaction time from Combined 
Block 3 was subtracted from the mean reaction time from Combined Block 5 and divided by 
the pooled standard deviation of the combined blocks. Finally, per trait and assessment we 
winsorized one to five outliers in IAT scores (i.e., > M +3SD) to the respective mean value 
plus 3 SD.6 
Latent change modeling. We examined interindividual differences in intraindividual 
changes for each Big Five trait using latent neighbor change models (McArdle, 1988; McArdle 
& Hamagami, 2001; McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994; Steyer et al., 1997; Steyer, Partchev, & 
Shanahan, 2000) in structural equation frameworks with the lavaan package version 0.5-23 in 
                                                 
6 Conscientiousness 1 score at T1, 3 scores at T2, 1 score at T3; agreeableness: 1 score at T1, 4 scores at T2, 2 
scores at T3; openness 3 scores at T1 and T2; extraversion no scores; emotional stability 5 scores at T1, 2 
scores at T2, 1 score at T3. 
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R version 3.3.3 (R Core Team, 2017; Rosseel, 2012). The code is available at 
osf.io/qp4az/?view_only=d1374fa304924303899c13709e4aea3e. We computed latent 
neighbor change models (Geiser, 2011; Steyer et al., 2000) because we were interested in the 
latent changes from one time point to another, which is slightly more flexible than latent 
growth models in modeling nonlinear change. In the neighbor change version of latent change 
models (i.e., LCM), the latent factors at T2 are decomposed into the initial intercepts at T1 
and the differences between T2 and T1, whereas the latent factors at T3 are decomposed into 
the initial intercept of T1, the difference between T2 and T1, and the difference between T3 
and T2 (Figure 1). As indicated by Figure 1, we specified occasion-specific measurement 
models where multiple manifest indicators determined the occasion-specific latent trait to 
control for unreliability (i.e., measurement error) in the manifest variables (Steyer et al., 1997; 
Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999). Another benefit of LC modeling is that all latent variables 
implemented in the model can serve as endogenous and exogenous variables (Steyer et al., 
2000). Thus, we were able to examine whether the study groups differed in individual change 
(i.e., the variance of the latent change variables) as well as whether the intercept and change 
parameters covaried.  
We tested differences between study groups using contrasts because compared to 
multigroup models, the contrast approach offered a higher statistical power due to including 
the entire sample (n = 380) in each model. In addition, the use of contrast codes allowed testing 
specific hypotheses for combined groups (e.g., a comparison of all younger students with all 
older students). The contrasts were entered simultaneously into the models and coded as 
follows to achieve orthogonal contrasts (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003): younger (0.4 
for all younger participants) versus older adults (-0.6 for all older participants); younger 
freshmen (0.5) versus younger advanced students (-0.5); older students (0.5) versus older 
controls (-0.5). Thus, we specified 15 models (5 traits × 3 manifestations: self-ratings, other-
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ratings, and IAT scores, Table A1) and included all contrasts simultaneously into the models 
to achieve orthogonal contrasts, to account for multiple testing, and to rely on the complete 
sample. Note that for each contrast more than 100 data points were available, that is the 
analysis were not based on the group sizes. 
In general, we specified separate models for each trait and each manifestation. In 
addition, we computed correlated change models to explore common change among different 
manifestations of traits. Specifically, for each trait, latent intercepts and change scores of self-
ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores were modeled simultaneously in one model per trait and 
were allowed to correlate. The results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. All latent 
change models were computed using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard 
errors and scaled test statistics. Missing values for personality trait variables were treated with 
the FIML method implemented in lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Latent neighbor change model of the Big Five traits. Latent traits from self- and 
other-ratings were estimated with three indicators (parcels) for each measurement occasion 
(T1, T2, and T3). Latent traits from IATs were estimated with two indicators for each 
measurement occasion (T1, T2, and T3). Measurement invariance was achieved by 
Chapter II: Age Differences in the Transition to College 
  
44 
 
constraining intercepts (not displayed) and factor loadings to be equal for each measurement 
occasion (λ12, λ13). Longitudinal method effects were accounted for using indicator-specific 
correlated method factors (IS2, IS3). Latent variables Diff T2-T1 and Diff T3-T2 reflect the 
amount of latent change in Big Five traits from T1 to T2 and from T2 to T3 respectively. 
 
Parceling strategy. For self- and other-ratings, we specified three parcels of two or 
three items each to model occasion-specific latent personality traits. We used item-to-construct 
parceling to achieve equally balanced parcels with respect to discrimination and difficulty 
(Allemand, Zimprich, & Hertzog, 2007; T. D. Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 
2002). To model occasion-specific implicit personality traits, we specified two parcels, each 
consisting of split-half D2 scores (Schmukle et al., 2008).
7 
Measurement invariance. We assessed the invariance of the measurement model 
across the three time points to ensure that the changes we examined in personality traits 
represented change that had not resulted from only changes in associations between indicators 
and the respective latent variables (Horn & McArdle, 1992; Van de Schoot, Lugtig, & Hox, 
2012; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). For self-ratings, full strong factorial invariance across time 
(i.e., invariant factor loadings and intercepts of manifest variables) held for openness (Table 
A1). For conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and emotional stability, partial strong 
factorial invariance was established by freeing one factor loading and/or one manifest 
variable’s intercept in each model (Table A1). For other-ratings, full strong factorial 
invariance across time held for all traits but conscientiousness. For conscientiousness, we 
again achieved partial strong invariance by releasing one factor loading and one manifest 
variable’s intercept (Table A1). For IAT models, full strong factorial invariance across time 
                                                 
7 Item parceling offers at least two main advantages over the use of single items. First, item parcels generally 
offer better psychometric properties such as higher reliability, higher communality, and a higher likelihood of 
being normally distributed (T. D. Little et al., 2002). Second, item parceling allows researchers to specify more 
parsimonious models with lower chances of encountering correlated residuals or cross-loadings between 
indicators (T. D. Little et al., 2002).  
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held for all traits but extraversion, where we freed one manifest variable’s intercept to establish 
partial strong invariance (Table A1). Due to full or partial strong factorial invariance, latent 
change scores for self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores could be substantially interpreted 
(Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). To further account 
for shared method variance over time, we implemented two correlated indicator-specific (IS) 
factors for the respective parcels (Eid, Schneider, & Schwenkmezger, 1999; Geiser & 
Lockhart, 2012). This approach yields theoretical (i.e., using well-defined latent variables) and 
psychometric advantages (i.e., handling method effects as separate effects instead of as part 
of the error variance) over the widely used correlated uniqueness approach (Geiser & 
Lockhart, 2012).  
 Model evaluation. To provide broad information for model evaluation, we assessed 
model fit with the chi-square test, the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR). As the χ² test statistic suffers from several drawbacks such as being 
dependent on the sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & 
Müller, 2003), we focused on the descriptive goodness-of-fit indices. For the CFI and TLI, 
values > .95 are recommended to indicate an acceptable model fit, and values > .97 should 
indicate a good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). With respect 
to the RMSEA, guidelines favor values of < .08 as indicating adequate model fit and values < 
.05 as indicating good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). SRMR 
indices < .10 and < .05 point to acceptable and good model fits, respectively (Hu & Bentler, 
1999; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). 
2.3 Results 
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, mean-level changes, and correlations 
between assessment points (i.e., temporal stability) for all central constructs based on manifest 
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variables. For the current research hypotheses, individual differences (i.e., variances) in mean-
level change were more important than the average change in the full sample because we 
assumed that the study groups differed. The variances in mean-level change were significant 
(p < .01) for all constructs and assessment periods. The temporal stability (i.e., rank-order 
correlation between assessments) across all transition and control groups reached expected 
values over the 6-month intervals of around .80 for self- and other-ratings and around .40 for 
IAT scores. The size of the temporal stability of IAT scores corresponds to previously reported 
coefficients over 1-2 months (Rauthmann, 2017). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Information on Self-Rated, Other-Rated, and Implicit Big Five Traits 
 T1  
M (SD) 
T1-T2 
d  
T2-T3 
d  
Stability 
r12 
Stability 
r23 
Conscientiousness      
Self-rating 4.99 (0.92) -0.06 0.05 .79** .83** 
Other-rating 5.33 (0.94) -0.07 0.04 .77** .74** 
Implicit measure (IAT) 0.26 (0.27) -0.14 0.00 .33** .28** 
Agreeableness      
Self-rating 4.97 (0.84) 0.05 -0.05 .81** .81** 
Other-rating 5.15 (0.87) -0.08 -0.05 .72** .67** 
Implicit measure (IAT) 0.51 (0.30) -0.03 -0.14 .38** .39** 
Openness      
Self-rating 5.26 (0.95) -0.06 -0.06 .84** .86** 
Other-rating 5.40 (0.83) -0.07 0.06 .77** .73** 
Implicit measure (IAT) 0.27 (0.29) 0.00 -0.12 .34** .34** 
Extraversion      
Self-rating 5.04 (1.10) -0.02 -0.04 .82** .89** 
Other-rating 5.47 (0.97) -0.06 0.10 .80** .69** 
Implicit measure (IAT) -0.05 (0.35) 0.11 0.07 .42** .47** 
Emotional stability      
Self-rating 4.17 (1.26) 0.08 0.02 .84** .84** 
Other-rating 4.38 (1.07) -0.07 0.04 .75** .73** 
Implicit measure (IAT) 0.30 (0.30) 0.06 -0.06 .36** .37** 
Note. d = standardized mean difference, positive values represent an increase between time 
periods. r12 = correlation between T1 and T2. r23 = correlation between T2 and T3.  
** p < .01. 
  
Chapter II: Age Differences in the Transition to College 
  
48 
 
Next, we report the results of the latent neighbor change models that we used to test 
our hypotheses for each trait. Again, we specified one model per trait and measure (i.e., 15 
models in sum) that included all contrasts simultaneously to reduce the number of tests. Table 
3 provides model fit indices of the final models; Tables 4 to 8 provide the estimated 
coefficients for the contrast effects of the models. We report follow-up analyses on contrast 
effects (i.e., simple intercepts and simple slopes) in the main text. For each trait, we first 
describe differences between the study groups at T1, and then we report results regarding our 
hypotheses how the groups changed differently over time in self-ratings, other-ratings, and 
IAT scores. We examined correlated changes for self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores 
and report the results in the Appendix because hardly any correlated changes occurred (Table 
A2). 
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Table 3 
Model Fit Indices for Final Latent Neighbor Change Models Examining Change in Self-
Rated, Other-Rated, and Implicit Big Five Traits from T1 to T2 and T3 
 χ² CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Conscientiousness      
Self-rating 52.222    0.997    0.960    0.019    0.023 
Other-rating 75.870    0.988    0.983    0.041    0.045 
Implicit measure (IAT) 22.951    0.986    0.975    0.030    0.027 
Agreeableness      
Self-rating 56.802    0.995    0.993    0.023    0.027 
Other-rating 74.930    0.989    0.985    0.036    0.037 
Implicit measure (IAT) 57.553    0.936    0.882    0.079    0.048 
Openness      
Self-rating 40.838 1.000    1.004    0.000    0.020 
Other-rating 71.614    0.992    0.989    0.034    0.026 
Implicit measure (IAT) 20.702    0.994    0.989    0.021    0.023 
Extraversion      
Self-rating 100.200    0.983    0.976    0.054    0.032 
Other-rating 114.441    0.975    0.967    0.058    0.052 
Implicit measure (IAT) 25.003    0.990    0.980    0.037    0.021 
Emotional stability      
Self-rating 100.689    0.981    0.973    0.055    0.036 
Other-rating 81.679    0.987    0.982    0.042    0.041 
Implicit measure (IAT) 33.501    0.973    0.951    0.049    0.028 
Note. All models were calculated using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard 
errors (Huber-White) and scaled test statistics. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-
Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root 
mean square residual. 
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2.3.1 Conscientiousness. 
The model fits were good to excellent for all three models (i.e., self-ratings, other-
ratings, IAT scores; Table 3). The participants differed at T1 in the predicted manner (Table 
4, Figures 2A-C): Younger adults had significantly lower conscientiousness scores compared 
with older adults when measured with self-ratings (Myounger = 4.31, SE = 0.06; Molder = 5.14, 
SE = 0.08), other-ratings (Myounger = 4.86, SE = 0.06; Molder = 5.71, SE = 0.07), and the IAT 
(Myounger = 0.22, SE = 0.01; Molder = 0.31, SE = 0.01, Table 4). Younger freshmen rated 
themselves significantly lower in conscientiousness (M = 4.15, SE = 0.09) than younger 
advanced students did (M = 4.43, SE = 0.08, Table 4).  
Regarding group differences in changes in conscientiousness over time and consistent 
with Hypothesis 1, younger and older participants did not differ significantly in change over 
time when measured with self-ratings, other-ratings, or IAT scores (Table 4). The results were 
the same when we compared only younger and older students (Table A3). Similar to previous 
studies and supporting Hypothesis 2, we observed that younger freshmen’s self-ratings 
increased during the first 6 months of college (bT2T1 = 0.077, SE = 0.03, p < .01). By contrast, 
younger advanced students’ self-ratings decreased (bT2T1 = -0.155, SE = 0.03, p < .01, Figure 
2A). Others perceived no significant differences between how younger freshmen and younger 
advanced students in how they changed from T1 to T2. Yet, others perceived that the advanced 
students increased from T2 to T3 (bT3T2 = 0.094, SE = 0.04, p = .02, Figure 2B), whereas others 
perceived that the freshmen did not change significantly (bT3T2 = 0.023, SE = 0.05, p = .64). 
In IAT-based conscientiousness, both younger freshmen and younger advanced students 
decreased from T1 to T2 (freshmen: bT2T1 = -0.031, SE = 0.01, p = .03; advanced students: 
bT2T1 = -0.043, SE = 0.02, p = .01; Figure 2C), which contradicted the freshmen’s self-ratings 
and matched the self-ratings of the advanced students. Examining Hypothesis 3 among older 
adults, students showed no significant change from T1 to T2 (bT2T1 = 0.013, SE = 0.04, p = 
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.74), whereas older control group participants decreased in their self-ratings (bT2T1 = -0.310, 
SE = 0.04, p < .01, Table 4, Figure 2A). With respect to other-ratings and IAT scores, older 
students and control groups participants showed similar changes (Table 4, Figures 2B and 2C). 
The results were the same when we compared all students with all non-students (Table A3). 
The divergent pattern of change in self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores suggests 
that these manifestations of conscientiousness did not change concurrently. We formally tested 
correlated changes in latent neighbor change models that included all three measures (see 
section “2.2.5 Analytic strategy.”). Overall, changes in self-ratings, other-ratings, or IAT 
scores were not significantly correlated during the same interval (e.g., from T1 to T2) and also 
showed no lagged correlations (e.g., change in self-ratings from T1 to T2 did not significantly 
predict change in other-ratings from T2 to T3, Table A2). 
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Table 4 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time for Conscientiousness 
 
Self-rating 
 
                Other-rating 
 
Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
Younger vs. 
older adults 
-0.831** 0.106 -0.031  -0.848** 0.134 0.165  -0.091** 0.015 -0.023 
Younger 
freshmen vs. 
advanced 
students 
-0.280* 0.232* -0.016  0.039 -0.091 -0.071  0.027 0.012 -0.010 
Older students 
vs. older 
controls 
0.061 0.323* 0.024  0.017 0.089 -0.043  -0.050 0.019 0.041 
Note. Coefficients represent the unstandardized contrast effects for testing for group differences in intercepts or change scores. The contrast 
“Younger freshmen vs. advanced students” was coded as 0.5 = younger freshmen, -0.5 = younger advanced students. The contrast “Older students 
vs. older controls” was coded as 0.5 = older students, -0.5 = older control group. The contrast “Younger vs. older” was coded as 0.4 = younger 
freshmen, younger advanced students, and younger control group, -0.6 = older students and older control group. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 
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Figure 2. Predicted longitudinal change in Big Five personality traits in younger (grey lines) 
and older adults (black lines). Student groups are indicated with solid and dashed lines; control 
groups are indicated with dotted lines. See Tables 4 to 8 for statistical models of group 
differences.  
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2.3.2 Agreeableness. 
The model fits were good to excellent for the models including the self- or other-ratings 
(Table 3). For the IAT model, however, the model fit was merely adequate (except for the 
TLI; Table 3). This could be attributed to including nonsignificant contrast codes because the 
model fit was excellent without contrast codes (CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.01, RMSEA = .000, 
SRMR = .018). Still, we kept the contrast codes in the model to test the hypotheses. The 
participants did not differ significantly at T1 (Table 5, Figures 2D-F), except that younger 
adults had lower values on the implicit measure of agreeableness compared with older adults 
(Myounger = 0.44, SE = 0.01; Molder = 0.55, SE = 0.02, Table 5), and a similar trend occurred for 
self-ratings (Myounger = 4.61, SE = 0.07; Molder = 4.78, SE = 0.05, b = -0.17, p = .09). 
Regarding group differences in changes in agreeableness over time, in line with 
Hypothesis 1, younger and older participants did not differ significantly in change over time 
(Table 5, Table A3). In addition, younger freshmen remained stable in self-rated agreeableness 
(bT3T2 = 0.007, SE = 0.02, p = .75), whereas younger advanced students decreased from T2 to 
T3 (bT3T2 = -0.169, SE = 0.02, p < .01, Figure 2D, Hypothesis 2). Examining hypothesis 3 
among older adults, students differed from older control group participants in changes that 
were based on self-ratings, such that students first increased (bT2T1 = 0.154, SE = 0.03, p < .01) 
and then decreased in agreeableness (bT3T2 = -0.197, SE = 0.03, p < .01), whereas the older 
nonstudents showed the opposite pattern (bT2T1 = -0.134, SE = 0.03, p < .01; bT3T2 = 0.090, SE 
= 0.03, p < .01; Table 5, Figure 2D). These differences in change patterns among older adults 
were not observed for the other-ratings or IAT scores (Table 5). The results were highly similar 
when we compared all students with all non-students (Table A3). 
The change patterns diverged between the self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores, 
but still, we tested correlated changes in latent neighbor change models that included all three 
measures of agreeableness. Overall, changes in self-ratings, other-ratings, or IAT scores were 
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not significantly correlated during the same interval (e.g., from T1 to T2) and also showed no 
lagged correlations (e.g., change in self-ratings from T1 to T2 did not significantly predict 
change in other-ratings from T2 to T3, see Table A2). 
.
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Table 5 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time for Agreeableness 
 
  Self-rating 
 
                Other-rating 
 
Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
Younger vs. 
older adults 
-0.172† -0.003 -0.031  0.156 -0.077 0.076  -0.112** -0.010 0.001 
Younger 
freshmen vs. 
advanced 
students 
-0.021 -0.054 0.176*  -0.084 -0.019 0.062  0.003 -0.031 0.035 
Older students 
vs. older 
controls 
-0.035 0.288* -0.288*  0.074 -0.055 0.078  -0.027 0.059 -0.063 
Note. Coefficients represent the unstandardized contrast effects for testing for group differences in intercepts or change scores. The contrast 
“Younger freshmen vs. advanced students” was coded as 0.5 = younger freshmen, -0.5 = younger advanced students. The contrast “Older students 
vs. older controls” was coded as 0.5 = older students, -0.5 = older control group. The contrast “Younger vs. older” was coded as 0.4 = younger 
freshmen, younger advanced students, and younger control group, -0.6 = older students and older control group. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01 
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2.3.3 Openness to experience. 
The model fits were good to excellent for all three models (i.e., self-ratings, other-
ratings, IAT scores; Table 3). At T1, the participants differed significantly only in the implicit 
measure of openness at T1 (Table 6, Figure 2G-I): Younger adults had lower IAT values (M 
= 0.24, SE = 0.01) compared with older adults (M = 0.34, SE = 0.02, Table 6), again with a 
similar pattern in self-ratings (MYounger = 5.36, SE = 0.06, MOlder = 5.54, SE = 0.07, b = -0.18, 
p = .09). In addition, younger freshmen had lower IAT values (M = 0.20, SE = 0.02) compared 
with younger advanced students (M = 0.27, SE = 0.02, Table 6), with a similar pattern in self-
ratings (MFreshmen = 5.25, SE = 0.09, MAdvanced = 5.52, SE = 0.09, b = -0.27, p = .07).  
The study groups hardly differed in how self-rated and other-rated openness changed 
(or remained stable) over time. Yet, in implicit representations of openness, younger adults 
increased from T1 to T2 (bT2T1 = 0.027, SE = 0.01 p = .01), a finding that can likely be 
attributed to changes among younger freshmen (see below), whereas older adults decreased 
from T1 to T2 (bT2T1 = -0.073, SE = 0.02, p < .01, Table 6, Figure 2I, Table A3). At the 
beginning of college, younger freshmen increased on the implicit measure of openness (bT2T1 
= 0.06, SE = 0.01 p < .01), whereas younger advanced students did not (bT2T1 = 0.01, SE = 
0.02, p = .65, Figure 2I, Hypothesis 2). Unexpectedly, older students showed a larger decrease 
in how others rated their openness (bT2T1 = -0.202, SE = 0.05 p < .01) compared with how 
older control group participants were rated (bT2T1 = 0.051, SE = 0.06, p = .35, Table 6, Figure 
2H). Additional control analyses that compared all students with all non-students while 
controlling for age effects, we observed that students were rated by others as more open 
compared to non-students, but changes in perceived openness did not differ significantly 
(Table A3). 
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Again, we examined correlated changes in self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores 
(Table A2). The nonsignificant correlated changes corresponded to the diverging pattern of 
changes in self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores.  
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Table 6 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time for Openness 
 
  Self-rating 
 
                Other-rating 
 
Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
Younger vs. 
older adults 
-0.181† -0.073 -0.016  -0.079 0.023 -0.093  -0.102** 0.104** -0.038 
Younger 
freshmen vs. 
advanced 
students 
-0.266† 0.038 0.103  0.041 -0.088 0.045  -0.073* 0.072† 0.014 
Older students 
vs. older 
controls 
0.066 0.009 0  0.238 -0.254* -0.034  -0.047 0.026 -0.012 
Note. Coefficients represent the unstandardized contrast effects for testing for group differences in intercepts or change scores. The contrast 
“Younger freshmen vs. advanced students” was coded as 0.5 = younger freshmen, -0.5 = younger advanced students. The contrast “Older students 
vs. older controls” was coded as 0.5 = older students, -0.5 = older control group. The contrast “Younger vs. older” was coded as 0.4 = younger 
freshmen, younger advanced students, and younger control group, -0.6 = older students and older control group. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
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2.3.4 Extraversion. 
The model fits were good for all three models (i.e., self-ratings, other-ratings, IAT 
scores; Table 3). At T1, younger and older adults did not differ in their self-ratings of 
extraversion (Table 7). However, acquaintances rated the younger adults as less extraverted 
(M = 5.01, SE = 0.07) than the older adults (M = 5.62, SE = 0.08, Table 7, Figure 2K), whereas 
the pattern was reversed for the implicit representations of extraversion (MYounger = -0.03, SE 
= 0.01, MOlder = -0.16, SE = 0.03, Table 7, Figure 2L). In addition, older students rated 
themselves higher in extraversion (M = 4.98, SE = 0.14) compared with older control group 
participants (M = 4.52, SE = 0.13, Table 7, Figure 2J). 
Regarding age differences in changes in extraversion over time and supporting 
Hypothesis 1, younger and older adults did not differ (i.e., based on self-ratings and other-
ratings, Table 7), except that the younger participants did not change in the implicit measure 
of extraversion (bT3T2 = -0.00, SE = 0.02, p = .74), whereas the older participants increased 
significantly (bT3T2 = 0.10, SE = 0.01, p < .01, Figure 2L). Younger freshmen and younger 
advanced students differed in changes over time (Hypothesis 2): Whereas younger freshmen 
did not change in how extraverted they rated themselves (bT2T1 = 0.02, SE = 0.05, p = .61) or 
others rated them (bT2T1 = -0.01, SE = 0.05, p = .78), younger advanced students decreased in 
self-rated (bT2T1 = -0.20, SE= 0.05, p < .01) and other-rated extraversion (bT2T1 = -0.21, SE= 
0.05, p < .01). For the implicit representations of extraversion, younger freshmen even 
increased (bT3T2 = 0.05, SE = 0.02 p < .01), whereas younger advanced students decreased 
significantly (bT3T2 = -0.06, SE = 0.02, p < .01). Older students and the age-matched control 
group did not differ significantly in how they changed over time (Table 7, Hypothesis 3). 
Likewise, no significant differences in changes occurred when all students were compared to 
all non-students (Table A3). 
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We examined correlated changes in self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores (Table 
A2) for the whole sample and observed that the more people increased between T1 and T2 in 
how extraverted they saw themselves, the more others also saw them as becoming increasingly 
extraverted during this time (bT2T1 = 0.07, SE = 0.03, p < .05). In addition, people’s explicit 
self-ratings of extraversion decreased more the more their implicit representations of 
extraversion had increased 6 months earlier (b = -0.04, SE = 0.01, p < .01). 
.
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Table 7 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time for Extraversion 
 
   Self-rating 
 
                Other-rating 
 
Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
  
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
Younger vs. 
older adults 
-0.138 -0.014 0.018  -0.610** -0.020 0.082  0.130** 0.066 -0.109** 
Younger 
freshmen vs. 
advanced 
students 
-0.182 0.220* 0.072  -0.015 0.192 -0.033  -0.052 0.061 0.115* 
Older students 
vs. older 
controls 
0.455* 0.011 0.075  0.221 -0.144 0.114  0.049 0.018 -0.048 
Note. Coefficients represent the unstandardized contrast effects for testing for group differences in intercepts or change scores. The contrast 
“Younger freshmen vs. advanced students” was coded as 0.5 = younger freshmen, -0.5 = younger advanced students. The contrast “Older students 
vs. older controls” was coded as 0.5 = older students, -0.5 = older control group. The contrast “Younger vs. older” was coded as 0.4 = younger 
freshmen, younger advanced students, and younger control group, -0.6 = older students and older control group. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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2.3.5 Emotional stability. 
The model fits were good for all three models (i.e., self-ratings, other-ratings, IAT 
scores; Table 3). At T1, younger adults showed consistently lower values in emotional stability 
compared with older participants (self-ratings: MYounger = 4.04, SE = 0.08, MOlder = 4.41, SE = 
0.10; other-ratings: MYounger = 4.34, SE = 0.06, MOlder = 4.60, SE = 0.09, IAT: MYounger = 0.26, 
SE = 0.01, MOlder = 0.39, SE = 0.02, Table 8, Figures 2M-O). Other than that, no significant 
differences between the participants occurred (Table 8). 
On average, participants saw themselves as becoming more emotionally stable (bT2T1 
= 0.09, p = .02), but others viewed them as becoming less stable (bT2T1 = -0.09, p = .04), 
without significant differences between the age or study groups (Table 8, Figures 2M & 2N; 
Table A3). Only others reported stronger increases from T2 to T3 among all non-students 
(bT3T2 = 0.26, SE = 0.09, p < .01) compared to all students (bT3T2 = -0.04, SE = 0.05, p = .45, 
Table A3, controlled for age). And regarding implicit representations of emotional stability, 
younger freshmen decreased from T2 to T3 (bT3T2 = -0.06, SE = 0.02, p < .01), whereas 
younger advanced students increased (bT3T2 = 0.03, SE = 0.01, p < .05, Table 8, Figure 2O). 
The divergence in change trajectories of self-ratings, other-ratings, and IAT scores was 
mirrored in the results of correlated change, all of which were in general uncorrelated across 
the different manifestations of emotional stability (Table A2). 
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Table 8 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time for Emotional Stability 
 
   Self-rating 
 
              Other-rating 
 
Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
Younger vs. 
older adults 
-0.374** 0.040 -0.023  -0.255* 0.042 0.127  -0.133** -0.037 0.027 
Younger 
freshmen vs. 
advanced 
students 
-0.090 -0.083 0.080  0.051 -0.128 0.129  -0.033 0.026 -0.092* 
Older students 
vs. older 
controls 
0.169 0.129 -0.088  0.194 -0.146 -0.225  0.014 -0.034 0.030 
Note. Coefficients represent the unstandardized contrast effects for testing for group differences in intercepts or change scores. The contrast 
“Younger freshmen vs. advanced students” was coded as 0.5 = younger freshmen, -0.5 = younger advanced students. The contrast “Older students 
vs. older controls” was coded as 0.5 = older students, -0.5 = older control group. The contrast “Younger vs. older” was coded as 0.4 = younger 
freshmen, younger advanced students, and younger control group, -0.6 = older students and older control group. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01
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2.3.6 Control analyses. 
We focused on how the Big Five traits changed and remained stable among younger 
and older adults while they experienced college life compared with their respective age- and 
education-matched control groups. To examine how other events that might also have occurred 
(e.g., changes in romantic relationships or health) contributed to the observed trajectories, we 
included the occurrence and the subjective valence of other life events as time-varying 
covariates in the latent neighbor change models (Table A4). The previously reported patterns 
of results remained unchanged except that the difference between younger and older 
participants regarding how conscientious others rated them was no longer statistically 
significant (Table A4). 
In additional control analyses, we included the number of previously studied semesters 
as a covariate for the older students because it varied for the older students but not for the two 
groups of younger students. Controlling for the number of previous semesters did not alter the 
main effects reported in Tables 4 to 8. Furthermore, the number of semesters hardly showed 
significant effects on the initial level or the amount of change in traits. The few significant 
effects were: The more semesters older adults had studied, the more others perceived decreases 
from T1 to T2 in openness (b = -0.079, SE = 0.022, p < .01), extraversion (b = -0.080, SE = 
0.024, p < .01), and emotional stability (b = -0.061, SE = 0.025, p = .02). Also, with a higher 
number of semesters, implicitly represented agreeableness (b = 0.017, SE = 0.008, p = .02) 
and other-perceived openness were higher at T1 (b = 0.088, SE = 0.033, p <.01). The number 
of semesters was higher, the older participants of the older student group were (rage = .38, p < 
.01), a finding that might partially explain the effects of the number of semesters on personality 
changes. 
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2.3.7 Summary of results. 
Our first hypothesis was that age differences in personality change would be 
diminished if younger and older people experienced a similar life transition, which would 
speak against the assumption of generally greater trait stability among older adults. Consistent 
with our hypothesis, we observed no significant differences between younger and older 
adults—and more specifically between younger and older students—regarding self- or other-
perceived changes across the 1-year time span in all Big Five traits. Young adults changed 
differently than older adults only in implicit representations of openness and extraversion. 
Further evidence for similar trait stability in younger and older adults in similar contexts arose 
from comparable retest correlations for younger (mean r = .84, range .78 to .88) and older 
students (mean r = .82, range .73 to .93). 
Our study replicated previous findings that were based on self-ratings of young adults 
such that younger freshmen increased in conscientiousness as well as emotional stability and 
remained stable in extraversion. Only partly supporting Hypothesis 2, freshmen showed more 
positive trait changes than advanced students during the first six months of college in 
conscientiousness, and extraversion. In addition, our study extended previous findings such 
that these changes were usually not observed in how others viewed young adults over time 
(i.e., changes in other-ratings) or in implicit representations except that implicit measures of 
extraversion and openness showed significant increases among younger freshmen.  
Finally, our study further extended previous findings by testing the effect of context 
(Hypothesis 3) and showing that changes in propositional representations of traits in older 
adulthood diverged when older adults experienced different contexts such as college and 
retirement. In contrast to the age- and education-matched control group, older students showed 
no significant decrease in self-rated conscientiousness and even increased in self-rated 
agreeableness; however, this latter effect was reversed in the second half year of the study. 
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Older students showed a larger decrease in other-rated openness but also started at a somewhat 
higher level. In addition, although the two groups of older adults did not differ from each other 
in stability or change in extraversion and emotional stability, older students generally remained 
at higher levels than their same-aged control group. Thus, for same-aged people, the context 
mattered for personality change, which we discuss in detail next. 
2.4 Discussion 
This longitudinal multi-method study examined whether age differences in personality 
trait changes would be less pronounced when younger and older people experienced similar 
contextual conditions, in this case, college life, as well as, whether same-aged people who 
experienced different contexts would display divergent trait changes. Next, we discuss the 
implications of the current findings for age differences in personality development. Because 
we examined propositional representations (i.e., explicit self-ratings), reputations (i.e., other-
ratings), and associative representations of traits (i.e., implicit self-views), this study offers 
initial insights into the personality changes that occur in different manifestations of traits 
among younger and older adults. 
2.4.1 Age differences in personality development. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has compared the personality 
development of younger and older adults who were both experiencing a similar life transition, 
that is, similar conditions in their daily environment. Accordingly, research had yet to clarify 
whether personality development is less pronounced after young adulthood because older 
adults’ personality is indeed more established and less malleable (i.e., greater trait stability; 
(Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Costa et al., 2000) or because more stable environments (i.e., greater 
context stability) contribute to smaller mean-level changes among older adults (Caspi & 
Roberts, 2001; Hutteman et al., 2014; Reitz & Staudinger, 2017). The current study offers 
some initial answers to these questions by comparing trait changes in (a) age- and education-
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matched older adults who were either currently attending college or not and (b) younger and 
older adults who were currently engaged in college life.  
In general and compared with same-aged nonstudents, older students showed more 
favorable development in some traits (e.g., stability in self-rated conscientiousness and 
increases in self-rated agreeableness), which had previously been shown to increase when 
young students entered college (e.g., Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011). Older students and 
nonstudents did not differ in their development of extraversion or emotional stability, but these 
traits were also hardly affected in young adults who went to college (Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke 
et al., 2011, but see Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). These patterns of results further support the 
idea that contextual factors contribute to differences in personality change in older adults 
(Wagner et al., 2016), and personality traits might not be generally less susceptible to being 
changed by environmental factors in older age groups compared with younger adulthood. 
Regarding openness to experience, older students showed larger decreases than older 
nonstudents. However, students started with somewhat higher levels of openness, which 
indicates selection effects among older students (i.e., adults who were more open than their 
same-aged peers entered college in their 60s). Still, it may be more difficult to maintain higher 
levels of openness at this age when cognitive abilities are generally decreasing (Curtis, 
Windsor, & Soubelet, 2015; Salthouse, 2010). Theoretically, enriching one’s daily life by 
engaging in enjoyable, demanding activities and social contacts could slow cognitive aging 
(Hertzog, Kramer, Wilson, & Lindenberger, 2008; Stine-Morrow et al., 2014), and this could 
partially contribute to slowing down decreases in openness. Previous studies among older 
adults have even showed increases in openness after a 4-month inductive reasoning program 
(Jackson, Hill, Payne, Roberts, & Stine-Morrow, 2012). The unexpected difference between 
older students and nonstudents suggests that additional experiences in daily life might have 
contributed to the personality development of older adults, a finding that emphasizes the 
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necessity not only to compare groups but also to examine individual processes in daily life 
(see section “2.4.3 Limitations and future directions.”). 
When directly testing greater trait stability with age by comparing age differences in 
trait changes, younger and older students did not differ significantly in how they or others 
viewed their personality traits (i.e., in self- or other-ratings), yet they differed in changes in 
implicit representations of openness and extraversion: Whereas younger students increased in 
openness as expected, older students decreased in openness. Extraversion did not change 
significantly among younger students, but it even increased among older students. Because 
such changes were not apparent in self- or other-ratings, it may well be the case that 
propositional and associative representations of changing traits form in different ways (Back 
& Nestler, 2016; Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). For example, both younger and older 
students may have been immersed in new ideas and knowledge (i.e., states relevant for 
openness), but this did not alter their explicit representations of their levels of openness, 
perhaps because younger students believe that this behavior is typical for students and not 
noteworthy. By contrast, implicit associations may have changed due to younger students’ 
increased engagement with new ideas, whereas the daily lives of older students most likely 
provided more familiar experiences (i.e., less novel situations; Gutsch et al., 2018), which 
contributed to decreases in their implicit associations regarding openness. Thus, we assume 
that the processes leading to changes in propositional and associative representations differ 
and may diverge between younger and older adults (for further details, see section “2.4.2 
Divergences between the self-perspective, the perspective of others, and implicit 
representations of traits.”). 
It has to be acknowledged that younger and older students’ changes did not show 
statistically significant differences in this sample, but it may nonetheless be the case that they 
changed differently in the overall population. We compared all younger with all older adults 
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to achieve higher power for the statistical tests from the larger samples, and in addition, we 
contrasted younger and older students to specifically test the effect of age among students. For 
these analyses, we treated younger freshmen and advanced students as one group and 
compared them with older students, whereas further analyses showed that younger freshmen 
and advanced students sometimes differed in trait changes, as we discuss next. 
The current study replicated and extended several effects of previous studies on young 
adults’ transition to college (e.g., Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Robins et al., 2005). For 
example, self-rated conscientiousness increased among freshmen, and although self-rated 
openness and extraversion were stable, implicit representations of both traits increased among 
freshmen. Also, as in previous studies (Lüdtke et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a; Specht et al., 
2011), self-ratings of emotional stability generally increased in all younger and older 
participants. In contrast to previous studies (Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Robins et al., 
2005), self-rated agreeableness remained stable among younger freshmen and even decreased 
among younger advanced students. Differences between the current and previous studies may 
have resulted from the somewhat shorter duration of 1 year compared with 2 and 4 years 
(Lüdtke et al., 2011; Robins et al., 2005). It is possible that the increases in implicit 
representations of openness and extraversion will also show up as increases in explicit, 
propositional representations a few months or years later. Thus, a longer duration of 
assessments would be desirable although studies with assessments four or five years apart 
often acknowledge that shorter assessment periods are needed to observe personality change 
close to the life transition and changes in contexts. Furthermore, one study (Bleidorn, 2012) 
also examined young adults across a 1-year period and found changes in self-rated Big Five 
traits that were comparable to those from longer studies (see Table 1).  
It is possible that recent changes in the German college system contribute to 
divergences from earlier German and US studies. Germany replaced the Diploma with a 
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Bachelor’s and Master’s degree system around 2010—with some variations between 
universities and subjects. For most subjects, this led to stricter curricula, more frequent exams, 
and greater perceived strain among bachelor students (Bargel, Ramm, & Multrus, 2012). Thus, 
whereas entering college in the US (Robins et al., 2005) or entering the earlier diploma system 
(Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998; Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011) included greater freedom 
in comparison with high school regarding the exploration of study topics and the scheduling 
of courses, nowadays, German bachelor education includes strict curricula and exams in the 
first two semesters. As a consequence, bachelor students perceive more demands and less 
leeway in comparison with diploma students (Sieverding, Schmidt, Obergfell, & Scheiter, 
2013). These changes in the conditions might contribute to different effects of college on 
personality development, especially because recent studies with bachelor students have also 
observed decreases in agreeableness and stability in openness among advanced students 
(Niehoff, Petersdotter, & Freund, 2017).  
2.4.2 Divergences between the self-perspective, the perspective of others, and 
implicit representations of traits. 
Self-ratings, other-ratings, and implicit measures are not simply three measures of 
traits but rather assess different parts of traits, that is, a person’s explicit propositional 
representations, the reputations others hold about a person, and implicit associative 
representations (Back et al., 2011; Back & Vazire, 2012; Funder, 2012; Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2007). Accordingly, these three representations might develop differently because they 
respond to distinct processes (Back & Nestler, 2016; Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
So far, research on personality development in adulthood has nearly exclusively focused on 
explicit representations (i.e., self-ratings; Roberts et al., 2006a, footnote 2). No previous study 
has examined longitudinal changes in implicit trait representations, and only recently have a 
few longitudinal studies in adolescence and parts of young adulthood included other-ratings 
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and generally found diverging patterns in changes in reputations and explicit self-
representations (Branje et al., 2007; Göllner et al., 2017; Luan et al., 2017).  
Several coefficients in the current study indicated that the other-ratings we obtained 
were as suited as self-ratings to assess personality traits over time: internal consistency 
coefficients and retest-correlations were generally comparable and high; measurement 
invariance was established and led to good model fits; and the level of self-other agreement 
(Quintus et al., 2017) was comparable to previous studies (e.g., Allik et al., 2016; McCrae et 
al., 2004). In addition, age differences in traits at the beginning of the study were comparable 
for self- and other-ratings, and the average mean-level changes were generally similar for self- 
and other-ratings. Yet, the developmental trajectories of specific groups often differed 
between self- and other-ratings, a finding that was also expressed in the generally absent 
correlated change between self- and other-ratings. One possible explanation could be that 
people are generally less sensitive to detecting change in other people. However, similar retest 
correlations (i.e., stability coefficients) and mean-level differences in other- and self-ratings 
contradict this explanation.  
The low concurrent (i.e., correlated) changes rather suggest that processes leading to 
changes (and stability) in one’s own and others’ explicit representations differ. For example, 
personality perception seems to include explicit, deliberate as well as implicit, intuitive 
judgments (Hirschmüller, Egloff, Nestler, & Back, 2013). Furthermore, people have many 
more opportunities to observe themselves than others do (i.e., availability and detection of 
behavioral cues; Back & Vazire, 2012; Funder, 2012). Yet, it is well-established that people 
do not always perceive and judge themselves accurately but also aim for consistency (i.e., 
judging oneself in line with existing propositional representations) or self-enhancement (i.e., 
judging oneself better than others or objective standards do; Robins & John, 1997; Wilson & 
Dunn, 2004). For example, older students did not change in the extent to which they saw 
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themselves as conscientious, but others perceived them as less conscientious over time. It is 
possible that older students may want to preserve their positive self-perception, whereas others 
(correctly) perceive decreases in conscientiousness. Alternatively, others might not see older 
students working hard in their courses, but they might instead see that some household chores 
are neglected. This necessarily leads to different opinions between the people themselves and 
the knowledgeable others in the extent to which conscientiousness ratings remain high or show 
a decrease. It is interesting that implicit representations of conscientiousness also decreased 
during the same period. 
It has to be acknowledged that self- and other-ratings of Big Five traits showed greater 
methodological similarities compared to the IAT: Self- and other-ratings were collected with 
the same item content and the same rating scale, whereas the IATs involved computer-based 
categorization tasks of trait adjectives. Nonetheless, the IATs also showed satisfactory internal 
consistencies, and the retest correlations were within the ranges that were reported previously 
(e.g., 1 month: r = .48 Rauthmann, 2017; r = .51 Hofmann et al., 2005; 1 and 2 years r = .47 , 
Egloff, Schwerdtfeger, and Schmukle, 2005; r = .52; Elgersma et al., 2013). In addition, 
measurement invariance was established for all Big Five traits and led to good model fits, and 
the application of IATs in age-heterogeneous studies was successfully demonstrated 
(Hummert, Garstka, O'Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002; Riediger, Wrzus, Schmiedek, 
Wagner, & Lindenberger, 2011; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
Accordingly, we assume that the pattern of changes in implicit representations of traits 
are meaningful, especially because they partly supported and also extended previous findings 
that were based on self-ratings. For example, as previously reported for explicit 
representations (i.e., self-ratings; Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Robins et 
al., 2005), young freshmen increased in their implicit representations of openness and 
extraversion. In addition, whereas self-ratings suggested increases in emotional stability for 
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all participants, implicit representations suggested decreases in emotional stability for 
freshmen during their second semester of college, that is, during the time when the freshmen 
were preparing for their first exams. Such a pattern is consistent with other findings of 
decreased emotional stability and well-being when experiencing stress (Lazarus, 1999; Myin-
Germeys & van Os, 2007; Suls & Martin, 2005). As stated in the beginning, we assume that 
explicit and implicit representations of traits can change in both similar and distinct ways—
similar to findings on attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Gawronski & LeBel, 
2008)—because different processes are involved. The TESSERA framework (Wrzus, 2018; 
Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) offers a detailed account of how explicit representations are more 
strongly shaped by rather conscious, reflective processes (e.g., reflection, accommodation, and 
self-narration), whereas implicit representations are more strongly shaped by associative 
processes (e.g., implicit learning and reinforcement learning). Future studies are needed to 
focus on such reflective and associative processes to better understand changes in explicit and 
implicit representations of traits and the conditions under which they change concurrently. 
2.4.3 Limitations and future directions. 
In the current study, we examined personality development in younger and older adults 
longitudinally under similar, yet admittedly not identical, contextual conditions and using 
multiple independent methods, that is self-ratings, other-ratings, and indirect measures. 
Though the overall sample of 380 participants is considerably smaller than samples of nation-
wide panel studies (e.g., SOEP, HILDA, MIDUS), the current study relied not only on self-
ratings and had lower attrition rates compared to most panel studies (e.g., SOEP 30% attrition, 
Specht et al., 2011; HILDA 24% attrition, Wortman et al., 2012): Over 94% of the current 
participants and 85% of the acquainted raters completed at least two assessments (85% of the 
participants and 71% of the raters completed all three assessments). Thus the drop-out rate 
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was very low given the extensive, multi-method nature of the study and the focus on 
nonstudents and nonpsychology students. 
Still, some limitations need to be acknowledged. First, the sample was comprised of 
more than two thirds women because we recruited from philology, history, and cultural 
studies, areas that often include more women than men (Dickson, 2010). In addition, the 
sample of older adults was somewhat selective because the older adults showed higher values 
in extraversion and openness in comparison with what is known from previous studies (e.g., 
McCrae et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2006a). It is very plausible that people have to be more 
open and more extraverted to engage in such an intensive study and specifically in college life 
during their mid-60s. Also, we included an equivalent number of age- and education-matched 
older nonstudents and students, but the number of age- and education-matched younger 
nonstudents was low. Currently, the percentage of people per birth cohort who engage in 
college education almost matches the percentage of people with the Abitur (i.e., university 
entrance degree, Autorengruppe Bildungsberichtserstattung, 2016). This impeded the 
recruitment of participants who had received the Abitur but who did not engage in a college 
education. We took the unequal number of participants into account by testing specific 
contrasts that matched our hypotheses and thus avoided analyses based on too small groups 
(see section “2.2.5 Analytic strategy.”). 
A second limitation concerns the people who provided other-ratings. Not all 
participants named two acquaintances, and participants also named different types of 
acquaintances (e.g., spouses, friends, family members), but the numbers and types of 
acquaintances did not vary significantly with participants’ personality traits. For example, the 
level of extraversion was not significantly related to whether participants named more or 
different acquaintances. In addition, about 80% of acquaintances had known the participant 
for 3 or more years, that is, an amount of time that is long enough to provide valid ratings. 
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Previous studies showed that the validity of other-ratings increases as the length of 
acquaintance increases from zero-acquaintance to well-acquainted (Brown & Bernieri, 2017), 
but it does not increase further when people have known each other for a larger number of 
years (Allik et al., 2016; Funder, 2012). Future studies might want to specify more strictly that 
participants should identify one friend and one family member (ideally a spouse), but this 
might not be feasible to actually implement. 
Finally, although the design with younger and older students and nonstudents offered 
us the advantage of being able to test specific hypotheses on age effects and effects of the 
college context, the study groups still might differ in some ways. For example, older people 
with secondary school education (i.e., German Abitur) are less common in their age cohort 
compared to young people with Abitur. Still, it seemed methodologically more appropriate to 
have the same educational requirements for all participants compared to including older adults 
without Abitur only because they are more common for their age cohort. In addition, although 
not exotic attending college courses might be experienced as less common among older adults 
and older adults might attend courses partly for different reasons than younger adults (e.g., 
personal growth and enlightment vs. preparation for a job). To the extent that daily experiences 
in college are similar (e.g., accomplishing course demands, meeting other and new people, 
dealing with new ideas and knowledge), one could speculate that initial and inevitable group 
differences do not affect trait changes substantially. Nonetheless, heterogeneity (i.e., variance) 
remained within the groups. This means that not all freshmen and not all older students 
changed in similar ways. Accordingly, further research is needed to study individual 
differences in change and stability by focusing on individuals’ daily processes (Wrzus, 2018; 
Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). For example, examining how often people actually interact with new 
people or discuss new ideas, how they behave and feel in such situations, and how they later 
reflect on such experiences might differ considerably within younger as well as older students 
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and might thus explain why some students increase more markedly in openness than others. 
Thus, future studies are needed to complement longitudinal assessments of traits with repeated 
momentary assessments of experiences and behaviors that might contribute to longitudinal 
personality development. 
2.4.4 Conclusion. 
This study addressed whether age differences in how the Big Five traits change 
diminish when younger and older adults undergo a similar transition and encounter the same 
context such as college. Overall, younger and older students did not differ much in trait 
changes, whereas older students and older non-students differed in trait changes. This suggests 
that contextual influences are essential for understanding age differences and more generally 
for understanding individual differences in personality development. Still, the question 
remains whether the effects of any life transition can be compared for any two people—be 
they of different ages or the same age. The experience of a life transition and its effects on 
personality and well-being will likely depend on whether the life transition occurs at a 
normative age (e.g., Lehnart et al., 2010), whether it has been experienced before (Luhmann 
& Eid, 2009), and how previous other experiences have cumulatively shaped personality 
(Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Roberts & Wood, 2006). With the current quasi-experimental study, 
we strove to achieve similar contextual conditions because random assignment to 
experimental effects seems unattainable in the field of personality development. 
In addition to examining context effects among younger and older adults, the study 
extended previous studies on personality development by including other-ratings as well as 
implicit measures of traits. Both representations revealed unique patterns of change, which 
suggests that they are not simply additional measures of traits. Rather, these additional 
representations show that further perceptional and interpretive processes occur in comparison 
with the processes that occur when participants provide self-assessments. One of the most 
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challenging tasks for future studies will be to capture and to compare the underlying processes 
in how explicit, implicit, and others’ representations of traits change at different times during 
people’s lives. 
 
  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III: 
Predictors of Volitional Personality Change in Younger and Older Adults: Response 
Surface Analyses Signify the Complementary Perspectives of the Self and 
Knowledgeable Others8 
  
                                                 
8 This chapter is based on the following manuscript: 
 
Quintus, M., Egloff, B., & Wrzus, C. (2017). Predictors of volitional personality change in younger and older 
adults: Response surface analyses signify the complementary perspectives of the self and knowledgeable 
others. Journal of Research in Personality, 70, 214-228. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2017.08.001 
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3.1 Introduction 
People’s personality traits exhibit continuity and change across the entire lifespan 
(Roberts et al., 2008). In part, people actively shape this development by setting goals to 
maintain or change certain characteristics. Such self-regulated or volitional personality 
development is currently discussed as one factor that contributes to the lifelong development 
of personality (Denissen et al., 2013; Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016b; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
However, little is known about why people set goals to change themselves (Hudson & Roberts, 
2014). Previous research has shown that goals to change depend on the current self-reported 
trait level (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a). For example, with lower self-perceived 
extraversion, the goal to increase in extraversion is more pronounced. Researchers have yet to 
determine whether setting goals to change is a purely subjective phenomenon (e.g., I think I 
am shy and thus I want to be more extraverted) or whether others’ perspectives play a role as 
well (e.g., others tell me I am shy, and therefore I want to be more extraverted, especially when 
I agree that I am shy). 
To fill this gap, we investigated the role of self- and other-reported Big Five traits in 
change goals in an age-heterogeneous sample. Specifically, in younger and older adults, we 
examined whether self- and other-perceptions that agree are associated with stronger change 
goals than trait perceptions that disagree. In addition, we examined more domain-specific 
predictors beyond the Big Five traits (e.g., self-esteem and entity orientation) as well as 
whether the effects of the predictors varied with age. This enabled us to provide a 
comprehensive picture of why and when people want to change or maintain certain traits.  
3.1.1 Current knowledge on goals to change or maintain personality traits. 
In general, goals are future states that a person wants or feels obliged to achieve (R. M. 
Ryan et al., 1996). Given the broad agreement that personality traits can be organized in terms 
of the Big Five dimensions—emotional stability (the inverse of neuroticism), 
 Chapter III: Predictors of Change Goals  
  
81 
 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness to experience (Goldberg, 1993; 
John et al., 2008)—Hudson and Roberts (2014) showed that goals to change personality traits 
can be organized within the same dimensions. Even when people freely described goals to 
change personality, the Five Factor structure emerged except for openness (Baranski et al., 
2017). 
In recent studies, the vast majority of people expressed goals to change aspects of their 
personality and generally wanted to become more emotionally stable, extraverted, open, 
agreeable, and conscientious (Baranski et al., 2017; Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016b; Hudson 
& Roberts, 2014; Robinson et al., 2015). Hudson and Roberts (2014) emphasized the 
importance of experiencing discrepancies between actual and desired future traits as an 
antecedent of change goals (see also Higgins, 1987). Similarly, a recent framework for self-
regulated personality change (Hennecke et al., 2014) proposed that changing trait-related 
behavior needs to be considered necessary or desirable (i.e., motivated) and feasible to enact 
behavioral changes, which, after becoming habitual, might change latent traits. Thus, initial 
studies investigated current trait levels as reasons for why trait changes are considered 
necessary or desirable (Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Robinson et al., 
2015). People might want to increase traits that are less pronounced because higher values on 
the aforementioned Big Five personality traits are partly socially desirable (Dunlop et al., 
2012). Accordingly, lower self-reported Big Five trait levels were consistently associated with 
stronger goals to change the trait (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; 
Robinson et al., 2015).  
Personality development has been found to be most prominent in young adulthood 
(Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006b; Soto, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2011). Therefore, 
goals to change personality might also be most prevalent in young adulthood. Supporting this 
assumption, for 6,800 adults between the ages of 18 and 70, goals to change traits were 
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generally less pronounced in older participants (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b). The age differences 
were especially prominent for conscientiousness, emotional stability, and extraversion. 
Nonetheless, change goals were prevalent, albeit weaker, in later life, with, for example, 85% 
of participants at age 70 expressing goals to change their conscientiousness (Hudson & Fraley, 
2016b). Yet previous studies relied on self-reported traits and change goals, inviting the 
questions of whether associations between traits and change goals arise from common 
response bias and whether such associations would also exist if traits were measured 
differently, for example, with observer reports. Hence, considering such an outside perspective 
would help to address this open question and to provide information on whether change goals 
are related only to self-perceived levels of personality traits or more generally to trait levels, 
irrespective of how the traits are assessed. 
3.1.2 Self- and other-perspectives on traits and goals to change. 
People can provide valid and unique information about their personality because they 
have access to a great quantity (e.g., due to their access to a long time span and many diverse 
situations) and quality (e.g., due to their access to intrapsychic processes) of trait-relevant data 
(McDonald, 2008; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). However, people’s perception of their own 
personality may also include biases and blind spots due to processes such as consistency 
seeking and self-enhancement (Back & Vazire, 2012; John & Robins, 1994; Kwan et al., 2004; 
Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Other people (e.g., friends or family) may provide complementary 
and unique information (Vazire & Carlson, 2011). Although such other-ratings may also suffer 
from biases (e.g., enhancement bias, fundamental attribution error) and may be based on less 
information (McDonald, 2008), they have been shown to be accurate, valid, and incrementally 
useful in predicting personality outcomes (Vazire, 2006; Vazire & Mehl, 2008).  
Regarding change goals, others’ perceptions may provide another view on a person’s 
“real” trait level (Back & Vazire, 2012). Because there is no direct, unbiased measure of the 
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“real” trait level, it is important to consider multiple sources (e.g., self- and other-ratings) that 
might provide corresponding or complementary information about a person’s personality 
traits. In addition, close, knowledgeable others may also influence goals to change if they 
provide feedback on a person’s current and prospectively desired personality (Taylor, 2006). 
In social interactions, such close others perceive a person’s personality through the person’s 
behavior and might communicate both the perceived and the desired personality (Back et al., 
2009; Funder, 1995; Vazire, 2010). The person might react to how knowledgeable others 
perceive her, so that the feedback might alter goals to change one’s personality (Back et al., 
2011). Aside from directly providing explicit feedback, others may interact with a person 
according to their perceptions of the person’s personality and thus provide more indirect 
feedback. In turn, the person could use such (behavioral) interactions with others to form a 
meta-perception that may then form the basis for evaluating the need for personality change 
(Back et al., 2011; Back & Vazire, 2012). For example, if others perceive a person as shy or 
reserved, they may make fewer efforts to start a conversation. The experience of such 
situations and indirect social feedback may then foster the person’s self-perception of being 
shy so that the person might thus desire personality change. 
A person and his or her knowledgeable others might agree or disagree in their 
perceptions of that person’s personality traits. This may lead to self- and other-ratings that 
agree more (e.g., my friends and I agree on my level of extraversion) or less, with 
disagreements taking two forms: higher self- than other-ratings (e.g., I think I am more 
extraverted than my friends think I am) or lower self- than other-ratings (e.g., I think I am less 
extraverted than my friends think I am; Atwater, Ostroff, Yammarino, & Fleenor, 1998; 
Atwater & Yammarino, 1997). Most literature on the consequences of self-other agreement 
comes from leadership research (for an overview, see Fleenor, Smither, Atwater, Braddy, & 
Sturm, 2010). For example, leaders who over- or underestimate their effectiveness relative to 
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how others rate their effectiveness misjudge their own strengths and deficits (Atwater & 
Yammarino, 1997). At the same time, leaders who overestimate themselves fail to set 
developmental goals to overcome their deficits (Atwater & Yammarino, 1997; Bass & 
Yammarino, 1991). Individuals who underestimate themselves may be interested in self-
development but may lack the aspirations and self-efficacy to set high goals (London & 
Smither, 1995). Thus, a rather accurate self-rating (i.e., self- and other-ratings that agree) of 
oneself seems important for realistic goal setting and goal accomplishment (London & 
Smither, 1995; Taylor, 2006).  
Translating these findings into the research on goals to change personality, one could 
expect that agreement between a person and others regarding the person’s traits would be 
associated with stronger goals to change traits compared with when the person and others 
disagree because views (i.e., ratings) that agree might better reflect the “real” trait level. In 
contrast, people with higher self- than other-ratings might neglect their weaknesses, give more 
weight to their own perception of strengths, and thus set lower change goals. For example, 
others may provide direct feedback or behave in a manner that corresponds with their 
impression that a person is not very extraverted, but the person might still hold the belief she 
is more extraverted than others think she is. Thus, the person may find it unnecessary to try to 
become more extraverted. Also, people with lower self- than other-ratings may be open about 
their assumed weaknesses but at the same time lack the self-confidence to set stronger goals 
to develop this trait. Furthermore, change goals may seem less necessary with lower self- than 
other-ratings because others’ feedback might be incorporated into a person’s self-view and 
thus lead to an adjustment of the person’s self-ratings (Back & Vazire, 2012). An accurate 
perception of one’s personality should provide an appropriate basis for forming realistic 
change goals because self- and other-ratings that agree are more likely to represent a person’s 
“real” trait level (Back & Vazire, 2012). In line with previous findings that lower self-
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perceived Big Five traits were associated with stronger change goals in these traits (Hudson 
& Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014), we suggest that when self- and other-ratings are 
both low (e.g., my friends and I agree that I am not very extraverted), goals to change a trait 
are more pronounced—compared with self- and other-ratings that are both high. 
Self-other agreement may be especially relevant for change goals regarding traits that 
play a stronger role in interpersonal relationships such as extraversion (Borkenau & Liebler, 
1995; Denissen & Penke, 2008; Selfhout et al., 2010), agreeableness (Denissen & Penke, 
2008; Nettle, 2006), and conscientiousness (Jensen-Campbell, Knack, Waldrip, & Campbell, 
2007). For these traits, and especially for extraversion, others may have detailed information, 
can thus provide more valid feedback, and may provide feedback because trait-related 
behavior is relevant for the relationship (Funder, 2012; Vazire, 2010; Vazire & Carlson, 2011). 
In addition, people might be more willing to complement their own perspective on their traits 
by considering close others’ feedback when they believe that this feedback is based on more 
valid information, which might be the case for these social traits (Back et al., 2011). Therefore, 
we suggest that both people’s own perceptions and the perceptions of others are important 
when people set goals to change extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Others’ 
perceptions might not be equally important concerning change goals for less social traits and 
traits that the self has privileged access to, such as emotional stability or openness to 
experience (Denissen & Penke, 2008; Funder, 2012; Vazire, 2010).  
3.1.3 Beyond the Big Five to predict goals to change. 
In addition to current trait levels, several additional personality characteristics might 
be relevant for change goals for theoretical or empirical reasons. Here, we focus on life 
satisfaction, self-esteem, locus of control, entity orientation, optimism, and loneliness and 
explain this selection next.  
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First, life satisfaction was found to be associated with intentional self-change (Kiecolt, 
1994), and low satisfaction with one’s life predicted stronger goals to change traits in previous 
studies, although this association was partly explained by existing Big Five traits (Hudson & 
Fraley, 2016a; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). That is, people who were less satisfied with their 
lives wanted to change their lives and themselves (Hudson & Fraley, 2016a; Hudson & 
Roberts, 2014), especially if the dissatisfaction was linked to their current traits (e.g., being 
shy and dissatisfied with one’s social life).  
Self-esteem, “an individual’s subjective evaluation of her or his worth as a person” 
(Donnellan, Trzesniewski, & Robins, 2011, p. 718), has been linked to higher life satisfaction 
(Diener & Diener, 1995; Donnellan et al., 2011). Lower self-esteem can therefore be seen as 
domain-specific dissatisfaction with oneself (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001; Robins, 
Tracy, Trzesniewski, Potter, & Gosling, 2001) which could thus be expected to elicit stronger 
goals to change oneself.  
An internal locus of control, that is, perceiving events as contingencies of one’s own 
actions or traits (Rotter, 1966), seems important for having change goals. Goal setting and 
specifically volitional changes in traits would seem promising only if events, e.g., goal 
achievement, are believed to result from one’s own actions. Accordingly, a stronger internal 
locus of control was found to predict more pronounced goal setting and pursuit of these goals 
in general (Judge, Bono, Erez, & Locke, 2005). Furthermore, having a stronger internal locus 
of control was associated with engaging more in self-developmental activities at work (e.g., 
career planning; Ng, Sorensen, & Eby, 2006). By contrast, having a stronger external locus of 
control, defined as perceiving events as the result of others’ actions or of destiny, has been 
linked to learned helplessness, passivity, and less intrinsic goal pursuit (Judge et al., 2005; 
Rotter, 1992), thus making goal setting for personality change less likely.  
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Believing that, in general, personality is dynamic and malleable (incremental 
orientation) instead of fixed and immutable (entity orientation) could be associated with 
change goals on theoretical grounds (Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Goals to 
change traits are reasonable only if personality is assumed to be malleable. Implicit theories 
were found to be largely independent of current Big Five trait levels (Spinath, Spinath, 
Riemann, & Angleitner, 2003) but they have not yet been linked directly to change goals. 
Previous research has suggested that beliefs about the changeability of characteristics affect 
self-regulatory processes (Burnette, O'Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013; Dweck, 
2008; Molden & Dweck, 2006). For example, an incremental orientation predicted the pursuit 
of learning goals and the use of mastery-oriented strategies, which include an active and 
tenacious pursuit of aims (Burnette et al., 2013).  
Optimism, having a positive and therefore confident view of one’s future, represents 
another possible predictor of goals to change. The anticipation that positive things will happen 
to oneself should promote active coping strategies (e.g., changing things) and individuals’ 
expectations that they can succeed in reaching their personal goals (Andersson, 1996; Carver, 
Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010; Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). However, lower optimism has been 
found to be associated with lower extraversion and emotional stability (Sharpe, Martin, & 
Roth, 2011) as well as lower life satisfaction (Bailey, Eng, Frisch, & Snyder, 2007). Hence, 
less optimistic people could have more reasons to change lower traits and might therefore 
express stronger change goals. 
Finally, loneliness, an “individual’s subjective perception of deficiencies in his or her 
network of social relationships” (Russell, Cutrona, Rose, & Yurko, 1984, p. 1313), has been 
associated with lower happiness, extraversion, and emotional stability (Booth, Bartlett, & 
Bohnsack, 1992; H. Cheng & Furnham, 2002; Ernst & Cacioppo, 1999). Prior research has 
suggested that personality affects loneliness inasmuch as behavioral expressions of traits 
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might lead to social exclusion (Ernst & Cacioppo, 1999; Shaver, Furman, & Buhrmester, 
1985). For example, showing higher levels of aggression and anger in different contexts might 
evoke rejection by others and thereby generate feelings of loneliness (Leary, Twenge, & 
Quinlivan, 2006). In addition, attributing failure to one’s character (i.e., personality) was 
associated with loneliness (Anderson, Miller, Riger, Dill, & Sedikides, 1994), so changing 
one’s personality could provide a promising way to overcome feelings of loneliness.  
3.1.4 Current study. 
We conducted the current study to investigate predictors of goals to change personality 
traits in two age groups of younger and older adults recruited from student and nonstudent 
contexts. As goals to change are part of an individual’s personal developmental strategy, we 
assessed them with self-report measures. In line with previous findings (Hudson & Fraley, 
2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 2014), we hypothesized that lower current trait levels would be 
associated with stronger change goals in both age groups (Hypothesis 1). Extending previous 
research, we used other-ratings of personality traits in addition to self-reported traits to predict 
goals to change. For both age groups, we hypothesized that self- and other-ratings that agree 
would be associated with stronger change goals than ratings that disagree and that change 
goals would be strongest when both self- and other-ratings indicate low current trait levels 
(Hypothesis 2). We also expected that agreement effects would be most pronounced for traits 
that are important in social situations such as extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness, whereas a person’s own perceptions (i.e., self-rated traits) would be more 
important than others’ perceptions for traits that are not as apparent in social situations such 
as emotional stability and openness to experience. To look beyond the Big Five traits as 
predictors of change goals, we investigated a wide range of additional theoretically and 
empirically meaningful predictors: We expected that change goals would be more pronounced 
with lower life satisfaction, lower self-esteem, less entity orientation, higher internal locus of 
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control, and higher loneliness (Hypothesis 3). Because theoretical and empirical research has 
suggested different effects for optimism, we examined its association with change goals 
exploratively. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants and procedure. 
We recruited 378 participants via local newspapers, flyers in public places (cafés, drug 
stores, vocational schools), Facebook groups, mailing lists, and from introductory 
nonpsychology courses for regular and older students at the university of Mainz, Germany. 
Participants were part of an ongoing longitudinal study on personality development, which 
aimed to assess 200 younger and older participants each, based on power analyses and 
considerations of attrition.9 The ethics committee of the Psychological Institute of the 
University of Mainz approved the study (approval #2015-JGU-psychEK-012). Due to the 
longitudinal nature of the study, we had to restrict the period for the first assessment and 
assessed 254 young adults between 17 and 32 years of age (M = 21.88, SD = 2.27; 75% female) 
and 124 older adults between 51 and 78 years of age (M = 67.85, SD = 5.33; 69% female). 
These sample sizes provided a power of .99 for younger adults and .96 for older adults to 
detect average-sized zero-order effects with p  .05 (r = .30 for Big Five traits; Hudson & 
Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). The power was .94 (younger adults) and .72 (older 
adults) for detecting smaller effects (r = .20 for additional personality characteristics) with p 
 .05. Participants received information about the study, provided informed consent, and first 
answered online questionnaires at home. Afterwards, participants came to the laboratory 
where they completed additional questionnaires and tests on personal computers in small age-
                                                 
9 The main focus of this project was on longitudinal personality change and daily experiences. An a priori power 
analysis for corresponding multilevel analyses suggested that with an anticipated attrition rate of 10%, 250 to 
300 participants were sufficient. 
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homogeneous group sessions. At the end of the laboratory session, participants named up to 
two persons (e.g., friends or family members) who would provide ratings of the participants’ 
personality. 
For 237 younger and 104 older participants, a total of 616 other people provided ratings 
online or on paper-pencil questionnaires if no internet access was available. Of the 341 
participants, 81% were rated by two other persons, and 19% were rated by one other person. 
If available, two ratings were averaged to form a composite other-rating score. The mean age 
of other-raters was 28.5 years (SD = 12.57) for younger adults and 59.3 years (SD = 14.16) for 
older adults. Participants most frequently named friends (46% of younger adults, 42% of older 
adults) or family members (31% of younger adults, 28% of older adults) with whom they had 
been acquainted often for 3 or more years (73% of younger adults, 98% of older adults). 
Agreement among other raters was ICC(1,2) = .34 for emotional stability, .46 for 
conscientiousness, .30 for agreeableness, .46 for extraversion, and .37 for openness (all ps < 
.001). 
3.2.2 Measures. 
Personality traits. 
We obtained self- and other-report ratings of emotional stability, conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, extraversion, and openness to experience using the German version of the 44-
item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999; Lang et al., 2001). Items were rated 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and averaged for 
each trait to form composites. Cronbach’s α reliabilities were satisfactory for self-reported 
(average α = .83, range α = .72 to .89) and other-reported BFI traits (average α = .85, range α 
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= .81 to .88). Revell’s ω total indicated good reliability for self-reported (average ω = .88, 
range ω = .80 to .93) and other-reported BFI traits (average ω = .89, range ω = .87 to .91).10 
Life satisfaction.  
We measured participants’ life satisfaction with the German version of the Satisfaction 
with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; Ferring, Filipp, & 
Schmidt, 1996), which extends the five-item English version of the SWLS (Diener et al., 1985) 
and differentiates between current, retrospective, and prospective life satisfaction. To form a 
comparable composite score, we aggregated the subscales for measuring current (six items, 
e.g., “My life is filled with interesting things”) and retrospective life satisfaction (four items, 
e.g., “Looking back on my life, I am rather satisfied”). The subscales correlated r = .65, p < 
.01. Participants rated their agreement with the items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The average of all 10 items showed high reliability 
(Cronbach’s α = .89, Revell’s ω total = .92).  
Self-esteem.  
We assessed participants’ self-esteem with the German version of the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem scale (RSE; Ferring & Filipp, 1996; Rosenberg, 1965). All 10 items were rated on a 
7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and again averaged to 
form a composite (α = .86, ω total = .89). 
Locus of control.  
We measured locus of control with a four-item scale (IE-4; Kovaleva, Beierlein, 
Kemper, & Rammstedt, 2012) that includes two items each for external and internal locus of 
control (e.g., “If I work hard, I will succeed”). Items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Answers to the external locus of control items 
                                                 
10 To account for methodological drawbacks of Cronbach’s alpha, we additionally report Revelle’s ω total for 
scales with more than three items (McNeish, 2017).  
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were reversed so that a four-item composite for locus of control could be formed with higher 
values indicating a more internal locus of control (α = .57, ω total = .65).11 
Entity orientation.  
We measured the implicit theory on changeability of personality traits with a three-
item scale adapted from Robins et al. (2005) in which all items reflect an entity orientation 
(e.g., “personality traits are hardly changeable”; see also Dweck, 1999; Dweck et al., 1995). 
Items were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
so that low values indicated an incremental orientation and high values represented an entity 
orientation. We averaged all items to form a composite (α = .69, ω total = .71). 
Optimism.  
A six-item German version of the Life-Orientation-Test (LOT-R; Glaesmer, Hoyer, 
Klotsche, & Herzberg, 2008; Scheier & Carver, 1985) served as a measure of optimism (e.g., 
“I am always optimistic about my future”). Items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and averaged to form a composite (α = .79, ω total 
= .84).  
Loneliness.  
We assessed global feelings of loneliness with 11 items from the German version of 
the UCLA Loneliness scale (e.g., “I feel completely alone”; Döring & Bortz, 1993). Items 
were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Averaging items resulted in a composite with α = .89 and ω total = .94.  
Change goals. 
Participants provided ratings on goals to change their emotional stability, 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness to experience. We measured 
                                                 
11 Table A5 in the Appendix presents analyses for the two subscales separately and shows that effects are 
somewhat stronger for the subscale internal locus of control. 
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change goals with a 16-item German short-version of the Change Goals BFI (C-BFI; Hudson 
& Roberts, 2014), which was originally developed from the 44-item BFI (John & Srivastava, 
1999). All items began with the stem “I want to be…” instead of “I am” as in the BFI, and 
then the original BFI items were presented (e.g., “I want to be … someone who is considerate 
and kind to almost everyone”; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). The short version of the C-BFI is 
based on the validated German BFI-S (Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005). Items were rated on a 5-point 
scale ranging from -2 (much less than I currently am), to 0 (I do not want to change on this 
trait), to +2 (much more than I currently am). The scale reliabilities were on average α = .63 
(range α = .43 to .76) and ω = .67 (range ω = .43 to .76).   
3.2.3 Analytic strategy. 
We tested Hypotheses 1 and 3 on associations of change goals with Big Five traits and 
additional personality characteristics by computing Pearson correlations and multiple 
regression analyses. To test Hypothesis 2 on agreement effects of self- and other-rated traits 
on goals to change, we applied polynomial regressions with response surface analysis (RSA), 
which extends moderated regression or difference scores analysis (Edwards, 1994, 2001; 
Edwards & Parry, 1993; Nestler, Grimm, & Schönbrodt, 2015; Shanock, Baran, Gentry, 
Pattison, & Heggestad, 2010). Barranti, Carlson, and Côté (2017) provide a detailed and easy-
to-read overview of RSA along with its advantages and several examples from personality 
psychology (for a recent empirical application, see, e.g., Weidmann, Schönbrodt, Ledermann, 
& Grob, 2017). 
In the unconstrained full polynomial regression, individuals’ change goals were 
predicted by self-rated traits (linear and quadratic terms), other-rated traits (linear and 
quadratic terms), and the multiplicative interaction of self- and other-ratings. Formally, the 
regression model was specified as 
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Change goal = b0 + b1 * Self-rated trait + b2 * Other-rated trait + b3 * Self-rated trait² 
+ b4 * Self-rated trait * Other-rated trait + 
b5 * Other-rated trait² + e,     (1) 
We used the RSA package (Schönbrodt, 2016; for R 3.3.3, R Core Team, 2017) with 
the Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimator to estimate the full polynomial 
regression models as well as simpler models (e.g., only self-ratings as predictors of change 
goals). Thus, several simpler models were also tested and preferred if they fit the data equally 
well to avoid overfitting of the data with the full polynomial model (Schönbrodt, 2015). 
Specifically, we used the Akaike Information Criterion (AICc), the model weight (an index 
that compares the relative fit of nested models), and the comparative fit index (CFI) to compare 
several strictly hierarchically nested polynomial regression models to find the most 
parsimonious model that did not show a significantly worse model fit than the previous more 
complex model (Schönbrodt, 2015). A difference in AICc (ΔAICc) < 2 indicated that two 
models fit equally well (Schönbrodt, 2015). We present the specific best fitting models for 
each trait and age group in Table 11 using the common RSA model terms to allow for model 
comparisons within the RSA framework (Schönbrodt, 2015). To facilitate model 
interpretation, we provide detailed information on what each selected model tests in the 
corresponding results section and in Table 12. 
After selecting the best fitting models, we then used the coefficients from the 
regression to construct response surface plots to visually represent the linear or quadratic 
effects of agreement and disagreement between self- and other-rated traits on change goals 
(Edwards & Parry, 1993; Schönbrodt, 2015; Shanock et al., 2010). The response surface plots 
contain a line of incongruence (LOIC; Figure 3) that shows where the self- and other-ratings 
disagree perfectly. The coefficients describing the slope (a3 = b1 - b2; see Equation 1) and the 
curvature (a4 = b3 - b4 + b5) along the LOIC indicate how disagreement between self-ratings 
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and other-ratings predicts change goals. For example, a negative curvature in a4 (displayed as 
a concave surface bending downwards) indicates that self- and other-ratings that disagree are 
associated with weaker change goals than ratings that agree. A negative a3 slope indicates that 
change goals are stronger when other-ratings are higher than self-ratings. The response surface 
plots also contain a line of congruence (LOC; Figure 3), where self- and other-ratings agree 
perfectly (self-rating = other-ratings). The LOC is described by a slope (a1 = b1 + b2) and a 
curvature (a2 = b3 + b4 + b5) that both specify agreement effects: For example, a negative a1 
slope means that people express stronger change goals as both their own and others’ ratings 
of the trait become lower. A positive a2 curvature means that change goals are more 
pronounced the more both self- and other-ratings approach high or low levels (convex curve; 
see also Barranti et al., 2017). 
The response surface can be additionally shifted by a constant (parameter C) or rotated 
along the LOC according to a scaling factor (parameter S), which we explain in the relevant 
results sections. It is important to mention that, in the displayed surface plots, the shape of the 
surface can be interpreted only in regions where actual data exist (Schönbrodt, 2015)—
indicated by the observed data points and the black contour (see Figure 3). To offer an easy 
interpretation of RSA parameters and plots, we centered all predictor variables on the scale 
midpoint (Barranti et al., 2017). 
3.3 Results 
When reporting the results, we first show that goals to change traits were more 
pronounced with lower self- or other-rated Big Five trait levels in both age groups (Hypothesis 
1). We then demonstrate that self- and other-ratings that agree on lower current trait levels 
were associated with stronger goals to change for extraversion and agreeableness in both age 
groups and for conscientiousness in older adults (Hypothesis 2). Finally, when life satisfaction, 
self-esteem, internal locus of control, and optimism were lower and when loneliness was 
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greater, change goals were stronger (zero-order correlation), whereas entity orientation 
showed no association with change goals (Hypothesis 3). However, multiple regression 
analyses suggested that the associations could be attributed to shared variance with current 
Big Five traits. Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for all predictors and their correlations 
with goals to change, separately for younger and older participants. 
3.3.1 Self- and Other-Reported Traits Predict Goals to Change. 
In general, younger participants reported significantly stronger change goals than older 
participants (Table 9, last row, all ts > 2.08, ps < .05). As predicted, lower self-reported Big 
Five trait levels were significantly associated with stronger change goals for that particular 
trait in both age groups (average r = -.42 for younger and r = -.43 for older adults). 
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Traits, Additional Personality Characteristics, and Change Goals 
   Change goals 
 M SD 
Emotional  
stability 
Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Variable 
Younger/ 
older 
 Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Self-reported 
traits 
  
     
1. Emotional stability 4.08a / 4.36b 1.27 / 1.22 -.65* / -.51* .05 / -.20* -.05 / -.10 -.13* / -.19 .04 / -.10 
2. Conscientiousness 4.77a / 5.43b 0.90 / 0.80 .06 / -.10 -.46* / -.42* -.09 / -.10 .02 / -.30* -.10 / -.16 
3. Agreeableness 4.91a / 5.10b 0.86 / 0.80 .07 / -.08 .08 / -.03 -.21* / -.33* .00 / -.15 .14* / .03 
4. Extraversion 5.03a / 5.05a 1.09 / 1.12 -.10 / -.28* -.14* / -.26* .05 / .03 -.49* / -.56* -.05 / -.26* 
5. Openness 5.21a / 5.38a 0.99 / 0.85 .10 / -.13 -.04 / -.10 .07 / .11 -.04 / -.32* -.17* / -.34* 
Other-reported 
traits 
       
6. Emotional stability 4.33a / 4.51a 1.04 / 1.13 -.34* / -.33* .14* / -.14 -.04 / -.05 .08 / -.15 .09 / -.13 
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Table 9 continued 
 
  
Change goals 
 M SD 
Emotional  
stability 
Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Variable 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older  
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
7. Conscientiousness 5.12a / 5.79b 0.91 / 0.84 .08 / .01 -.21* / -.25* .12 / -.14 .12 / .02 -.03 / .15 
8. Agreeableness 5.19a / 5.04a 0.84 / 0.92 .05 / -.13 .05 / -.10 -.17* / -.14 .06/ -.07 .13 / -.06 
9. Extraversion 5.37a / 5.70b 0.97 / 0.92 -.08 / -.08 -.01 / -.05 .09 / -.00 -.38* / -.31* .06 / -.13 
10. Openness  5.38a / 5.45a 0.83 / 0.81 .13 / -.14 -.03 / -.10 .06 / -.07 -.02 / -.17 -.06 / -.20* 
Additional personality 
characteristics 
       
11. Life satisfaction 5.52a / 5.83b 1.05 / 0.93 -.19* / -.32* -.26* / -.16 -.06 / -.18 -.12 / -.36* -.07 / -.25* 
12. Self-esteem 5.17a / 5.91b 1.02 / 0.79 -.29* / -.17 -.22* / -.26* .02 / -.08 -.01 / -.28* -.13* / -.27* 
13. Locus of control 3.87a / 4.02b 0.54 / 0.51 -.15* / -.26* -.23* / -.21* -.03 / -.18 -.08 / -.13 -.13* / -.21* 
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Table 9 continued 
   Change goals 
 M SD 
Emotional  
stability 
Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Variable Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older  
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
Younger/ 
older 
14. Entity  
      orientation 
3.51a / 3.91b 1.22 / 1.50 -.10 / -.02 .04 / -.08 -.08 / .15 -.03 / -.03 -.05 / -.07 
15. Optimism 3.62a / 4.04b 0.68 / 0.63 -.26* / -.34* -.15* / -.08 -.06 / -.08 .00 / -.17 -.01 / -.07 
16. Loneliness 1.74a / 1.70a 0.65 / 0.60 .21* / .31* .19* / .26* .16* / .15 .18* / .37* .05 / .32* 
Change goals M    0.88a / 0.66b 0.82a / 0.28b 0.40a / 0.31b 0.47a / 0.29b 0.52a / 0.41b 
Change goals SD   0.62 / 0.57 0.55 / 0.44 0.46 / 0.41 0.59 / 0.51 0.41 / 0.43 
Note. Values to the left of the slashes refer to younger adults; values to the right refer to older adults.  
Means for younger and older participants with different subscripts within rows and columns are significantly different at p ≤ .05 according to t 
tests for independent samples. 
* p < .05. 
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Zero-order correlations (Table 9) suggested that the associations between traits and 
change goals differed between age groups. We therefore predicted change goals with the 
corresponding self-reported Big Five traits, age group, and Big Five Traits  Age Group 
interactions in multiple regression models (Table 10). As in zero-order correlations, lower 
current Big Five traits significantly predicted higher corresponding goals to change. The 
significant age group effects mirrored the mean-level differences in change goals presented in 
Table 9 when differences in current trait levels were controlled for. The significant Trait  
Age Group interaction for emotional stability indicated that associations between current trait 
level with goals to change varied between age groups. The correlation was stronger for 
younger adults (r = -.66, p < .01) than for older adults (r = -.49, p < .01). No further significant 
differences between age groups in the associations between self-reported traits and change 
goals were found.12 
The zero-order associations of other-reported trait levels and change goals suggested 
that, in general, goals to change were more pronounced with lower trait levels and also when 
others reported the traits (Table 9).13 This was especially true for extraversion, 
conscientiousness, and emotional stability.  
                                                 
12 Table A6 presents regression analysis predicting goals to change simultaneously from all Big Five Traits, age 
group, and Big Five × Age Group interactions. 
13 The correlations of self- and other-reported traits were on average r = .53, p ≤ .001, in younger adults (range 
r = .45, p ≤ .001 for agreeableness to r = .62, p ≤ .001 for extraversion,) and r = .41, p ≤ .001, in older adults (r 
= .21, p = .035 for conscientiousness to r = .55, p ≤ .001 for emotional stability). Self-other agreement did not 
differ significantly between younger and older adult, zs < 1.96, ps > .05, except for conscientiousness, z = 2.52, 
p = .012. 
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Table 10 
Regression Analysis Predicting Goals to Change from Self-Reported Big Five Traits and Age group  
 Change goals 
  Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Trait -.66*  -.47* -.22*  -.51*  -.17* 
 [-.71, -.61] [-.53, -.40] [-.28, -.16] [-.57, -.46] [-.22, -.12] 
Age group -.12*  -.31*  -.07  -.14*  -.09  
 [-.22, -.01] [-.42, -.20] [-.16, .02] [-.25, -.04] [-.18, <.01] 
Trait × Age Group .11*  .06  -.07  -.03  -.11  
 [.02, .19] [-.06, .19] [-.18, .04] [-.07, .13] [-.21, <.01] 
R² .39  .36  .07  .26  .07 
F(3, 374) 81.01  71.12  10.69  45.70  10.09 
p < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Note. All continuous predictors are standardized. Age group is dummy-coded with 0 = younger adults, 1 = older adults. 
* p < .05. 
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3.3.2 Self-Other Agreement in Traits Predicts Goals to Change in Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. 
In a next step, we conducted RSAs for each Big Five trait and age group separately to 
test whether agreement between self- and other-ratings predicted change goals. We report the 
model indices for the three best fitting models (Table 11) to allow retracing of the model 
selection and next describe the final model for each trait and the appropriate regression 
coefficients.14 The regression coefficients for the selected models are summarized in Table 12. 
                                                 
14 To provide a more intuitive account of whether self-other agreement matters in the prediction of change goals, 
we additionally calculated linear interaction models for each trait. Results can be found in Table A7. Furthermore, 
we present results for the full polynomial models for each trait in Table A8 and response surfaces in Figure A1 
to A5 to allow for comparisons with the selected models. 
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Table 11 
Model Comparisons for Big Five Traits per Age Group, Ordered by ΔAICc 
Trait Age group Model k AICc ΔAICc 
Model 
weight 
Evidence 
ratio 
CFI R²adj Δ-2LL (df) pΔ-2LL 
ES Younger adults Onlyx 3 4197.24 0.00 .31  1.00 .43   
  Onlyx² 4 4197.60 0.36 .26 1.20 1.00 .44 1.66 (1) .197 
  Additive 4 4199.12 1.89 .12 2.57 1.00 .43 0.15 (1) .702 
ES Older adults Onlyx 3 1920.23 0.00 .35  1.00 .24   
  Additive 4 1921.62 1.38 .18 2.00 1.00 .24 0.37 (1) .540 
  Onlyx² 4 1921.92 1.69 .15 2.33 1.00 .24 0.68 (1) .408 
C Younger adults Onlyx 3 3494.09 0.00 .27  0.99 .23   
  SRR 5 3494.85 0.76 .18 1.47 1.00 .23 3.32 (2) .190 
  IA 5 3494.91 0.82 .18 1.50 1.00 .23 3.26 (2) .195 
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Table 11 continued  
Trait Age group Model k AICc ΔAICc 
Model 
weight 
Evidence 
ratio 
CFI R²adj Δ-2LL (df) pΔ-2LL 
C Older adults SRRR 6 1386.79 0.00 .22  1.00 .22   
  Additive 4 1387.12 0.33 .19 1.18 0.93 .19 4.56 (2) .102 
  SRR 5 1387.51 0.72 .15 1.43 0.96 .20 2.85 (1) .091 
A Younger adults RR 4 3125.21 0.00 .34  1.00 .06   
  IA 5 3127.09 1.89 .13 2.57 1.00 .05 0.16 (1) .687 
  SRR 5 3127.17 1.97 .13 2.67 1.00 .05 0.08 (1) .776 
A Older adults 
Full  
polynomial 
7 1393.94 0.00 .43  1.00 .25   
  SRRR 6 1394.04 0.11 .40 1.05 0.97 .24 2.28 (1) .131 
  SRR 5 1397.22 3.28 .08 5.16 0.85 .20 7.59 (2) .022 
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Table 11 continued  
Trait Age group Model k AICc ΔAICc 
Model 
weight 
Evidence 
ratio 
CFI R²adj Δ-2LL (df) pΔ-2LL 
E Younger adults IA 5 3712.74 0.00 .27  1.00 .28   
  Onlyx² 4 3713.42 0.68 .19 1.40 0.99 .28 2.72 (1) .098 
  SRRR 6 3713.62 0.88 .18 1.55 1.00 .28 1.18 (1) .276 
E Older adults SRR 5 1736.54 0.00 .56  1.00 .33   
  SRRR 6 1738.64 2.11 .20 2.87 1.00 .33 0.03 (1) .865 
  Onlyx 3 1740.64 4.10 .07 7.77 0.94 .28 8.27 (2) .016 
O Younger adults Onlyx 3 3195.97 0.00 .32  1.00 .03   
  Onlyx² 4 3197.42 1.45 .15 2.07 1.00 .03 0.58 (1) .447 
  Additive 4 3197.50 1.53 .15 2.25 1.00 .03 0.50 (1) .480 
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Table 11 continued  
Trait Age group Model k AICc ΔAICc 
Model 
weight 
Evidence 
ratio 
CFI R²adj Δ-2LL (df) pΔ-2LL 
O Older adults Onlyx² 4 1373.20 0.00 .22  0.99 .14   
  SRSQD 5 1373.64 0.43 .18 1.24 1.00 .15 1.67 (1) .196 
  Onlyx 3 1373.69 0.48 .18 1.27 0.96 .12 2.55 (1) .110 
Note. Boldface, selected model. k = Number of parameters; AICc = corrected Akaike Information Criterion; Model weight = probability of a 
model being the best of the examined models given the data; Evidence ratio = Ratio of model weights of the best model compared with each other 
model; CFI = Comparative ﬁt index; R²adj = adjusted variance explained of the model, all ps < .05; Δ-2LL = Log-likelihood Difference Test 
comparing a model with the selected model, significant values indicating a better model fit of the selected model. Onlyx = Model with one linear 
main effect of self-rated traits; Onlyx² = Model with one linear and quadratic main effect of self-rated traits; Additive = Model with two linear 
main effects of self- and other-rated traits; IA = Interaction model with two linear main effects and the interaction between self- and other-rated 
traits; SRSQD = Shifted and rotated squared difference model with nonlinear additive and interaction effects; RR = Rising ridge model with 
nonlinear additive and interaction effects; SRR = Shifted rising ridge model with nonlinear additive and interaction effects; SRRR = Shifted and 
rotated rising ridge model with nonlinear additive and interaction effects. For detailed model descriptions, see Schönbrodt (2015). 
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Table 12  
Regression Coefficients and Derived Model Parameters for each Big Five Trait and Age Group 
 Change goals 
  Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
(Onlyx) 
Older:  
self-rating  
only 
model 
(Onlyx) 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
 (Onlyx) 
Older: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(SRRR) 
Younger: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(RR) 
Older: 
full 
polynomial 
model 
 
Younger: 
linear 
interaction 
model 
(IA) 
Older: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(SRR) 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
 (Onlyx) 
Older:  
self-rating  
only²  
model 
 (Onlyx²) 
b1 -0.32* -0.23* -0.29* -0.27* -0.07* -0.38* -0.35* -0.33* -0.08* -0.33* 
 [-0.36,-0.28] [-0.31,-0.16] [-0.37,-0.22] [-0.45,-0.09] [-0.11,-0.03] [-0.54,-0.22] [-0.46,-0.25] [-0.41,-0.25] [-0.13,-0.02] [-0.50,-0.17] 
b2 - - - 0.14 -0.07* -0.01 -0.11* -0.05 - - 
 - - - [-0.09,0.38] [-0.11,-0.03] [-0.14,0.11] [-0.20,-0.02] [-0.03,0.13] - - 
b3 - - - -0.01 0.04 0.00 - -0.07* - 0.06 
 - - - [-0.05,0.03] [<-0.01,0.09] [-0.08,0.08] - [-0.12,-0.03] - [-0.02,0.14] 
b4 - - - 0.06 -0.08 0.20* 0.07* 0.14* - - 
 - - - [-0.08,0.20] [-0.17,0.01] [0.07,0.33] [0.02,0.13] [0.06,0.23] - - 
b5 - - - -0.11* 0.04 -0.13* - -0.07* - - 
 - - - [-0.19,-0.02] [<-0.01,0.09] [-0.22,-0.05] - [-0.12,-0.03] - - 
C - - - 2.50 - - - 1.34* - - 
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Table 12 continued 
 Change goals 
 Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
(Onlyx) 
Older:  
self-rating  
only  
model  
(Onlyx) 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model  
(Onlyx) 
Older: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(SRRR) 
Younger: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(RR) 
Older: 
full 
polynomial 
model 
 
Younger: 
linear 
interaction 
model 
(IA) 
Older: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(SRR) 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
(Onlyx) 
Older:  
self-rating  
only²  
model 
(Onlyx²) 
 - - - [-1.66,6.66] - - - [0.41,2.27] - - 
S - - - 0.28* - - - - - - 
    [-0.29,0.86] - - - - - - 
a1 -0.32* -0.23* -0.29* -0.13 -0.14* -0.39* -0.46* -0.28* -0.08* -0.33* 
 [-0.36,-0.28] [-0.31,-0.16] [-0.37,-0.22] [-0.45,0.20] [-0.22,-0.06] [-0.63,-0.16] [-0.59,-0.33] [-0.36,-0.20] [-0.13,-0.02] [-0.50,-0.17] 
a2 - - - -0.06 - 0.07 0.07* - - 0.06 
    [-0.15,0.04] - [-0.04,0.18] [0.02,0.13] - - [-0.02,0.14] 
a3 -0.32* -0.23* -0.29* -0.41* - -0.37* -0.24* -0.38* -0.08* -0.33* 
 [-0.36,-0.28] [-0.31,-0.16] [-0.37,-0.22] [-0.68,-0.14] - [-0.54,-0.20] [-0.39,-0.09] [-0.52,-0.25] [-0.13,-0.02] [-0.50,-0.17] 
a4 - - - -0.18 0.17 -0.33* -0.07* -0.29* - 0.06 
 - - - 
[-0.41,0.05] 
 
[-0.01,0.35] 
 
[-0.58,-0.09] 
 
[-0.13,-0.02] 
 
[-0.46,-0.11] 
 
- 
[-0.02,0.14] 
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Table 12 continued 
 Change goals 
 Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
(Onlyx) 
Older:  
self-rating  
only  
model  
(Onlyx) 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
(Onlyx) 
Older: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(SRRR) 
Younger: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(RR) 
Older: 
full 
polynomial 
model 
 
Younger: 
linear 
interaction 
model 
(IA) 
Older: 
nonlinear 
interaction 
model  
(SRR) 
Younger:  
self-rating  
only  
model 
(Onlyx) 
Older:  
self-rating  
only²  
model 
(Onlyx²) 
a´4 - - - -0.44* - - - - - - 
 - - - [-0.77,-0.10] - - - - - - 
bM - - - -0.81 - - - - - - 
 - - - [-2.31,0.52] - - - - - - 
Note. Younger = younger adults, Older = older adults. 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors in brackets. b1 = self-reported 
trait; b2 = other-reported trait; b3 = self-reported trait²; b4 = self- and other-reported trait interaction; b5 = other-reported trait². For the S parameter, 
the p-value resulted from a test of H0: S = 1; for all other parameters, the p-value resulted from a test of whether the parameter was zero. Note 
that in less complex models (e.g., without significant quadratic effects), not all regression coefficients b1 to b5 and consequently not all surface 
parameters a1 to a4 were estimated. 
* p < .05. 
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3.3.2.1 Emotional stability. 
Regarding emotional stability, for both age groups, the best fitting and most 
parsimonious models according to the lowest AICc and greatest model weight (i.e., the 
probability that the model is the best fitting model) were models where only self-rated 
emotional stability predicted goals to change (Tables 11 and 12). As shown in Figures 3A and 
3B, for both age groups, the response surfaces indicated that goals to increase in emotional 
stability were more pronounced the lower participants rated themselves on emotional stability 
(coefficient b1, Table 12). It is important to mention that the surfaces did not cross zero at the 
z-axis, which means that people with the highest levels of self-rated emotional stability 
reported goals to maintain but not to decrease their level of emotional stability (Figures 3A 
and 3B). 
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Figure 3. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated emotional stability with goals to change emotional stability for each age 
group: (A) for younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease 
emotional stability) to +3 (increase emotional stability), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
A B 
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3.3.2.2 Conscientiousness. 
The best fitting model for conscientiousness in younger adults was a model in which 
only self-reported conscientiousness predicted change goals (Table 11; coefficient b1, Table 
12). Figure 4A shows that goals to change were stronger the lower younger people rated 
themselves regarding conscientiousness. 
In older adults, goals to change conscientiousness were best predicted by a model that 
considered both participants’ and others’ perspectives in a nonlinear combination (Table 11). 
In addition, the response surface was rotated to the left as indicated by the significant rotation 
parameter S (Table 12; dotted line in Figure 4B). In general, change goals were more 
pronounced when older adults’ self-ratings on conscientiousness were low (coefficient b1, 
Table 12). Change goals were stronger for self- and other-ratings that agreed, albeit only for 
the curvature along the rotated ridge, as suggested by the curvature in Figure 4B and the 
significant a´4 parameter (rotation-adjusted a4, Table 12). In addition, change goals were more 
pronounced when others rated people as more conscientious than the people rated themselves, 
as indicated by the significant a3 parameter (Table 12). Furthermore, as we found for emotional 
stability, in both age groups, actual data existed only when people held goals to increase but 
not to decrease in conscientiousness. 
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Figure 4. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated conscientiousness with goals to change conscientiousness for each age 
group: (A) for younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease 
conscientiousness) to +3 (increase conscientiousness), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
A B 
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3.3.2.3 Agreeableness. 
For agreeableness in younger adults, the best fitting model was a nonlinear interaction 
model in which both self- and other-rated trait levels were considered (Table 11). In general, 
change goals were stronger when both the people themselves and their knowledgeable others 
rated current traits as lower (coefficients b1 and b2, Table 12). The curvature in Figure 5A 
suggested more pronounced change goals when participants and their knowledgeable others 
disagreed on current traits. However, the nonsignificant a4 parameter (Table 12) and the region 
of actual data in the surface plot suggested that no significant effect of disagreement occurred. 
However, change goals were stronger when participants and their knowledgeable others 
agreed on low current trait levels (parameter a1, Table 12). Furthermore, for younger adults, 
the surface did not cross zero at the z-axis so that only goals to increase in agreeableness were 
modeled. 
For older adults, goals to change agreeableness were best predicted by the full 
polynomial model, which included both self- and other-ratings (Table 11). Change goals were 
stronger when older adults rated themselves lower on agreeableness (coefficient b1, Table 12). 
In addition, change goals were stronger for self- and other-ratings that agreed along the LOC 
(parameter a4, Table 12). Moreover, change goals were stronger when other-rated 
agreeableness exceeded self-rated agreeableness (parameter a3, Table 12). Goals to change 
agreeableness were more pronounced when the participants and others consistently gave low 
agreeableness ratings (parameter a1, Table 12). Note that for older adults, the observed data in 
the model included both goals to increase and goals to decrease in agreeableness (Figure 5B).
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Figure 5. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated agreeableness with goals to change agreeableness for each age group: (A) 
for younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease agreeableness) 
to +3 (increase agreeableness), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
A B 
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3.3.2.4 Extraversion. 
The model considering the interaction between self- and other-ratings fit best when 
predicting goals to change extraversion for younger adults (Table 11). In general, change goals 
were stronger when both the participants themselves and their knowledgeable others gave 
lower ratings on current extraversion (coefficients b1 and b2, Table 12). Furthermore, change 
goals were stronger the more participants and their knowledgeable others agreed on the current 
level of extraversion (parameter a4, Table 12), also shown by the downward curvature in 
Figure 6A, and the more participants and their knowledgeable others agreed that the current 
trait levels were low (parameter a1, Table 12). In addition, change goals were stronger when 
self- and other-ratings agreed that the current trait levels were extremely high or extremely 
low (parameter a2, Table 12). Change goals were stronger when other-rated extraversion 
exceeded self-rated extraversion (parameter a3, Table 12).  
For older adults, a nonlinear interaction model accounting for both self- and other-
ratings had the best fit (Table 11). Change goals were stronger when both the participants 
themselves and their knowledgeable others rated current extraversion as low (coefficients b1, 
b3, and b5, Table 12). Also, change goals were stronger the more people and their 
knowledgeable others agreed about current levels of extraversion (parameter a4, Table 12), 
suggested by the downward curvature in Figure 6B. Goals to increase in extraversion were 
more pronounced the more people and their knowledgeable others agreed that current trait 
levels were low (parameter a1, Table 12). In addition, change goals were stronger for higher 
other- than self-rated extraversion (parameter a3, Table 12). For both age groups, the actual 
data in the model included both goals to increase and slightly decrease in extraversion (Figures 
6A and 6B). 
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Figure 6. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated extraversion with goals to change extraversion for each age group: (A) for 
younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease extraversion) to 
+3 (increase extraversion), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
A B 
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3.3.2.5 Openness to experience. 
The best fitting models for predicting goals to change openness to experience included 
self-ratings as a linear predictor among younger adults and as a quadratic predictor among 
older adults (Table 11). The response surface in Figure 7A shows that, for younger adults, 
goals to increase openness were more pronounced when participants gave themselves low 
ratings on their current level of openness (coefficient b1, Table 12). Similarly, for older adults, 
the curved response surface in Figure 7B indicates that change goals were again more 
pronounced when participants gave themselves low ratings on openness (coefficient b1, Table 
12). Note again that the actual data included only goals to increase openness (Figures 7A and 
7B). 
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Figure 7. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated openness with goals to change openness for each age group: (A) for 
younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease openness) to +3 
(increase openness), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
A B 
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3.3.3 Personality characteristics beyond the Big Five and goals to change. 
To extend knowledge on which characteristics predict goals to change traits beyond 
the Big Five traits, we examined associations with life satisfaction, self-esteem, locus of 
control, entity orientation, optimism, and loneliness. In addition, we analyzed whether the 
associations between personality characteristics and change goals differed with age, that is, 
whether age moderated the associations in multiple regression analyses. We report the zero-
order correlations (Table 9) and regression results when all characteristics and the respective 
current Big Five traits were considered simultaneously (Table A9) to reduce the number of 
tests and avoid reports of false positive results. 
In general, with lower life satisfaction, lower self-esteem, less internal locus of control, 
less optimism, and greater loneliness, most change goals were more pronounced in both age 
groups on a zero-order level (Table 9). The belief that personality is fixed and unchangeable 
(entity orientation) was not significantly associated with goals to change any trait (Table 9).  
However, most of these zero-order associations diminished in the multiple regression 
analyses in which we additionally controlled for the current Big Five traits, whereas the 
associations of the Big Five with change goals remained significant (see Table A9 for the 
complete results; see Table A10 for correlations between the Big Five traits and personality 
characteristics). The few exceptions were that, with lower life satisfaction, goals to change 
conscientiousness were more pronounced (β = -.17, p = .043), and higher optimism was now 
associated with stronger goals to change extraversion (β = .16, p = .042).  
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3.3.4 Summary of results. 
 In this study, we investigated the roles of several potentially important predictors of 
goals to change in a sample of younger and older adults. Across both age groups, results 
suggested that on a zero-order level, self-rated and other-rated current Big Five trait levels 
predicted change goals. We showed that for agreeableness, extraversion, and partly for 
conscientiousness, self-other agreement mattered in the prediction of change goals. For most 
of these traits, change goals were stronger when both the self and others consistently rated a 
current trait level as low. For both age groups, only self-rated traits predicted goals to change 
emotional stability and openness. Characteristic adaptations such as life satisfaction, self-
esteem, or optimism were significantly associated with change goals across both age groups 
on a zero-order level. However, most associations diminished in the multiple regression when 
the current Big Five traits were considered simultaneously. We discuss the results next.  
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3.4 Discussion 
This study is the first to investigate the importance of both self- and other-rated Big 
Five traits for goals to change personality traits. Furthermore, we examined several personality 
characteristics beyond the Big Five traits to provide a comprehensive picture of factors that 
contribute to people’s goals to change or maintain personality traits. As a previous study 
showed age differences in goals to change personality traits (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b), we 
also examined an age-heterogeneous sample and replicated the age differences. We next 
discuss the relevance of one’s own and others’ perspectives on an individual's traits for goals 
to maintain or change the traits. 
3.4.1 Change goals differ with self-perceived trait levels and age. 
In line with previous research (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 
2014) and Hypothesis 1, we found that both younger and older adults wanted to increase their 
Big Five traits and, most important, goals to increase traits were more pronounced the less 
participants perceived themselves to have the trait. Younger adults expressed stronger change 
goals than older adults for all Big Five traits, a finding that could be partly attributed to younger 
adults showing lower current trait levels (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b). Hence, change goals 
might facilitate increases in maturity (Roberts & Wood, 2006) or identity development 
(Roberts & Caspi, 2003) in young adulthood. For both age groups, goals to increase traits that 
are less pronounced might, for example, reflect the belief that a certain trait level is desirable 
(Dunlop et al., 2012; Hennecke et al., 2014). In addition, such goals may indicate that the trait 
is helpful for fulfilling age-specific social roles such as being a reliable employee (Hudson, 
Roberts, & Lodi-Smith, 2012) or a caring grandparent (D. Wood & Roberts, 2006). To test 
whether change goals merely reflect low self-perceived trait levels and might therefore result 
from a response bias, we examined the role of others’ perspectives.  
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3.4.2 Self-other agreement in traits is important for specific change goals.  
We investigated whether change goals were more pronounced when self- and other-
ratings agreed than when they disagreed and whether change goals were stronger the more 
both self- and other-ratings indicated lower current trait levels (Hypothesis 2). As expected, 
self-other agreement on traits was most important for goals to change extraversion. In both 
age groups, goals to change extraversion were more pronounced the more ratings agreed and 
stronger when both self- and other-ratings suggested lower current trait levels. We found a 
similar pattern of self-other agreement for goals to change agreeableness. For 
conscientiousness in younger adults, only one’s own perspective on the current trait level 
played a role in the prediction of goals to change. Among older adults, goals to change 
conscientiousness were also linked to both one’s own and others’ perspective as well as their 
agreement. Finally, only one’s own perspective on traits mattered for goals to change 
emotional stability and openness in both age groups. 
To explain why self-other agreement on current traits is important for goals to change 
extraversion, agreeableness, and in part conscientiousness but not for emotional stability and 
openness, it may be helpful to consider their importance in social interactions and the different 
perspectives of the self and of others on these traits. Extraversion, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness are considered social traits with great relevance for interpersonal 
interactions and relationships (Denissen & Penke, 2008; K. Harris & Vazire, 2016; Selfhout 
et al., 2010). Because these traits are expressed strongly in social behavior (Borkenau & 
Liebler, 1995; Funder, 2012; John & Robins, 1993), others may have many opportunities to 
observe trait-relevant behavior and to form a comprehensive personality judgment (Vazire, 
2010; Vazire & Carlson, 2011) that they could (directly or indirectly) report back to the person 
(Back et al., 2011; Back & Vazire, 2012). This feedback may be taken into account when 
people assess whether they want to change because they may consider the feedback to be valid 
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as others had the opportunity to observe trait-relevant behavior. When evaluating the need to 
set goals to change these more social traits, people with self- and other-ratings that agree might 
have the most sensible and least distorted self-perceptions of their “real” trait levels (Atwater 
& Yammarino, 1997; Back & Vazire, 2012; London & Smither, 1995) and might in part 
therefore form the strongest change goals for lower current trait ratings that agree.  
Others’ perspectives on people’s trait levels might not play an equally important role 
for goals to change emotional stability and openness because these traits may be less relevant 
in many social situations. Therefore, others might (be able to) provide less feedback. Also, 
people may see fewer reasons to integrate the perspectives of others for these traits because 
they might not believe that others possess valid knowledge about their anxieties, worries and 
intellectual preferences. Thus, when evaluating the need to set goals to change emotional 
stability or openness, people largely rely on their own, unique perspective and tend to neglect 
others’ perspectives on their current personality. At this point, our explanations for differences 
between change goal domains remain tentative and await further examination. 
We examined whether higher or lower self- than other-ratings would be found to be 
associated with stronger change goals, and results showed a consistent picture for extraversion, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness. When disagreement occurred, change goals were 
stronger when other-ratings exceeded self-ratings. Yet, this effect occurred in addition to the 
general effect that change goals were more pronounced with lower self-perceived trait levels. 
This finding might indicate that people set stronger change goals to bring their personality in 
line with how significant others perceive them. 
We did not expect large age differences in the role of self-other agreement for change 
goals and largely observed similar patterns for all Big Five domains except conscientiousness. 
Among younger adults, only the perspective of the self mattered for goals to change 
conscientiousness, which stands in contrast to the results for older adults. Although this age 
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difference awaits replication, it is possible that feedback processes as described above might 
not be of vital importance in young adulthood where increasing conscientiousness might be a 
normative, work-related developmental task (Hudson & Roberts, 2016; Hudson et al., 2012; 
Roberts & Wood, 2006). Alternatively, other-ratings of one’s conscientiousness provided by 
friends or family members may be less relevant compared with feedback from other sources 
(e.g., work- or study-related feedback from colleagues).  
When interpreting the results for goals to change openness or agreeableness, it has to 
be noted that even the best fitting models explained only a little variance. This is in line with 
previous findings (Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014) and leaves open the 
question of which other predictors (e.g., more specific personality characteristics) might 
contribute to an individual’s change goals for these traits.  
3.4.3 Personality characteristics beyond the Big Five traits as predictors of change 
goals. 
We investigated the association of several additional personality characteristics beyond 
the Big Five traits with change goals and found significant zero-order effects for all 
characteristics except entity orientation. So, for example, the finding that with lower life 
satisfaction, people in both age groups stated stronger change goals for emotional stability and 
extraversion is in line with previous findings in young adults (Hudson & Roberts, 2014) and 
highlights the idea that dissatisfaction with one’s life may contribute to a desire for change. 
Unexpectedly, entity orientation was not associated with change goals at all, although a less 
pronounced entity orientation (i.e., believing that traits are malleable) was associated with 
greater actual personality change (Robins et al., 2005). Perhaps assuming that change is 
possible in general might not necessarily lead to wanting to change oneself, and vice versa, 
goals to change oneself might not always be met by the assumption that change is possible.  
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In the multiple regression analyses, the zero-order associations diminished when we 
controlled for current Big Five traits, likely because most of the characteristics we examined 
were associated with Big Five traits. Thus, the zero-order effects could have resulted from 
shared variance with current traits. In contrast to zero-order effects, higher optimism was now 
associated with stronger goals to change extraversion when controlling for personality traits. 
This might indicate that if the current personality profile is statistically controlled for (e.g., 
low extraversion), optimism may foster the wish to change, perhaps because change is 
considered possible. These findings on the additional personality characteristics seem relevant 
for achieving a better understanding of factors that do and do not contribute to the desire to 
change personality traits and for advancing theoretical knowledge of volitional personality 
development. We carefully conclude that people’s current standing on a trait seems to be the 
most important factor for wanting to change therein. We speculate that the same applies to 
goals to change characteristics beyond the Big Five (e.g., goals to change self-esteem), where 
the specific characteristics (i.e., self-esteem) would be more important predictors than broad 
Big Five traits (for example, see Kiecolt & Mabry, 2000).  
3.4.4 Limitations and future directions. 
The current study is the first to investigate the importance of self-other agreement in 
current traits and a comprehensive set of personality characteristics beyond Big Five traits in 
the prediction of change goals. Still, some limitations and future directions need to be 
discussed. First, although participants were recruited through various channels, we cannot rule 
out potential self-selection effects. For example, older adults in the current sample reported 
being as extraverted and open to experience as younger adults, which is an atypical pattern 
because extraversion and openness were found to be lower in older participants in a 
representative German sample (Specht et al., 2011). Second, only participants’ Big Five traits 
were rated by others, whereas other characteristics and change goals were assessed with self-
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reports. However, goals to change might not be observable, and hence reportable, for others 
because such goals are rarely manifested in everyday behavior. In addition, some subscales 
displayed lower reliabilities (e.g., goals to change agreeableness, entity orientation), which 
might result from using only a few, somewhat heterogeneous items. Third, mechanisms of and 
causal associations among other-rated current Big Five traits and self-rated change goals 
remain open. Future studies could assess or experimentally manipulate feedback provided by 
others as well as individuals’ meta-perceived traits (e.g., “Others think I am talkative”) to 
better understand the mechanisms.  
3.4.5 Conclusion. 
Previous research used self-reported current traits and focused on life satisfaction in 
addition to Big Five traits to investigate goals to change traits. The present study extended this 
research by showing that other-rated trait levels also matter for most traits. Self-other 
agreement, especially about low current trait levels, predicted goals to change extraversion, 
agreeableness, and in part conscientiousness. We therefore conclude that goals to change traits 
may reflect much more than a biased perception of one’s own traits but instead domains where 
individuals (and their significant others) see room for personality development.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV: 
 
Momentary Processes and Goals to Change Personality as Predictor of Long-term 
Development in Explicit and Implicit Representations of Big Five Traits: An Empirical 
Test of the TESSERA Framework15 
 
                                                 
15 This chapter is in part based on the following manuscript: 
 
Quintus, M., & Egloff, B., Wrzus, C. (2018). Momentary processes predict long-term development in explicit 
and implicit representations of Big Five traits: An empirical test of the TESSERA framework. Manuscript in 
preparation. 
Chapter IV: Momentary Processes and Goals to Change Personality 
  
129 
4.1 Introduction 
Broad evidence suggests that people’s explicit, self-rated representations of Big Five 
traits show both normative continuity and change across the lifespan (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; 
Roberts et al., 2006a; Roberts et al., 2008). At the same time, people show individual (i.e., 
person-specific) patterns of trait development with large differences regarding direction, 
amount or timing of changes (Schwaba & Bleidorn, 2017). A growing body of research 
emphasizes that, aside from interpersonal factors (e.g., life transitions, see Chapter II), 
intrapersonal factors (e.g., goals, motives, see Chapter III) may contribute to both normative 
and person-specific patterns of development as well. Specifically, self-regulated or volitional 
trait changes, based on people’s goals to change traits, have come into focus as one factor that 
contributes to the larger picture of personality development in general (Hennecke et al., 2014; 
Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). 
Both personality development in general and volitional personality development in 
particular are often theoretically explained by different daily (i.e., momentary) processes that 
contribute to long-term trait development (Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 2006, 2009, 2017; 
Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). However, such momentary processes received little attention in 
previous longitudinal research that employed more macro-analytical approaches (e.g., by 
focusing on life events; Specht et al., 2011). Although theory postulates that trait-relevant 
momentary states contribute to personality development, little is known about the 
developmental links between traits, goals to change traits and repeated states as well as the 
cascade of momentary processes that precedes and follows such states in daily situations 
(Durbin & Hicks, 2014; Hennecke et al., 2014; Hopwood et al., 2009; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Importantly, longitudinal research on both personality development in general and 
volitional development in particular focused so far on self-rated traits, that is propositional or 
explicit representations, and neglected the long-term development of implicitly measured traits 
and their underlying processes. Yet, previous research demonstrated the importance and 
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validity of implicit, less conscious representations of traits (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; 
Back et al., 2009; Schmukle et al., 2008). Aside from its relevance for personality research, a 
more detailed understanding of processes of development in both explicit and implicit 
representation of traits could guide psychological interventions for example in clinical (e.g., 
changing aggressive behavior; Penton-Voak et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2017) and 
organizational psychology (i.e., supporting managers in changing their personality to improve 
organizational performance; Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003).  
The aim of this chapter is twofold: First, we examine momentary processes of general 
long-term development in explicit and implicit representations of traits as proposed by the 
TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). On this basis, we secondly address volitional 
aspects of development in explicit and implicit representations of traits by investigating whether 
people’s change goals a) are linked with goal-relevant momentary experiences as suggested by 
the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) and b) further manifest in actual trait 
changes, especially when they are perceived as important and feasible.  
4.1.1 A brief overview of the TESSERA framework on personality development. 
According to the recently proposed TESSERA framework, long-term trait development 
results from repeated sequences of momentary processes, which consist of the four components: 
Triggering situations, Expectancies, States/State Expressions, and ReActions (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017; see Wrzus, 2018 for a comparison with other theories on personality 
development, e.g., Back et al., 2011; Dweck, 2017; Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; 
Roberts & Jackson, 2008). For example, the TESSERA framework describes that experiencing 
a triggering situation (e.g., sitting at one’s work desk) may elicit clear expectations on one’s 
behavior (e.g., working on a task or project) that is in turn linked to a specific state (e.g., 
thoroughly working on a paper), and reaction (e.g., feeling good); subsequent repetitions of 
similar sequences may finally lead to trait changes (e.g., increases in conscientiousness; Wrzus 
& Roberts, 2017). As specified in previous work on situation selection (Emmons, Diener, & 
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Larsen, 1986; Wrzus et al., 2016) and trait expression (Fleeson, 2001; Rauthmann et al., 2015b), 
TESSERA components are systematically modified and constrained by environmental (e.g., 
cultural and proximal social contexts) and individual factors (e.g., Big Five traits, change goals, 
see sections “4.1.3.Linking momentary processes with long-term development of traits.” and 
“4.1.4 Change goals may shape the experience of situations and states.”).  
The generic TESSERA framework acknowledges that traits manifest on different levels 
and thus distinguishes between explicit and implicit representations of traits. Distinguishing 
explicit and implicit representations of traits is useful, since both representations reflect 
different levels of personality (i.e., propositional self-perceptions vs. associative self-concepts, 
see below), that may not be linked closely to each other (Hofmann et al., 2005a). Explicit 
representations of traits (e.g., assessed with self-ratings) generally refer to people’s 
propositional representations of self-concepts that is based on a conscious perception and 
evaluation of own behavior, thoughts or feelings (Back et al., 2009; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). 
Implicit representations of traits (e.g., assessed with indirect measures) refer to associative 
representations of self-concepts (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Marco Perugini & Leone, 2009; 
Schmukle et al., 2008). Accordingly, reflective processes should translate TESSERA sequences 
into long-term development of explicit representations of traits, while associative processes 
should account for development of implicit representations of traits (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004; see section "4.1.3. Linking momentary processes with long-term 
development of traits."). 
Note that the TESSERA framework can be applied to both personality development in 
general and volitional development in particular (Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Specifically, although change goals may differentially contribute to people’s experience of 
situations and states, momentary TESSERA sequences and reflective as well as associative 
processes should be equally important for volitional personality development. 
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4.1.2 Momentary processes of personality development. 
The TESSERA framework suggests that momentary processes of personality 
development can be organized in recursive TESSERA sequences and makes specific 
predictions on the associations of components within these sequences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Next, we briefly describe each TESSERA component and explain how components are 
expected to be associated within the framework (i.e., form TESSERA sequences). 
 Triggering situations cover daily situations or events external to people that may occur 
in different contexts (e.g., life events, social roles, interactions with others, Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017)16. Although such situations can be described in terms of their physical properties (e.g., 
location, time), psychological properties (e.g., perceiving adversity, request to work) seem to 
be more relevant for subsequent states (Fleeson & Jolley, 2006; Rauthmann et al., 2015b; 
Sherman, Rauthmann, Brown, Serfass, & Jones, 2015). Triggering situations, and especially 
common situations (e.g., working or social situations) should produce clear expectations on 
how to behave, think or feel within that situation (D. Wood & Denissen, 2015; Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017). Moreover, the situation may directly trigger certain states or state expressions 
for example in terms of if-then contingencies (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Rauthmann et al., 2014; 
Roberts, 2017; Schmitt et al., 2013; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Needless to say, different situations (e.g., being at the office vs. at a party) are generally linked 
to specific states (e.g., working vs. socializing; Rauthmann et al., 2014; Sherman et al., 2015).17 
In addition, certain situations might directly elicit people’s reactions. Previous research for 
example suggests that people feel more positive in social situations (David, Green, Martin, & 
Suls, 1997; Weinstein & Mermelstein, 2007). In contrast, people feel more uncomfortable in 
                                                 
16 The TESSERA framework also acknowledges that internal events can serve as triggers within TESSERA 
sequences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). For example thoughts about a situation might evoke subsequent expectancies, 
states or reactions. For the sake of clarity, we however focused on external triggering situations. 
17 In reality, a triggering situation might not only elicit one distinct state (Mischel & Shoda, 1995) but result in co-
occurring different aspects of states (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). The investigation of such co-occurring states will 
be a methodological question for future research. 
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demanding or unpleasant situations (e.g., including work or adversity; Bolger, DeLongis, 
Kessler, & Schilling, 1989; Bryson & MacKerron, 2017; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, 
Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). 
 Expectancies describe part of people’s momentary motivation that guides how to behave 
or feel in a situation (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thereby, expectancies help to intentionally 
select a response (i.e., state or state expression) from a broad range of possible responses 
(Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Roberts & Wood, 2006; D. Wood, Gardner, & Harms, 2015) 
and ensure a more conscious, goal-related pathway from triggering situations to states (Wrzus 
& Roberts, 2017; see also Ajzen, 1991; Eccles, 1983; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
States refer to people’s momentary, concrete patterns of behaviors, thoughts, or feelings 
(Heller, Komar, & Lee, 2007; Steyer, Mayer, Geiser, & Cole, 2015; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Since traits display somewhat persistent inter-individual differences in behavior, thoughts or 
feelings across time and situations (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Fleeson & Jolley, 2006; 
Hooker & McAdams, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Roberts & Jackson, 2008), states and state 
expressions should form the basis of long-term trait change (Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et 
al., 2014; Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In addition, 
momentary states may be linked with momentary reactions (e.g., feelings; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017), particularly, if such behavior reflects a socially desirable trait level (Dunlop et al., 2012). 
For example, conscientiously working on a task should be associated with feeling more positive 
than procrastinating.  
 Reactions include one’s own or others’ responses to states (i.e., thoughts, feelings, or 
behavior; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Especially one’s own feelings after a TESSERA sequence 
might play an important role in long-term trait development because it offers an immediate and 
significant reward or punishment for one’s state (Bower, 1992; Corr, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017). Reacting with positive feelings should reinforce one’s displayed behaviors, thoughts or 
feelings while states that result in negative feelings should be avoided (Caspi & Roberts, 2001; 
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Kanfer & Grimm, 1977; Kanfer & Phillips, 1970; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Roberts & Wood, 
2006). The punishing element of negative feelings requires a change in one’s behavior, thoughts 
or feelings to avoid future punishment and approach more positive feelings (Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017; see also Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Baumeister, Vohs, Nathan 
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Bless, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992; Mor & Winquist, 2002). We 
therefore suggest that negative feelings following a TESSERA sequence will be associated with 
a stronger reflection of this sequence that is necessary to implement such change in the future.   
 Reflection is not conceptualized as part of TESSERA sequences, but instead covers 
people’s conscious thinking about TESSERA sequences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). When 
thinking about an experience, it is not only remembered, but also weighted and actively 
restructured or evaluated (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002; Mayer, 2004; Staudinger, 2001; 
Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thus, reflective processes should play a crucial role in the 
development of explicit, but not implicit representation of traits (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
In the next section, we first explain how traits affect the experience of situations and 
states. In addition, we describe reflective and associative processes in greater detail to explain 
how these processes link momentary TESSERA sequences with long-term development of 
explicit and implicit representations of traits. Addressing volitional personality development, 
we thereafter explain how change goals may affect people’s experience of situations and states. 
Finally, we briefly summarize current knowledge on whether volitional personality 
development is indeed possible and outline important remaining questions that need to be 
tackled.  
4.1.3 Linking momentary processes with long-term development of traits. 
The TESSERA framework takes into account that people’s experiences of situations, 
behavior, thoughts, and feelings are at least partly shaped by their explicit and implicit 
representations of traits (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Traits may affect the experience of situations 
because people tend to actively select or form trait-congruent environments (Buss, 1987; Caspi 
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& Roberts, 2001; Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984; Emmons et al., 1986; Rauthmann et al., 
2015b; Roberts & Robins, 2004; Wrzus et al., 2016). In line with the idea that traits manifest in 
states, previous research showed that both explicit and implicit representations of traits 
predicted subsequent, trait-relevant behavior (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Back et al., 2009; Egloff 
& Schmukle, 2002; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009; Mehl et al., 2006; Schnabel, 
Banse, & Asendorpf, 2006). Importantly, each representation provided a unique contribution to 
the prediction of the examined behavior (Back et al., 2009).  
Yet, associations between traits and states are assumed to be bidirectional with states 
also influencing traits over time (Geukes et al., 2017; Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; 
Roberts & Wood, 2006; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thus, people could use experienced trait-
relevant states and state expressions as indicators of their latent traits (Back & Vazire, 2012; 
Buss & Craik, 1983; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009; Hutteman et al., 2015; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017). In line with this assumption, previous studies demonstrated that adults who increased in 
momentary stress reactivity (i.e., increased negative affect when hassles occurred in daily life) 
increased in trait neuroticism over 6 years (Wrzus et al., 2018a), and young adults who 
increased in monthly-assessed state self-esteem increased in self-esteem over one year 
(Hutteman et al., 2015). In addition, long-term development in explicit representations of traits 
should result from reflective processes on TESSERA sequences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In 
line with previous research, reflective processes like conscious remembering or reappraising 
should help to translate momentary experiences into people’s self-concepts (Bem, 1972; 
Brandtstädter, 1989; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Hooker & McAdams, 2003; Staudinger, 2001). 
By actively evaluating an experience and especially by reflecting on experienced states, people 
should be able to confirm or adjust their explicit representations of traits (Back et al., 2009; 
Bem, 1972; Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017).  
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 The repeated experience of TESSERA sequences should foster changes in implicit 
representations of traits due to associative processes like implicit learning and reinforcement 
learning (Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Specifically, implicit learning (Seger, 1994) 
helps to transfer repeated states into the procedural memory whereby habit formation is fostered 
that may finally lead to changes in implicit representations of traits (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; 
Amodio & Ratner, 2011; Rauthmann, 2017; W. Wood & Neal, 2007). The repeated and 
combined activation of states and people’s self-concept might further contribute to the 
development of implicit associations within the associative memory (Back & Nestler, 2016; 
Back et al., 2009; Higgins, 1996b; Wrzus, 2018; Zinkernagel, Hofmann, Gerstenberg, & 
Schmitt, 2013). Aside from the mere repetition of states and accompanied implicit learning, 
reinforcement learning should contribute to long-term trait development (Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus 
& Roberts, 2017). Especially people’s own positive or negative affective reactions should 
reinforce or punish preceding states or state expressions so that they more easily condense into 
new or altered habits and finally, changes in implicit self-concepts (W. Wood, 2017; Wrzus, 
2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  
  Due to the generic nature of the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), the 
above explained links of momentary processes with long-term development in explicit and 
implicit representations of traits should apply to both personality development in general and 
volitional development in particular (Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017; see also Hennecke 
et al., 2014). Yet, in addition, the association of states and state expressions with long-term 
changes in explicit and implicit representations of traits may also depend on people’s change 
goals. Specifically, people who both hold stronger change goals and experience more 
pronounced states and state expressions may show more pronounced trait changes, because they 
pay more attention to changes in their behavior, thoughts or feelings and are more motivated to 
perceive these changes as part of their self-concepts (i.e., traits; Hennecke et al., 2014; Hudson 
& Fraley, 2015, 2017; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
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4.1.4 Change goals may shape the experience of situations and states. 
To successfully implement more abstract, long-term goals like goals to change traits, 
people may need to translate them into subordinate but more concrete short-term goals 
(Bandura, 2001; Emmons, 1992). In particular, such short-term goals may involve specific 
plans of which situations to engage in or how to behave, think or feel in this situations (e.g., to 
increase one’s extraversion, attending parties and starting conversations with strangers might 
be sensible; Gollwitzer, 1999; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011). In line with this idea, the 
TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) suggests that change goals shape the 
experience of subsequent situations and states.  
In particular, change goals may be linked with experiencing more goal-relevant 
situations because people’s enhanced encountering of such situations offers possibilities to gain 
new trait-relevant experiences and to display or train altered behavior, thoughts or feelings 
(Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 2014; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In line with this 
suggestion, a previous study showed that students joined extracurricular activities (i.e., 
exposing themselves to new situations, for example by joining collaborative, prosocial 
activities) that they believed to help approaching their desired self (e.g., being an altruistic 
person; Stevenson & Clegg, 2011). Furthermore, recent research demonstrated that change 
goals were more successfully implemented if people followed a “change plan” that also covered 
intensified engagement in goal-relevant situations (e.g., asking a friend to lunch; Hudson & 
Fraley, 2015), again highlighting potential associations between change goals and experienced 
situations. Connecting traits and change goals, the association of change goals and experienced 
situations may additionally depend on people’s current trait level. Specifically, people with 
lower current trait levels who also hold stronger change goals may feel amplified needs to 
actively reduce these larger discrepancies and therefore may expose themselves to more goal-
related situations (for arguments in favor of this idea, see Higgins, 1987, 1996a; Higgins & 
Tykocinski, 1992; R. M. Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
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Goals to change should also affect the experienced states because, as a bottom-up 
strategy, actively changing trait-relevant behavior, thoughts and feelings was suggested to be a 
viable way to change a trait in the long run (Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 2014; 
Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Magidson et al., 2014). In that sense, a study in which laypersons were 
asked to describe strategies they use to change their traits suggested that people may indeed try 
to tackle their states by changing concrete patterns of their behaviors (e.g., “try to force myself 
to talk more”) or thoughts (e.g., “acknowledging when my thoughts stray into criticism”; 
Baranski et al., 2017). In line with these findings, another study showed that the more people 
wanted to change, the more trait-relevant behavior they reported, which in turn was associated 
with more pronounced trait changes (Hudson & Fraley, 2015; but see also McCabe & Fleeson, 
2012). Yet, in contrast, another study did not show an association of change goals with more 
trait-relevant daily behavior, especially when current traits were controlled (Hudson & Roberts, 
2014), thereby supporting the idea that showing new, or contra-trait behavior requires more 
effort and is therefore harder to perform (Gallagher, Fleeson, & Hoyle, 2011; see also W. Wood 
& Neal, 2007). Again, showing both lower current traits and stronger change goals may be 
linked with experiencing more goal-relevant states as people may strongly want to overcome 
their self-perceived shortcomings (for arguments in favor of this idea, see Carver & Scheier, 
1999; W. Cheng & Ickes, 2009; Higgins, 1987, 1996a; R. M. Ryan & Deci, 2000; for arguments 
against this idea, see Hudson & Roberts, 2014).  
Importantly, people may not show equal efforts to implement all of their change goals. 
Instead, more important and more feasible change goals may benefit from intensified attempts 
and actual capacity for their successful implementation (Hennecke et al., 2014; B. R. Little, 
1983; Peters, 2015; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). Specifically, people may feel more committed 
to more important goals so that they may expose themselves to more goal-relevant situations 
and show more goal-relevant states (for similar arguments, see Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; Gollwitzer, 1990; H. Heckhausen, 1991; for empirical examples, see Harris, Daniels & 
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Briner, 2003; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987). More feasible change goals may in turn profit 
from clearer requirements (e.g., which situations to expose to and how to behave) and higher 
perceived ability to meet these requirements so that people could invest more strongly into these 
goals (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Gollwitzer, 1990; H. Heckhausen, 1991; for an 
empirical example, see Perugini & Conner, 2000). Moreover, both the more important and the 
more feasible a change goal appears, the more goal-relevant situations and states people may 
experience (see also Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012; Hennecke et al., 2014; Peters, 2015; D. 
Wood & Denissen, 2015; for empirical research in favor of this idea, see Brandstätter & Frank, 
2002). In addition, the general effects of both goal importance and feasibility should be more 
pronounced the stronger the corresponding change goals are framed (for similar arguments, see 
Hennecke et al., 2014). For example, people with a stronger goal to increase in extraversion 
who also consider this goal to be highly important should strongly seek out for goal-relevant 
situations (e.g., parties) and display more goal-relevant states (e.g., chatting with strangers).  
4.1.5 Is volitional personality development possible?. 
 So far, with momentary TESSERA sequences forming the building blocks of long-term 
personality development, the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) served as 
theoretical foundation to also explain volitional personality development. In a nutshell, people’s 
change goals should shape both the experienced situations and states whereas reflective or 
associative processes should transform the experienced TESSERA sequences into long-term 
development in explicit or implicit representations of traits. With this perspective in mind, any 
association of change goals and subsequent trait development should be due to momentary 
processes (i.e., in terms of a full mediation). Yet, in addition, more direct links between change 
goals and actual trait development need to be considered for at least two reasons.  
First, empirical examinations of processes of volitional personality development may 
face substantial methodological challenges to assess all TESSERA sequences and reflective or 
associative processes relevant for volitional trait changes, because for example limited research 
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resources allow to only taking a glimpse into people’s momentary experiences. Consequently, 
change goals and trait development may be linked beyond the assessed momentary processes 
(for a discussion on methodological challenges in the assessment of momentary processes, see 
Mehl & Wrzus, in press; Wrzus & Mehl, 2015). Second, as indicated by a previous study, 
change goals may directly result in the construction of a new, desired identity that could be 
largely independent from people’s momentary experiences in the first place (Hudson & Fraley, 
2015). Specifically, change goals may, via more learning-oriented (i.e., top-down) processes 
and increased self-reflection alter people’s schemata of themselves (Allemand & Flückiger, 
2017; Prochaska & Prochaska, 2010).  
 In the light of a growing interest in volitional aspects of personality development 
(Denissen & Penke, 2008; Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 2014; Hudson & Fraley, 2017; 
Hudson & Roberts, 2014), research recently started to investigate direct links between people’s 
change goals and actual trait changes. However, to date, this research remains scarce and 
provides mixed results (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a; Robinson et al., 2015). A recent study 
for example repeatedly assessed people’s self-reported traits and change goals over a period of 
four months (Hudson & Fraley, 2015). As hypothesized, results showed that stronger change 
goals at the first assessment were linked with stronger subsequent growth in actual traits 
(Hudson & Fraley, 2015). For example, people who at the first assessment expressed goals to 
become more extraverted experienced stronger growth in self-rated extraversion across four 
months than people who did not want to change this trait. In contrast, another study found that 
change goals were not followed by self-rated trait changes after a period of 12 months 
(Robinson et al., 2015). Instead, goals to change conscientiousness and neuroticism were even 
associated with decreases in the respective traits (Robinson et al., 2015). One potential 
explanation for these inconclusive findings might be that change goals affect trait development 
only within a short time span (e.g., four months; Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a), while their 
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effects fade out in the long run (e.g., after one year; Robinson et al., 2015). However, this 
explanation remains to be tested.  
In addition, previous research on whether change goals contribute to long-term trait 
development suffers from at least three limitations. First, previous studies relied only on self-
reports and were therefore limited to examine changes in explicit representations of traits 
(Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a; Robinson et al., 2015). It remains an open question whether 
change goals can also manifest in changes of different manifestations of personality like 
implicit representations of traits (Hudson & Fraley, 2017; see also Rauthmann, 2017). Second, 
although change goals seem to be common across the entire lifespan (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b), 
previous studies focused on younger students thereby limiting the generalizability of their 
findings (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a; Robinson et al., 2015). Since young adulthood and 
especially the college years reflect a life period of more pronounced trait development (Arnett, 
2004; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Lüdtke et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a), such samples may 
overestimate the malleability of traits due to change goals. Third, preceding research did hardly 
investigate additional factors that may foster direct links between change goals and long-term 
trait development (for a recent exception, see Peters, 2015). For example, people with lower 
current trait levels and stronger change goals may experience more pronounced trait changes, 
maybe because they invest more resources to overcome these discrepancies and have simply 
more to gain in terms of trait development (Higgins, 1987, 1996a; Latham & Locke, 1991; R. 
M. Ryan & Deci, 2000; for empirical arguments from clinical psychology, see Shapiro et al., 
1994). In addition, more important and more feasible change goals and especially change goals 
that are considered both more important and feasible may benefit from increased goal 
dedication and higher perceived capacity of goal implementation (for similar arguments, see 
Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; H. Heckhausen, 1991; Hennecke et al., 2014; for 
empirical examples, see Beattie, Hardy & Woodman, 2015; Maier & Brunstein, 2001). 
Furthermore, research needs to clarify whether both general effects of importance and 
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feasibility are more pronounced the stronger the corresponding change goal is framed (see also 
Hennecke et al., 2014; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015).  
4.1.6 Current research. 
The first aim of this chapter was to examine central assumptions of the TESSERA 
framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) on momentary TESSERA processes and their importance 
in long-term development of explicit and implicit representations of Big Five traits. We 
hypothesized that situational characteristics predict expectancies on how to behave (H1a). 
Furthermore, situations should predict situation-relevant states (H1b) and affective reactions 
(H1c). Additionally, we expected clearer expectancies on how to behave to predict more 
pronounced states (H1d). In turn, states should predict affective reactions (H1e) and reflections 
on the experiences (H1f). Finally, we suggested that less positive reactions should be associated 
with more reflections on the experiences (H1g). 
In addition, we hypothesized that both explicit and implicit representations of Big Five 
traits predict the subsequent experience of situations and states (H2). Although previous 
experimental research and research on explicit trait representations and daily situations and 
states support our hypothesis (Back et al., 2009; Rauthmann et al., 2014; Wrzus et al., 2016), 
we are not aware of any longitudinal research that investigated the associations of both explicit 
and implicit representations of traits with subsequent momentary situations and states in daily 
life.  
Finally, we expected that the more trait-relevant momentary states people experience 
and the more they reflect on experiences with more pronounced states, the more they change in 
explicit representations of Big Five traits (H3a). For implicit representations of Big Five traits 
more trait-relevant momentary states and stronger reactions on experiences with more 
pronounced states should be relevant for trait changes (H3b). Previous studies primarily linked 
momentary states with change in explicit representations of traits (e.g., Wrzus et al., 2018a), 
but did not investigate the role of reflective and associative processes for change in both explicit 
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and implicit representations of traits. In contrast to previous studies, we combined a multi-
method approach with extensive daily diary assessments (i.e., in terms of a measurement burst 
design; Nesselroade, 1991, 2004; Sliwinski, 2008) and thus were able to examine the 
generalizability of effects in different manifestations of Big Five traits.  
The second aim of this chapter was to expand the aforementioned hypotheses addressing 
personality development in general by additionally examining volitional personality 
development and its momentary processes. In line with the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017), we hypothesized that stronger change goals should be linked with more 
pronounced experiences of corresponding situations and states (H4a), especially when people 
show low current trait levels (H4b). In addition, the more important (H4c) or feasible (H4d) 
people rate their change goals, the more goal-relevant situations and states they should 
experience. Yet, this effect should be stronger for change goals that are perceived both more 
important and more feasible (H4e). Finally, stronger change goals that are at the same time 
considered to be more important (H4f) or feasible (H4g), should be more strongly associated 
with experiencing more goal-relevant situations and states. 
Lastly, moving beyond associations of momentary processes with long-term trait 
changes as proposed by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), stronger change 
goals should be directly linked with more pronounced long-term trait changes in both explicit 
and implicit representations of traits (H5a). These associations should be stronger for people 
who show lower current trait levels (H5b) and experience more pronounced goal-relevant states 
(H5c). Furthermore, more important (H5d) or more feasible (H5e) change goals should be 
linked with more pronounced trait changes, especially when goals are rated both important and 
feasible (H5f). Finally, the stronger a change goal and the more important (H5g) or more 
feasible (H5h) it is perceived, the more according trait changes should be experienced.  
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants. 
 The current longitudinal study investigated processes of trait development in an age-
heterogeneous sample of 382 participants (73% women) with comparable high educational 
background (i.e., German Abitur or similar), who either studied at the University of Mainz, 
Germany, or belonged to the non-student control-group (see Wrzus, Quintus, & Egloff, 2018b 
for further details on the sample and recruitment strategy). The sample consisted of 255 younger 
adults (Mage = 21.57, SDage = 2.20) and 127 older adults (Mage = 67.76, SDage = 5.31). A priori 
power analysis suggested that with an anticipated attrition rate of 10%, >300 participants were 
sufficient to detect longitudinal changes of d = 0.2 with a power of .95. In addition, a priori 
sample considerations indicated that in a sample of >300 participants answering at least 30 daily 
diaries, an assumed unstandardized within-person association of b = 0.4 would be significant 
with p < .01. 
4.2.2 Procedure. 
 Personality trait assessments. We assessed explicit and implicit representations of 
participants’ traits as well as their goals to change in four assessment periods that took place in 
fall 2015 (Time 1 = T1), in spring 2016 (Time 2 = T2, 6 months after T1), in fall 2016 (Time 3 
= T3, 6 months after T2) and in fall 2017 (Time 4 = T4, 12 months after T3). For logistic 
reasons, a small subgroup of younger adults (n = 27) started the study in spring 2016 and then 
followed the original assessment design (i.e., with analog time lags). At T1, participants 
provided informed consent and answered questionnaires online and in the laboratory as part of 
a larger study (see Quintus et al., 2017; Wrzus et al., 2018b). A list of all measures applied in 
this study is available at 
https://osf.io/k9wsv/?view_only=ac0c0b103fff4a61959ed1b893ddfcce. At T2, participants 
answered all questionnaires in the laboratory. Both laboratory assessments at T1 and T2 were 
administered in small age-homogeneous group sessions using personal computers. At T3 and 
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T4, participants could answer all questionnaires online at home because they were now familiar 
with the procedure and the instruments. The ethics committee at the University of Mainz 
approved the study (approval #2015-JGU-psychEK-012). Participants were provided with 
regular study updates, holiday greetings, and continuous email- and phone-support which 
helped to maintain a high participation rate at T2 (n = 358), T3 (n = 327) and T4 (n = 327, 
85.8% of initial participants). 
 Daily diary assessment. To investigate momentary processes of trait development, 
participants completed up to 30 daily diaries between T1 and T2 and another 20 daily diaries 
between T2 and T3. Specifically, right after the T1 trait assessment, participants started the first 
period of ten daily diaries (Diary 1 = D1) that should be answered on ten consecutive evenings. 
Eight weeks after the beginning of D1, participants were invited for the second period of ten 
daily diaries (Diary 2 = D2) and another eight weeks after the beginning of D2, participants 
should answer the third period of ten daily diaries (Diary 3 = D3). Again, right after the T2 trait 
assessment, participants were asked to complete the fourth (Diary 4 = D4) and, eight weeks 
later, the final fifth (Diary 5 = D5) period of ten daily diaries each. In the present study, the first 
three periods of daily diaries represented momentary processes between T1 and T2 and were 
analyzed as a combined set of 30 daily diaries (D1-D3, see section “4.2.5 Analytic strategy.”). 
The final two periods of daily diaries however represented momentary processes between T2 
and T3 and were analyzed as combined set of 20 daily diaries (D4-D5, see section “4.2.5 
Analytic strategy.”).  
During the 50 days of daily diary assessment, participants received emails at 6pm and 
reminders at 10pm including a personalized link that invited them to answer an online 
questionnaire. Daily diaries were conducted via the online survey platform SoSci Survey 
(https://soscisurvey.de) that allowed participants to answer the questionnaire with any internet-
enabled device at hand (e.g., personal computer, smartphone). All daily diary assessments 
started on a Saturday and ended on a Monday to cover both working days and weekends. If 
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participants could not answer the questionnaire in the evening, they were allowed to keep their 
personalized link and complete it the next day (as scheduled, at 87% of days only one 
questionnaire was completed). On average participants completed diaries for 43.90 days (SD = 
10.64, range 3-50 days) with 97% of participants providing information on a minimum of five 
days per assessment period (range for assessment periods 93%-99%). Participants received a 
compensation of 117€ for completing the full study protocol and partial compensation if they 
missed assessments. 
4.2.3 Measures. 
Explicit representations of Big Five traits. At all four trait assessments we assessed 
explicit representations of the Big Five traits openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability with self-ratings using the German version 
of the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999; Lang et al., 2001). 
Participants rated agreement with BFI-items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Scale reliabilities were satisfactory at all assessments: T1 
(average α = .83, range α = .73 to .89, average ω = .88, range ω = .81 to .93), T2 (average α = 
.81, range α = .72 to .88, average ω = .86, range ω = .79 to .91), T3 (average α = .82, range α = 
.75 to .88, average ω = .87, range ω = .81 to .92) and T4 (average α = .83, range α = .76 to .89, 
average ω = .87, range ω = .83 to .91).  
Implicit representations of Big Five traits. We assessed participants’ implicit 
representations of Big Five traits using the Big Five Implicit Association Test (i.e., IAT; 
Schmukle et al., 2008). The IAT consisted of five blocks of word classification tasks with 20 
trials in each Practice Block 1, 2, and 4, and with 60 trials in each of the combined Test Blocks 
3 and 5 as recommended in standard literature (Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald et al., 2003; 
Richetin et al., 2015). The two target categories me and others were used across all Big Five 
traits and included five different stimuli each (e.g., I, my, those, other). Attribute category labels 
were specific for each Big Five trait (e.g., agreeableness vs. disagreeableness, 
Chapter IV: Momentary Processes and Goals to Change Personality 
  
147 
conscientiousness vs. carelessness) and required the discrimination of five different stimuli 
each (e.g., for agreeableness: friendly, helpful, quarrelsome, resentful; for conscientiousness: 
reliable, neat, careless, erratic). In each block, after participants had successfully assigned all 
stimuli once, stimuli were repeated without replacement until participants reached the specified 
number of trials in each block. Target and attribute stimuli alternated in the combined Test 
Blocks 3 and 5. More details on the IAT assessment applied in this study can be found in Wrzus 
et al. (2018b). Split-half reliabilities were largely satisfactory at T1 (average α = .74, range α = 
.68 to .79), T2 (average α = .75, range α = .71 to .80), T3 (average α = .73, range α = .65 to .83) 
and T4 (average α = .74, range α = .68 to .84). 
Change goals. At T1, we assessed participants’ goals to change Big Five traits with a 
16-item German short-version of the Change Goals BFI (C-BFI; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). For 
a recent application and further details on the short version of the C-BFI see Quintus et al. 
(2017). A sample extraversion item is “I want to be outgoing, sociable” (Hudson & Roberts, 
2014; Quintus et al., 2017). Items were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 (much less than 
I currently am), to 0 (I do not want to change on this trait), to +2 (much more than I currently 
am). The scale reliabilities were on average α = .63 (range α = .43 to .76) and ω = .67 (range ω 
= .44 to .76). Additionally, participants rated how important and feasible each of their change 
goal appeared to them. Importance of change goals was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 
1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important) and averaged to form a composite for each trait 
(average α = .71, range α = .65 to .76, average ω = .72, range ω = .69 to .76). Similarly, 
feasibility of change goals was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not difficult at all) to 5 
(very difficult) that was inverted and averaged to form a composite of for each trait (average α 
= .67, range α = .56 to .76, average ω = .69, range ω = .59 to .78). 
TESSERA components assessed in daily diaries. At the beginning of each daily diary 
questionnaire, participants were instructed to recall the most relevant experience of their day 
(i.e., the experience that “…still stuck in their mind…”). Participants then rated that experience 
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regarding the TESSERA components triggering situation, expectancy, states, and reaction. 
Finally, participants rated their reflections on situation as a whole. The triggering situation was 
rated with the German DIAMONDS S8-I questionnaire (Rauthmann & Sherman, 2016) on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Based on previously 
reported relevance for Big Five traits (Rauthmann et al., 2014), the analyses focused on the 
dimensions intellect, duty, sociality, deception, negativity and adversity, which were measured 
with one item each (e.g., duty “Work had to be done.”, adversity “Somebody is being 
threatened, accused, or criticized.”). Participants’ expectations were measured using one item 
(“Did you have expectations on how to behave in this situation?”) that was rated on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (no expectations) to 7 (very clear expectations). To assess states, 
participants rated their behavior during the experience on a 7-point scale using five items with 
opposite anchor adjectives that mirrored the Big Five traits: for openness narrow-minded and 
open, for conscientiousness careless and thoughtful, for extraversion shy and sociable, for 
agreeableness rejecting and empathic, and for emotional stability insecure and secure. We 
measured participant’s reaction to the experience with one item (“How did you feel after the 
experience?”) that could be answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very 
good). Finally, to assess reflection, participants rated how much they had thought about the 
situation during the day on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (all day long). 
4.2.4 Attrition analyses. 
 We compared participants who missed out at least one personality trait assessment (n = 
73) with completers to test for sample selectivity due to attrition. Participants who missed out 
at least one personality trait assessment did not differ from remaining participants with respect 
to age (d = 0.18, p = .17), gender (χ²(1, 382) = 0.15, p = .70) or explicit representations of traits 
(range ds -0.29 to 0.18, all ps > .05), except for emotional stability at T3 (d = 0.58, p = .03). In 
addition, participants who missed out at least one personality trait assessment did not differ in 
implicit representations of traits (range ds -0.29 to 0.25, all ps > .05). Furthermore, we examined 
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whether missing data were missing completely at random (MCAR; R. J. A. Little, 1988). A 
non-significant test for “nonrandomness” that included all parcels from each assessment T1 to 
T4 supported the MCAR assumption (Χ²(1551) = 1601.88, p = .18). Hence, we used full 
information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) that accounts for missing data (Enders, 
2010).  
4.2.5 Analytic strategy.  
IAT scoring algorithm. We computed participants’ scores for implicit representations 
of traits at each assessment by calculating D2 scores (Greenwald et al., 2003; Richetin et al., 
2015) with built-in error penalties and winsorized reaction times < 300 ms and > 10,000 ms. D2 
scores for each participant where computed as the difference between the participant’s mean 
reaction time from Combined Block 5 and Combined Block 3 divided by the pooled standard 
deviation of the combined blocks. Afterwards, in total, 35 outliers > M +3SD were winsorized 
to their respective means plus 3 SD. 
Multilevel structural equation modeling. To account for the multilevel data structure 
with daily diary assessments being nested within participants, we applied multilevel structural 
equation modeling (MSEM; Asparouhov & Muthen, 2008; Mehta & Neale, 2005; Muthén & 
Satorra, 1995) in Mplus Version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). MSEM combines the 
advantages of structural equation modeling (i.e., modeling of complex associations of latent 
variables while accounting for measurement error) and multilevel regression (i.e., modeling of 
hierarchical data with measurements clustered within superordinate levels such as individuals). 
MSEM handles the current study’s two-level data by decomposing the total variance/covariance 
matrix into two components, the within-person level (i.e., within-person associations of 
momentary TESSERA components) and the between-person level (i.e., individual differences 
in within-person means, associations, or traits) and is therefore suitable to investigate 
associations of daily TESSERA components and traits (for recent applications see Roesch et 
al., 2010; Sturgeon, Zautra, & Arewasikporn, 2014). To assess the need for MSEM, we formally 
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tested the amount of variability within TESSERA components that is due to between-person 
differences using intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC; Muthén & Satorra, 1995). As shown 
in Table 13, ICCs indicated that most TESSERA components varied substantially between 
participants so that the application of MSEM is recommended (Hedges & Hedberg, 2007; 
Muthén & Satorra, 1995; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). We tested our hypotheses by estimating 
separate but structurally similar MSEMs for each Big Five trait (i.e., separate models for self-
rated and implicitly measured traits, see Figure 8). For openness, conscientiousness and 
extraversion, we tested one model for each trait representation that was based on one trait-
relevant aspect of situations (e.g., duty in models for self-rated and implicitly measured 
conscientiousness). Since two different aspects of situations could be important for 
agreeableness and emotional stability, for these two traits we tested two models per trait 
representation (e.g., sociality and deception for self-rated and implicitly measured 
agreeableness), resulting in 14 models to investigate personality development in general. All 
models on personality development in general were computed using the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator with robust standard errors that is also robust for non-normality and non-
independence of observations (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). The code is available at 
https://osf.io/k9wsv/?view_only=ac0c0b103fff4a61959ed1b893ddfcce.
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Figure 8. MSEM on the associations of latent changes in self-rated Big Five traits with TESSERA components. The upper half covers the between-
person level with latent traits being estimated with three indicators (parcels) for each measurement occasion (T1, T2, T3, T4). Latent traits at T1 
predicted subsequent triggering situations and states. Longitudinal method effects were accounted for using indicator-specific correlated method 
factors (IS2, IS3). Latent variables Diff T2-T1, Diff T3-T2 and Diff T4-T3 reflect the amount of latent change in Big Five traits from T1 to T2, from 
T2 to T3 and from T3 to T4 respectively. Latent trait changes were predicted by preceding states, reflections and their interaction-term (black dots). 
For TESSERA components, we allowed for covarying intercepts during D1-D3 and D4-D5 (not depicted). Additionally, we predicted each 
TESSERA component during D4-D5 by its equivalent component during D1-D3 (not depicted). 
The lower part covers the within-person level which used random incepts (black dots) to test associations of TESSERA components within 
TESSERA sequences (see text for details). 
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Modeling associations of TESSERA components (within-person level). To examine the 
hypothesized associations of TESSERA components we specified manifest path models 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017) for the one-item measures assessed during daily diaries D1-
D3 and D4-D5 (lower part of Figure 8). In MSEM for implicit representations of traits, we did 
not model the reflection component in within-person level path models since we did not expect 
reflective processes to play a role in development of implicit representations of traits (see 
section “4.1.3 Linking momentary processes with long-term development of traits.”). We tested 
associations of TESSERA components using random intercepts, but not random slopes, because 
we had no specific hypothesis that required these coefficients and because models were more 
easily identified without random slopes. To ease interpretability, we centered all daily diary 
variables on their scale midpoint. 
Modeling individual differences in initial traits and trait change (between-person level). As 
shown in the upper part of Figure 8, we used latent neighbor change models (McArdle, 1988; 
McArdle & Hamagami, 2001; McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994; Steyer et al., 1997; Steyer et al., 
2000) to assess individual changes in explicit and implicit representations of traits from T1 to 
T4. Latent neighbor change models offer a flexible but parsimonious way to model latent trait 
change from one assessment to the next (Geiser, 2011; Steyer et al., 2000). Specifically, in 
latent neighbor change models, a latent trait is simply dismantled into its initial latent trait at 
T1 and the according latent differences to previous trait assessments (e.g., the latent trait at T2 
is dismantled into the latent trait at T1 and the differences between T2 and T1). The latent 
difference score coefficients reflect participants’ average trait change whereas the variances of 
the latent difference scores capture the amount of variability in change. Another crucial 
advantage of latent change modelling is that all latent variables can act as exogenous and 
endogenous variables (Steyer et al., 2000) for example allowing trait assessments to predict 
subsequent states and to be predicted by preceding states. 
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For all measurement occasions T1-T4, multiple manifest indicators specified the 
occasion-specific latent trait thereby controlling for measurement error in the manifest 
indicators (see upper part of Figure 8; Steyer et al., 1997; Steyer et al., 1999). At each 
measurement occasion, we modeled explicit latent representations of traits by three parcels 
consisting of two or three items each. We generated parcels using the item-to-construct 
parceling method that ensures equally balanced parcels with respect to discrimination and 
difficulty (Allemand et al., 2007; T. D. Little et al., 2002). For implicit latent representations of 
traits, we generated two parcels at each measurement occasion based on split-half D2-scores 
(Schmukle et al., 2008).  
Modeling associations of traits and TESSERA components (between-person level). To test our 
hypotheses regarding the associations of traits and trait change with TESSERA components on 
the between-person level, we expanded the basic latent neighbor change models. Specifically, 
we predicted states during D1-D3 and D4-D5 and situations during D4-D5 by traits at T1 (lower 
part of Figure 8). However, it was not possible to predict situations during D1-D3 because this 
TESSERA component served as exogenous variable on the within-person level (lower part of 
Figure 8). Moreover, we predicted change in traits by preceding states, reflections and the 
interaction of states × reflections (only for self-rated traits), or reactions and the interaction of 
states × reactions (only for implicitly measured traits) in daily diaries (lower part of Figure 8). 
We also predicted each TESSERA component during D4-D5 by its equivalent TESSERA 
component during D1-D3 to account for temporal consistencies in participants’ everyday 
experiences (see for example Epstein, 1979; Fleeson, 2007; Wrzus, 2018). Finally, we allowed 
for covarying intercepts of TESSERA components during D1-D3 and D4-D5. Thereby we 
accounted for the possibility that participants with a higher mean-level for a TESSERA 
component (e.g., higher average perceived duty of situations) could also have a higher-mean 
level for other TESSERA components (e.g., higher average thoughtful behavior).  
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Expanding models on personality development in general to investigate volitional personality 
development (between-person level). We tested our hypotheses on volitional personality 
development by computing 14 additional models that simply expanded the previously described 
MSEMs (see Figure 9). Specifically, to investigate whether change goals were successfully 
implemented into actual trait changes, especially when participants exhibited lower current trait 
levels, we predicted trait changes by change goals at T1 and their interaction with traits at T1 
(i.e., change goals × traits at T1). Moreover, we predicted trait changes by the importance and 
feasibility of change goals, the corresponding interaction (i.e., importance × feasibility) as well 
as their interactions with change goals (i.e., change goals × importance, change goals × 
feasibility). However, expanding the MSEMs applied to investigate personality development in 
general by three latently modeled predictors (i.e., change goals, importance, feasibility) as well 
as a total of four latent interaction terms lead to a non-convergence of the model estimation that 
may have resulted from a too small sample size, especially for estimating latent interactions 
(but see Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004; Moosbrugger, Schermelleh-Engel, & Klein, 1997). In 
addition, even simplified MSEMs that included only one latent interaction (i.e., change goals × 
traits at T1) did not converge. Thus, to provide a parsimonious but sufficient test of our 
hypotheses on volitional personality development, we relied on MSEMs being built solely on 
manifest variables (however, for disadvantages of using manifest variables see for example 
Bentler & Weeks, 1980; Muthen, 2002). Specifically, in models considering volitional 
personality development, long-term trait changes were now conceptualized in terms of manifest 
neighbor-change models (upper part of Figure 9). Equally, all predictors and their interaction 
terms represented manifest composite scores (see section “4.2.3 Measures.”). All predictors 
were mean-centered. 
 To further examine associations of change goals and TESSERA components, we 
additionally predicted situations during D4-D5 as well as states during D1-D3 and D4-D5 by 
change goals, their interaction with traits at T1, their importance and feasibility as well as 
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corresponding interaction terms (i.e., importance × feasibility, change goals × importance, 
change goals × feasibility; lower part of Figure 9). To control for effects of current trait levels, 
both situations and states were additionally predicted by corresponding traits at T1 (see 
subsection “Modeling associations of traits and TESSERA components (between-person 
level)”; lower part of Figure 9). Further expanding models on personality development in 
general, trait changes were additionally predicted by the interaction of change goals and 
preceding states (lower part of Figure 9). The code is available at 
https://osf.io/k9wsv/?view_only=ac0c0b103fff4a61959ed1b893ddfcce. 
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Figure 9. MSEM on the associations of manifest changes in self-rated Big Five traits with TESSERA components and change goals. Note that these 
models closely mirrored MSEMs on personality development in general as depicted in Figure 8. Yet, the upper half depicts expansions made to 
additionally account for volitional personality development on the between person level. To maintain clarity, associations of change goals at T1, 
their importance, their feasibility and corresponding interaction terms with subsequent triggering situations, states/state expressions, and long-term 
trait changes are depicted in dashed gray arrows.  
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Measurement invariance. To ensure that changes in explicit and implicit 
representations of traits can be interpreted as actual trait changes and not as changes in the 
measurement model, we tested measurement invariance for latent neighbor change models on 
personality development in general across T1-T4 (Horn & McArdle, 1992; Van de Schoot et 
al., 2012; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Due to the sensitivity of chi square difference tests for 
sample size, we also investigated changes in CFI, RMSEA and SRMR for each step towards 
strong measurement invariance (Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Testing weak 
measurement invariance, we suggested models with ΔCFI ≤ .010, ΔRMSEA ≤ .015 and 
ΔSRMR ≤ .030 to provide an approximately equivalent fit so that the more parsimonious (i.e., 
more measurement invariant) model was accepted (Chen, 2007). To determine strong 
measurement invariance, we suggested models with ΔCFI ≤ .010, ΔRMSEA ≤ .015 and 
ΔSRMR ≤ .010 to be equivalent with models with weak measurement invariance (Chen, 2007). 
Following these guidelines, for measures of all explicit and all implicit representations of traits, 
except extraversion, full strong measurement invariance held in each model (Table A11). For 
implicit measures of extraversion, we achieved partial strong invariance by freeing one manifest 
variable’s intercept (Table A11; Byrne et al., 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). 
Furthermore, we included indicator specific factors (IS) for the non-reference parcels (upper 
part of Figure 8) to account for shared method variance over time (Eid, 2000; Eid, Schneider, 
& Schwenkmezger, 1999; Geiser & Lockhart, 2012). The implementation of IS factors offers 
theoretical and methodological advantages over the popular correlated uniqueness approach 
(e.g., more parsimonious models, differentiation of method and residual variance, Geiser & 
Lockhart, 2012). 
Model evaluation. We evaluated the model fits with chi-square test, the comparative 
fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). For SRMR, MPlus offers 
separate indices for both the within- and between-person level in MSEM (Muthén & Muthén, 
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1998-2017). Since the chi-square test tends to reject plausible models with increasing sample 
size, we primarily concentrated on CFI, TLI, RMSEA and SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003; West, Taylor, & Wu, 2012). For ordinary SEM, common 
guidelines on CFI and TLI recommend values > .90 or >.95 to indicate reasonable or good 
model fit respectively (Kline, 2005; Van de Schoot et al., 2012). For RMSEA, indices < .08 
imply adequate model fit and indices < .05 point to good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). Finally, SRMR values < .10 indicate acceptable model fit and 
values < .05 demonstrate good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 
2003).These guidelines arise from studies without multilevel data structures and therefore the 
appropriateness for MSEM is currently open. Although research starts to address this issue 
(Ryu, 2014; Yuan & Bentler, 2007), MSEM specific model fit evaluation techniques still await 
its implementation in research and practice. Thus, we preliminary apply the above stated 
recommendations for SEM.  
4.3 Results 
 Table 13 shows descriptive statistics on within-person means, within-person SDs and 
ICCs for TESSERA components, i.e., situations, expectancies, states, reactions, and 
reflection. As indicated by wide ranges of within-person means and the substantial within-
person SDs, participants showed both inter-individual differences and intra-individual 
variation in their experiences of TESSERA components (Table 13, see table note for people 
with zero intra-individual variation).
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Table 13 
Descriptive Information on TESSERA Sequences 
 
Average 
within-person 
mean 
Range within-
person means 
Average 
within-person 
SD 
Range within-
person SD 
ICC 
for D1-D3 
ICC 
for D4-D5 
Triggering situations  
Intellect 3.21 1.18 – 6.29 1.93 0.69 – 2.93 .139 .187 
Duty 3.15 1 – 6.84 2.22 0 – 3.21 .124 .154 
Sociality 4.96 1 – 6.63 2.11 0 – 3.21 .125 .161 
Deception 1.39 1 – 3.21 0.91 0 – 2.60 .109 .138 
Negativity 2.86 1 – 6 2.00 0.74 – 3.46 .136 .145 
Adversity 1.63 1 – 3.76 1.30 0 – 2.89 .094 .140 
Own Expectations 4.47 1.04 – 6.84 1.86 0.29 – 3.20 .258 .338 
States   
Open  5.42 3.65 – 7 1.32 0 – 2.27 .144 .147 
Conscientious  5.11 3 – 7 1.26 0 – 2.70 .248 .277 
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Note. For some variables, ranges for within-person SDs also include 0 because few participants did not vary in their responses across the investigated 
days. For triggering situations, two participants showed no variation in duty (3 and 30 days completed), one showed no variation in sociality (25 days 
completed) and 51 did not experience deceptive or adverse situations at all (3 – 50 days completed). For states, three participants showed no variation 
in conscientious behavior (3, 5 and 6 days completed), two showed no variation in extraverted behavior (5 and 6 days completed), one showed no 
variation in open and agreeable behavior (5 days completed) and another one did not show variation in emotional stable behavior (6 days completed).  
 
Table 13 continued  
 
Average 
within-person 
mean 
Range within-
person means 
Average 
within-person 
SD 
Range within-
person SD 
ICC 
for D1-D3 
ICC 
for D4-D5 
States  
Extraverted  5.26 3.33 – 7 1.32 0 – 2.42 .120 .153 
Agreeable  4.96 3.25 – 7 1.29 0 – 3.21 .158 .159 
Emotional stable  5.23 2.25 – 7 1.47 0 – 3.46 .180 .195 
Affective reaction 
after experiences 
5.27 2.79 – 6.67 1.69 0.5 – 3.21 .096 .120 
Reflection on 
experiences 
4.11 1.31 – 6.62 1.63 0.55 – 2.93 .174 .264 
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 Table 14 presents descriptive information on explicit and implicit representations of 
Big Five traits for all 4 assessments. Since the present research focused on explaining 
individual differences in change, variances in trait changes were more important than average 
(i.e., mean-level) trait changes in the entire sample. As expected, variances for mean-level 
changes were significant (p < .01) for both self-rated and implicitly measured traits in all 
assessment periods (see also Chapter II).  
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Note. IAT = implicit association test. r12 = correlation between T1 and T2. r23 = correlation between T2 and T3. r34 = correlation between T3 and T4. 
Descriptives for T1-T3 are also reported in Chapter II. 
** p < .01. 
Table 14 
Descriptive Information on Explicit and Implicit Representations of Big Five Traits for T1-T4 
 
 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion  Agreeableness Emotional stability 
 
Self-
rating 
IAT 
Self-
rating 
IAT 
Self-
rating 
IAT 
Self-
rating 
IAT 
Self-
rating 
IAT 
Mean (SD) T1 5.264 
(0.952) 
0.272 
(0.290) 
4.988 
(0.919) 
0.265 
(0.270) 
5.036 
(1.099) 
-0.046 
(0.348) 
4.972 
(0.841) 
0.508  
(0.302) 
4.170 
(1.255) 
0.303 
(0.296) 
Mean (SD) T2 5.212 
(0.893) 
0.270 
(0.283) 
4.934 
(0.887) 
0.225 
(0.289) 
5.002 
(1.121) 
-0.006 
(0.354) 
5.014 
(0.884) 
0.499 
(0.293) 
4.268 
(1.195) 
0.320 
(0.287) 
Mean (SD) T3 5.162 
(0.900) 
0.236 
(0.270) 
4.982 
(0.934) 
0.225 
(0.252) 
4.969 
(1.129) 
0.020 
(0.371) 
4.968 
(0.900) 
0.458 
(0.300) 
4.290 
(1.143) 
0.301 
(0.289) 
Mean (SD) T4 5.198 
(0.930) 
0.244 
(0.276) 
5.012 
(0.953) 
0.224 
(0.266) 
5.016 
(1.111) 
0.019 
(0.357) 
4.994 
(0.896) 
0.458 
(0.291) 
4.265 
(1.181) 
0.299 
(0.286) 
r12 .839** .344** .794** .325** .816** .423** .807** .382** .837** .363** 
r23 .860** .335** .827** .277** .891** .470** .807** .390** .839** .374** 
r34 .831** .321** .827** .278** .879** .384** .787** .331** .823** .319** 
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Zero-order correlations of self-rated and implicitly measured traits at T1 as well as change 
goals at T1 with subsequent TESSERA components are shown in Table 15. Means, standard 
deviations and intercorrelations of change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 are 
presented in Table A12. Table A13 shows correlations of importance and feasibility of change 
goals at T1 with subsequent TESSERA components. 
Next, we for each trait first report the results of MSEMs on personality development in general. 
Afterwards we for each trait present results of MSEMs on volitional personality development.
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Table 15 
Correlations of Self-Rated, Implicitly Measured Big Five Traits and Change Goals at T1 with TESSERA components 
 
 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional stability 
 
Self-
rating 
IAT CG 
Self-
rating 
IAT CG 
Self-
rating 
IAT CG 
Self-
rating 
IAT CG 
Self-
rating 
IAT CG 
Triggering situations 
Intellect .205* .058 .003 .051 .056 .086 .048 -.027 -.043 -.030 .004 .096 -.017 .030 .003 
Duty .007 .056 -.102* .107* .138* -.028 .031 .016 -.101 -.087 .063 -.034 -.046 .070 -.040 
Sociality .032 .056 -.045 -.033 -.013 -.028 .181* .088 -.130* .116* .024 .001 .034 .058 .072 
Deception .017 -.007 .045 -.124* .047 .123* -.043 .005 -.003 -.117* .061 .118* -.170* -.062 .132* 
Negativity -.012 -.037 .078 -.242* .064 .272* -.162* .049 .089 -.266* -.034 .143* -.399* -.138* .295* 
Adversity .071 -.002 .038 -.191* -.008 .127* -.086 -.021 .031 -.206* .004 .069 -.191* -.077 .117* 
Own Expectations .073 .004 -.110* .077 .033 -.087 .039 -.057 -.067 -.082 .052 .010 .078 .007 -.157* 
States and state expressions 
Open .155* .050 -.118* .334* .026 -.211* .415* .012 .415* .334* .047 -.091 .301* .166* -.202* 
Conscientious .148* .052 -.188* .343* .057 -.290* .218* -.037 .218* .073 .121* -.052 .234* .164* -.222* 
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Note. IAT = implicit association test. CG = Change goals. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
Table 15 continued 
 
 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional stability 
 
Self-
report 
IAT CG 
Self-
report 
IAT CG 
Self-
report 
IAT CG 
Self-
report 
IAT CG 
Self-
report 
IAT CG 
States and state expressions 
Extraverted .050 .075 -.091* .224* .008 -.107* .414* .108* -.183* .255* .055 -.003 .317* .147* -.193* 
Agreeable .194* .051 -.136* .290* .030 -.165* .329* -.014 -.206* .383* .090 -.093 .225* .124* -.128* 
Emotional stable .069 .049 -.151* .338* .023 -.325* .373* .050 -.219* .179* .087 -.125* .423* .206* -.358* 
Affective reaction 
after experiences 
.056 .067 -.122* .263* -.043 -.250* .297* -.048 -.129* .256* .020 -.081 .397* .161* -.278* 
Reflection on 
experiences 
.088 .062 -.062 .101 .072 -.026 .029 .018 -.019 -.094 .031 .111* -.158* .001 .108* 
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4.3.1 Personality development in general. 
Regarding personality development in general, for each trait we first briefly explain 
model fit indices for MSEMs as displayed in Table 16. Afterwards, for each trait, we describe 
associations among TESSERA components within TESSERA sequences (i.e., on the within-
person level) for self-rated traits. Note that parameter estimates for the within-person level 
associations were equivalent for self-rated and implicitly measured traits, but the latter models 
did not include reflection. We then explain associations between both self-rated and implicitly 
measured traits at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components (i.e., on the between-person 
level). Finally, we describe associations of TESSERA components with subsequent changes 
in both self-rated and implicitly measured traits (i.e., on the between-person level). Table 17 
to 21 provide the estimated coefficients on the between-level associations of TESSERA 
components and traits for personality development in general.  
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Table 16 
Model Fit Indices for MSEMs Examining Associations of TESSERA Components with 
Changes in Self-Rated and Implicitly Measured Big Five Traits  
 χ² CFI TLI 
 
RMSEA SRMR 
(within) 
SRMR 
(between) 
Openness       
Self-rating 1256.310 0.913 0.893 0.021 0.050 0.058 
IAT 273.692 0.979 0.972 0.011 0.016 0.079 
Conscientiousness       
Self-rating 530.180 0.960 0.951 0.011 0.024 0.105 
IAT 286.267 0.957 0.941 0.012 0.023 0.065 
Extraversion        
Self-rating 755.808 0.962 0.953 0.015 0.031 0.097 
IAT 242.173 0.988 0.983 0.010 0.014 0.069 
Agreeableness       
Self-rating 620.101 / 
652.824 
0.960 / 
0.955 
0.950 / 
0.944 
0.013 / 
0.013 
0.028 / 
0.027 
0.088 / 
0.088 
IAT 259.574 / 
264.217 
0.980 / 
0.978 
0.973 / 
0.970 
0.011 / 
0.011 
0.016 / 
0.017 
0.066 / 
0.069 
Emotional stability       
Self-rating 1428.931 / 
807.702 
0.944 / 
0.956 
0.931 / 
0.947 
0.022 / 
0.015 
0.041 / 
0.030 
0.127 / 
0.139 
IAT 297.409 / 
232.823 
0.990 / 
0.988 
0.986 / 
0.984 
0.012 / 
0.010 
0.017 / 
0.009 
0.102 / 
0.100 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. All models were calculated using maximum likelihood 
estimation with robust standard errors and scaled test statistics. CFI = comparative fit index; 
TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual. For agreeableness, values to the left of the slashes 
refer to models comprising sociality; values to the right refer to models comprising deception.   
For emotional stability, values to the left of the slashes refer to models comprising negativity; 
values to the right refer to models comprising adversity.  
4.3.1.1 Openness. 
 Aside from TLI, model fit indices for self-rated openness demonstrated a reasonable to 
good fit of the applied MSEMs (Table 16). Since the TLI was only slightly below the 
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recommended value of .90 for conventional SEM, we decided to keep this model to allow for 
comparisons between traits. For implicitly measured openness, model fit indices were good to 
excellent (Table 16).  
 Testing associations of TESSERA components (i.e., on the within-person level), during 
D1-D3, results showed that the more intellect a situation required, the clearer were participants’ 
own expectations on how to behave (b = 0.084, SE = 0.014, p < .01) and the worse they felt 
after the experiences (b = -0.128, SE = 0.010, p < .01). Unexpectedly, higher perceived need 
for intellect of a situation predicted less open behavior (b = -0.020, SE = 0.014, p = .049). Again 
as expected, clearer expectations on how to behave predicted more open behavior (b = 0.075, 
SE = 0.009, p < .01). Also, the more open behavior participants reported, the better they felt 
after the experience (b = 0.666, SE = 0.016, p < .01). Finally, more open behavior (b = 0.075, 
SE = 0.018, p < .01) and feeling worse after the experience (b = -0.233, SE = 0.010, p < .01) 
predicted more reflection on the experience. Results during D4-D5 closely replicated these 
findings (Table A14). 
 For associations of openness at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components, results 
showed that higher self-rated openness at T1 predicted higher required intellect of situations 
(Table 15, Table 17) and more open behavior during D1-D3 (Table 17). However, self-rated 
openness at T1 did not predict open behavior in the long run (i.e., during D4-D5, see also section 
“4.3.3 Control analyses.”). Implicitly measured openness did not predict required intellect of 
situations or open behavior (Table 15, Table 17).  
 Linking momentary TESSERA components with long-term trait development, it 
showed that neither open behavior nor other TESSERA components predicted change in self-
rated or implicitly measured openness (Table 17, but see section “4.3.3 Control analyses.”). 
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Table 17 
Associations of TESSERA components with Openness at T1 and Long-term Development in Openness (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting TESSERA components by openness at T1 
Intellect of triggering situations (D4-D5) on openness 0.179* [0.061; 0.298] 0.223 [-0.334; 0.780] 
Open state (D1-D3) on openness 0.060* [0.008; 0.112] 0.097 [-0.138; 0.332] 
Open state (D4-D5) on openness -0.008 [-0.054; 0.038] 0.046 [-0.150; 0.243] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on open state 0.078 [-0.033; 0.189] -0.023 [-0.108; 0.061] 
Change T2-T1 on reflection on experience 0.048 [-0.030; 0.126] - - 
Change T2-T1 on open state × reflection on experience 0.002 [-0.073; 0.077] - - 
Change T2-T1 on reaction to experience - - -0.021 [-0.098; 0.055] 
Change T2-T1 on open state × reaction to experience - - -0.009 [-0.033; 0.016] 
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Table 17 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T3-T2 on open state 0.040 [-0.070; 0.151] -0.002 [-0.097; 0.094] 
Change T3-T2 on reflection on experience 0.039 [-0.021; 0.100] - - 
Change T3-T2 on open state × reflection on experience 0.007 [-0.065; 0.078] - - 
Change T3-T2 on reaction to experience - - 0.050 [-0.040; 0.139] 
Change T3-T2 on open state × reaction to experience - - 0.003 [-0.032; 0.038] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T4-T3 on open state 0.039 [-0.083; 0.162] 0.017 [-0.073; 0.108] 
Change T4-T3 on reflection on experience -0.009 [-0.085; 0.066] - - 
Change T4-T3 on open state × reflection on experience -0.003 [-0.093; 0.086] - - 
Change T4-T3 on reaction to experience - - 0.021 [-0.064; 0.106] 
Change T4-T3 on open state × reaction to experience - - 0.025 [-0.015; 0.066] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. CI = 95% confidence interval. 
* p < .05. 
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4.3.1.2 Conscientiousness. 
 For self-rated conscientiousness, fit indices of MSEMs pointed to a good to excellent 
model fit, except for SRMR (between) that lay slightly above the recommended value for 
conventional SEM of .10 (Table 16). Nonetheless, since all other indices indicated a very good 
fit, we kept this model to allow for comparisons between traits. For implicitly measured 
conscientiousness, model fit was good to excellent (Table 16).  
 Again, we examined associations of TESSERA components on the within-person level. 
As hypothesized, during D1-D3, the more duty a situation implied, the clearer participants’ own 
expectations were on how to behave (b = 0.153, SE = 0.011, p < .01), the more conscientious 
behavior they reported (b = 0.077, SE = 0.008, p < .01), and the worse they felt after their 
experiences (b = -0.098, SE = 0.009, p < .01). In addition, clearer expectations on how to behave 
predicted more conscientious behavior (b = 0.126, SE = 0.009, p < .01). Furthermore, the more 
conscientious behavior participants reported, the better they felt after the experiences (b = 
0.256, SE = 0.024, p < .01) and the more they reflected on these experiences (b = 0.138, SE = 
0.017, p < .01). Lastly, worse feelings after the experiences predicted more reflection on the 
experiences (b = -0.217, SE = 0.013, p < .01). Results during D4-D5 mirrored these findings 
(Table A14). 
 Regarding associations of self-rated conscientiousness at T1 and subsequent TESSERA 
components, results showed that associations of conscientiousness at T1 and perceived duty in 
situations were in the expected direction but missed the conventional significance level (Table 
15, Table 18). In addition, the higher participants rated themselves in conscientiousness at T1, 
the more conscientious behavior they reported during D1-D3 (Table 18). Associations between 
conscientiousness at T1 and self-rated conscientious behavior during D4-D5 remained non-
significant when controlling for conscientious behavior during D1-D3 (see also section “4.3.3 
Control analyses.”). Implicitly measured conscientiousness at T1 predicted higher perceived 
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duty in situations on a marginally significant level, but did not predict subsequent conscientious 
behavior (Table 15, Table 18).  
 As expected, for associations of TESSERA components and long-term trait 
development, during D1-D3, it showed that the more conscientious behavior participants 
reported and the more they reflected on experiences in which they behaved conscientiously, the 
more they increased in self-rated conscientiousness from T1 to T2 (Table 18). However, 
associations of TESSERA components during D4-D5 and subsequent changes in self-rated 
conscientiousness remained non-significant (Table 18, see also section “4.3.3 Control 
analyses.”). For implicitly measured conscientiousness, only conscientious behavior during D4-
D5 predicted lagged increases in conscientiousness from T3 to T4 (Table 18). 
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Table 18 
Associations of TESSERA components with Conscientiousness at T1 and Long-term Development in Conscientiousness (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting TESSERA components by conscientiousness at T1 
Duty of triggering situations (D4-D5) on conscientiousness  0.123† [-0.002; 0.249] 0.806† [-0.022; 1.635] 
Conscientious state (D1-D3) on conscientiousness  0.142** [0.066; 0.218] 0.310 [-0.145; 0.765] 
Conscientious state (D4-D5) on conscientiousness  -0.001 [-0.058; 0.056] 0.011 [-0.322; 0.345] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on conscientious state 0.128* [0.020 ; 0.237] 0.024 [-0.018; 0.065] 
Change T2-T1 on reflection on experience -0.073 [-0.164 ; 0.019] - - 
Change T2-T1 on conscientious state × reflection on experience 0.123* [0.006; 0.241] - - 
Change T2-T1 on reaction to experience - - -0.010 [-0.076 ; 0.055] 
Change T2-T1 on conscientious state × reaction to experience - - 0.001 [-0.023; 0.024] 
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Table 18 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T3-T2 on conscientious state -0.023 [-0.140; 0.095] -0.043† [-0.091; 0.005] 
Change T3-T2 on reflection on experience 0.066 [-0.031; 0.162] - - 
Change T3-T2 on conscientious state × reflection on experience -0.030 [-0.126; 0.067] - - 
Change T3-T2 on reaction to experience - - 0.062† [-0.010; 0.135] 
Change T3-T2 on conscientious state × reaction to experience - - 0.007 [-0.019; 0.034] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T4-T3 on conscientious state -0.095 [-0.216; 0.026] 0.048* [0.002; 0.094] 
Change T4-T3 on reflection on experience 0 [-0.113; 0.112] - - 
Change T4-T3 on conscientious state × reflection on experience -0.073 [-0.184; 0.037] - - 
Change T4-T3 on reaction to experience - - -0.025 [-0.082; 0.031] 
Change T4-T3 on conscientious state × reaction to experience - - -0.002 [-0.036; 0.033] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. CI = 95% confidence interval. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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4.3.1.3 Extraversion. 
Model fits for self-rated extraversion exhibited an acceptable to good model fit. For 
implicitly measured extraversion, model fits were good to excellent (Table 16).  
Associations of TESSERA components during D1-D3 (i.e., on the within-person level) 
indicated that, as expected, higher sociality of situations predicted clearer own expectations on 
how to behave (b = 0.113, SE = 0.013, p < .01) and more extraverted behavior (b = 0.296, SE 
= 0.008, p < .01). Unexpectedly, higher perceived sociality of situations was associated with 
worse feelings after the experiences (b = -0.128, SE = 0.010, p < .01). Yet, as predicted, clearer 
expectations on how to behave predicted more extraverted behavior (b = 0.039, SE = 0.009, p 
< .01). In addition, the more extraverted behavior participants reported, the better they felt after 
the experiences (b = 0.674, SE = 0.018, p < .01). However, extraverted behavior did not predict 
reflections on the experiences (b = -0.026, SE = 0.017, p = .130). Again, worse feelings after 
the experiences predicted more reflections on the experiences (b = -0.190, SE = 0.013, p < .01). 
All results were replicated during D4-D5 (Table A14). 
For associations of extraversion at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components, results 
showed that the higher participants rated themselves in extraversion at T1, the higher they rated 
sociality of situations (Table 15, Table 19) and the more extraverted behavior they reported 
during D1-D3 (Table 19). Extraversion at T1 did not predict extraverted behavior during D4-
D5 when controlling for extraverted behavior at D1-D3 (Table 19, see also section “4.3.3 
Control analyses.”). Associations for self-ratings were replicated in implicitly measured 
extraversion, with however implicitly measured extraversion at T1 predicting perceived 
sociality of situations only on a marginally significant level (Table 15, Table 19).  
Investigating associations of TESSERA components and long-term trait development 
showed that extraverted behavior during D1-D3 predicted subsequent increases in both self-
rated and implicitly measured extraversion from T1 to T2 (Table 19). Unexpectedly and only 
marginally significant, the worse participants felt after their experiences during D1-D3, the 
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more they increased in implicitly measured extraversion from T1 to T2 (Table 19). However, 
links between TESSERA components during D4-D5 and subsequent changes in extraversion 
were statistically non-significant (Table 19, see also section “4.3.3 Control analyses.”). 
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Table 19 
Associations of TESSERA components with Extraversion at T1 and Long-term Development in Extraversion (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting TESSERA components by extraversion at T1 
Sociality of triggering situations (D4-D5) on extraversion  0.116* [0.013; 0.220] 0.403† [-0.076; 0.881] 
Extraverted state (D1-D3) on extraversion  0.086** [0.047; 0.125] 0.201* [0.039; 0.363] 
Extraverted state (D4-D5) on extraversion  0.016 [-0.029; 0.061] 0.062 [-0.125; 0.248] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on extraverted state 0.325** [0.099; 0.552] 0.194** [0.094; 0.295] 
Change T2-T1 on reflection on experience 0.047 [-0.066; 0.161] - - 
Change T2-T1 on extraverted state × reflection on experience -0.027 [-0.173; 0.118] - - 
Change T2-T1 on reaction to experience - - -0.086† [-0.176; 0.004] 
Change T2-T1 on extraverted state × reaction to experience - - 0.008 [-0.032; 0.049] 
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Table 19 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T3-T2 on extraverted state 0.007 [-0.128; 0.141] -0.011 [-0.105; 0.083] 
Change T3-T2 on reflection on experience 0.022 [-0.067; 0.111] - - 
Change T3-T2 on extraverted state × reflection on experience 0.033 [-0.066; 0.131] - - 
Change T3-T2 on reaction to experience - - 0.039 [-0.053; 0.131] 
Change T3-T2 on extraverted state × reaction to experience - - 0.012 [-0.033; 0.058] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T4-T3 on extraverted state 0.079 [-0.081 ; 0.239] -0.055 [-0.169; 0.058] 
Change T4-T3 on reflection on experience 0.027 [-0.065; 0.118] - - 
Change T4-T3 on extraverted state × reflection on experience 0.083 [-0.035; 0.200] - - 
Change T4-T3 on reaction to experience - - 0.016 [-0.098; 0.130] 
Change T4-T3 on extraverted state × reaction to experience - - -0.001 [-0.059; 0.058] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. CI = 95% confidence interval. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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4.3.1.4 Agreeableness. 
 For self-rated and implicitly measured agreeableness, we calculated two models each to 
test the associations with sociality and deception in situations. For self-rated agreeableness, 
both models showed a reasonable to good fit and for implicitly measured agreeableness, both 
models demonstrated a good to excellent fit (Table 16).  
 Results for the associations of TESSERA components on the within-person level during 
D1-D3 showed that higher perceived sociality of situations did predict clearer own expectations 
on how to behave (b = 0.114, SE = 0.013, p < .01), and more agreeable behavior (b = 0.216, SE 
= 0.008, p < .01), but failed to predict feelings after the experiences (b = 0.005, SE = 0.011, p 
= .674). Higher perceived deception in situations however did not predict participants’ 
expectations on how to behave (b = -0.040, SE = 0.021, p = .052) but did predict less agreeable 
behavior (b = -0.221, SE = 0.008, p < .01) and feeling worse after the experiences (b = -0.401, 
SE = 0.008, p < .01). In turn, in models for both sociality and deception in situations, the clearer 
participants’ expectations on how to behave were, the more agreeable behavior they reported 
(b = 0.027, SE = 0.008, p < .01; b = 0.055, SE = 0.008, p < .01, respectively). In addition, the 
more agreeable behavior participants reported, the better they felt after their experiences (b = 
0.561, SE = 0.017, p < .01; b = 0.499, SE = 0.016, p < .01) and the more they reflected on their 
experiences (b = 0.083, SE = 0.017, p < .01; b = 0.081, SE = 0.017, p < .01). Also, feeling worse 
after the experiences predicted more reflection on the experiences (b = -0.226, SE = 0.013, p < 
.01; b = -0.228, SE = 0.013, p < .01). The two coefficients for each association differed slightly 
between the two models with different situational predictor because the situational variable 
accounted for different amounts of variance in the subsequent variables of the TESSERA 
sequence. By and large, results during D4-D5 replicated these findings (Table A14). 
 Higher self-rated agreeableness at T1 was associated with less perceived deception but 
not with more perceived sociality of situations (Table 15, Table 20). Also, the higher 
participants rated themselves in agreeableness at T1, the more agreeable behavior they reported 
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during D1-D3 (Table 20). Again, agreeableness at T1 did not predict self-rated agreeable 
behavior during D4-D5 controlling for agreeable behavior during D1-D3 (Table 20, see also 
section “4.3.3 Control analyses.”). For implicitly measured agreeableness however, none of 
these associations were significant (Table 15, Table 20).  
 For associations of TESSERA components and long-term trait development, results of 
both models for sociality and deception in situations demonstrated that agreeable behavior 
during D1-D3 predicted increases in self-rated agreeableness from T1 to T2 (Table 20, see also 
section “4.3.3 Control analyses.”). Yet, for implicitly measured agreeableness, no TESSERA 
component predicted trait change (Table 20). 
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Table 20 
Associations of TESSERA components with Agreeableness at T1 and Long-term Development in Agreeableness (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting TESSERA components by agreeableness at T1 
Sociality / deception of triggering situations (D4-D5) on 
agreeableness 
0.010 /  
-0.063** 
[-0.124; 0.145] /  
[-0.117; -0.008] 
0.196 /  
0.145 
[-0.309; 0.701] /  
[-0.084; 0.374] 
Agreeable state (D1-D3) on agreeableness  0.166** / 
 0.175** 
[0.106; 0.227] / 
[0.115; 0.236] 
0.148 /  
0.148 
[-0.119; 0.415] /  
[-0.115; 0.410] 
Agreeable state (D4-D5) on agreeableness  -0.011 / 
 -0.017 
[-0.069; 0.046] / 
[-0.071; 0.036] 
0.114 /  
0.110 
[-0.117; 0.346] /  
[-0.104; 0.324] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on agreeable state 0.254** /  
0.213** 
[0.100; 0.408] / 
[0.072; 0.354] 
0.027 /  
0.027 
[-0.043; 0.097] /  
[-0.044; 0.099] 
Change T2-T1 on reflection on experience 0.011 /  
0.022 
[-0.070; 0.092] / 
[-0.062; 0.105] 
- - 
Change T2-T1 on agreeable state × reflection on experience -0.007 / 
 0.002 
[-0.142; 0.127] / 
[-0.131; 0.136] 
- - 
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Table 20 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on reaction to experience - - 0.029 /  
0.016 
[-0.050; 0.109] /  
[-0.062; 0.095] 
Change T2-T1 on agreeable state × reaction to experience - - 0.013 /  
0.010 
[-0.018; 0.043] /  
[-0.020; 0.039 ] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T3-T2 on agreeable state -0.017 /  
-0.013 
[-0.192; 0.159] / 
[-0.190; 0.165] 
-0.026 /  
-0.032 
[-0.123; 0.071] /  
[-0.136; 0.072] 
Change T3-T2 on reflection on experience 0.002 /  
-0.003 
[-0.073; 0.077] / 
[-0.079; 0.073] 
- 
- 
Change T3-T2 on agreeable state × reflection on experience -0.027 /  
-0.025 
[-0.139; 0.084] / 
[-0.136; 0.086] 
- 
- 
Change T3-T2 on reaction to experience - - -0.015 /  
-0.001 
[-0.109; 0.078] /  
[-0.096; 0.093] 
Change T3-T2 on agreeable state × reaction to experience - - 0.019 / 
 0.020 
[-0.009; 0.048] /  
[-0.009; 0.048] 
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Table 20 continued 
 
Self-rating 
IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T4-T3 on agreeable state -0.049 /  
-0.043 
[-0.229; 0.132] / 
[-0.230; 0.145] 
0.023 /  
0.021 
[-0.076; 0.122] /  
[-0.081; 0.123] 
Change T4-T3 on reflection on experience -0.012 /  
-0.015 
[-0.103; 0.080] / 
[-0.107; 0.077] 
- 
- 
Change T4-T3 on agreeable state × reflection on experience 0.064 /  
0.064 
[-0.078; 0.205] / 
[-0.077; 0.204] 
- 
- 
Change T4-T3 on reaction to experience - - 0.000 / 
 0.008 
[-0.098; 0.098] /  
[-0.095; 0.112] 
Change T4-T3 on agreeable state × reaction to experience - - -0.028 /  
-0.027 
[-0.066; 0.011] /  
[-0.066; 0.012] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. Values to the left of the slashes refer to models comprising sociality; values to the right refer to models 
comprising deception. CI = 95% confidence interval. 
** p < .01. 
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4.3.1.5 Emotional stability. 
 For both self-rated and implicitly measured emotional stability, we again calculated two 
MSEMs each to investigate the role of negativity and adversity of situations. Except for SRMR 
(between), fit indices demonstrated a good to excellent model fit for both self-rated and 
implicitly measured emotional stability (Table 16). As SRMR (between) did not exceed 
conventional SEM’s cut-off values by large, we decided to keep these models to allow for 
comparisons between traits. 
  In general, in both models for negativity and adversity of situations, path coefficients 
for associations of TESSERA components were similar in direction and magnitude. 
Unexpectedly neither perceived negativity, nor adversity of situations predicted participants’ 
own expectations on how to behave (b = 0.008, SE = 0.013, p = .578; b = -0.013, SE = 0.017, p 
= .431, respectively). The more participants perceived negativity and adversity in situations, 
the less emotional stable behavior they reported (b = -0.348, SE = 0.011, p < .01; b = -0.200, 
SE = 0.015, p < .01) and the worse they felt after the experiences (b = -0.485, SE = 0.011, p < 
.01; b = -0.359, SE = 0.015, p < .01). Moreover, clearer expectations on how to behave predicted 
more emotional stable behavior (b = 0.141, SE = 0.010, p < .01; b = 0.135, SE = 0.013, p < .01). 
In addition, the more emotional stable behavior participants reported, the better they felt after 
their experiences (b = 0.298, SE = 0.014, p < .01; b = 0.535, SE = 0.013, p < .01) and the less 
they reflected on their experiences (for negativity b = -0.140, SE = 0.017, p < .01; for adversity 
b = -0.138, SE = 0.017, p < .01). Finally, as suggested, feeling worse after the experiences 
predicted more reflection on the experiences (for negativity b = -0.141, SE = 0.015, p < .01; for 
adversity b = -0.137, SE = 0.015, p < .01). These results replicated during D4-D5 (Table A14). 
Regarding associations of emotional stability at T1 and subsequent TESSERA 
components, results showed that self-rated emotional stability at T1 predicted less perceived 
negativity of situations (Table 15, Table 21). In addition, implicitly measured emotional 
stability at T1 was on a marginally significant level linked with less adversity of situations 
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(Table 15, Table 21). Both higher self-rated and implicitly measured emotional stability at T1 
predicted more emotional stable behavior during D1-D3, but not during D4-D5 when 
controlling for emotional stable behavior during D1-D3 (Table 21, see also section “4.3.3 
Control analyses.”).  
Unexpectedly, no TESSERA component was associated with long-term development in 
self-rated and implicitly measured emotional stability (Table 21). 
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Table 21 
Associations of TESSERA components with Emotional Stability at T1 and Long-term Development in Emotional Stability (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting TESSERA components by emotional stability at T1 
Negativity / adversity of triggering situations (D4-D5) on emotional 
stability 
-0.057* / 
 -0.026 
[-0.108; -0.006] /  
[-0.088; 0.037] 
-0.102 /  
-0.290† 
[-0.389; 0.185] /  
[-0.600; 0.021] 
Emotional stable state (D1-D3) on emotional stability  0.133** /  
0.119** 
[0.087; 0.180] /  
[0.068 ; 0.171] 
0.523** /  
0.453** 
[0.256; 0.791] /  
[0.188; 0.717] 
Emotional stable state (D4-D5) on emotional stability  -0.004 /  
-0.016 
[-0.046; 0.038] /  
[-0.058; 0.026] 
-0.144 / 
 -0.153 
 [-0.383; 0.095] / 
[-0.389; 0.083] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on emotional stable state -0.040 / 
 0.023 
[-0.190; 0.111] /  
[-0.113; 0.160] 
0.037 /  
0.034 
[-0.026; 0.099] /  
[-0.031; 0.098] 
Change T2-T1 on reflection on experience -0.017 / 
 -0.031 
[-0.117; 0.083] /  
[-0.127; 0.066] 
- - 
Change T2-T1 on emotional stable state × reflection on experience 0.012 / 
 0.007 
[-0.065; 0.089] /  
[-0.072; 0.086] 
- - 
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Table 21 continued 
 
Self-rating 
IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by TESSERA components during D1-D3 
Change T2-T1 on reaction to experience 
- - 
-0.008 /  
-0.004 
[-0.094; 0.077] /  
[-0.099; 0.090] 
Change T2-T1 on emotional stable state × reaction to experience 
- - 
0.004 /  
0.006 
[-0.024; 0.032] /  
[-0.022; 0.034] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T3-T2 on emotional stable state 0.069 / 
 0.045 
[-0.056; 0.195] /  
[-0.078; 0.168] 
-0.025 /  
-0.025 
[-0.103; 0.052] /  
[-0.105; 0.055] 
Change T3-T2 on reflection on experience 0.038 /  
0.043 
[-0.041; 0.117] /  
[-0.035; 0.121] 
- - 
Change T3-T2 on emotional stable state × reflection on experience 0.065 /  
0.067 
[-0.036; 0.165] /  
[-0.033; 0.167] 
- - 
Change T3-T2 on reaction to experience 
- - 
0.055 /  
0.050 
[-0.034; 0.143] /  
[-0.048; 0.148] 
Change T3-T2 on emotional stable state × reaction to experience 
- - 
-0.016 / 
 -0.016 
[-0.048; 0.016] /  
[-0.048; 0.015] 
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Table 21 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
 Estimate CI Estimate CI 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by TESSERA components during D4-D5 
Change T4-T3 on emotional stable state 0.075 /  
0.071 
[-0.067; 0.218] /  
[-0.069; 0.210] 
-0.033 /  
-0.035 
[-0.116; 0.049] /  
[-0.120; 0.049] 
Change T4-T3 on reflection on experience 0.014 /  
0.013 
[-0.079; 0.107] /  
[-0.079; 0.105] 
- - 
Change T4-T3 on emotional stable state × reflection on experience 0.026 / 
 0.026 
[-0.081; 0.134] /  
[-0.082; 0.134] 
- - 
Change T4-T3 on reaction to experience 
- - 
-0.011 / 
 -0.001 
[-0.116; 0.094] /  
[-0.108; 0.107] 
Change T4-T3 on emotional stable state × reaction to experience 
- - 
-0.013 / 
 -0.011 
[-0.051; 0.025] /  
[-0.049; 0.027] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. Values to the left of the slashes refer to models comprising negativity; values to the right refer to models 
comprising adversity. CI = 95% confidence interval. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
Chapter IV: Momentary Processes and Goals to Change Personality 
  
191 
4.3.2 Volitional personality development. 
Regarding volitional personality development, we again for each trait first explain 
model fit indices for MSEMs as displayed in Table 22. Thereafter, for each trait, we first 
report associations of change goals at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components (i.e., on the 
between-person level). Then, we explain direct links between change goals and long-term 
development in both self-rated and implicitly measured traits (i.e., on the between-person 
level). Table 23 to 27 provide the estimated coefficients. Keep in mind that associations 
among TESSERA components within TESSERA sequences (i.e., on the within-person level) 
and links between reflective or associative processes and long-term trait change (i.e., on the 
between-person level) were modeled just like in models on personality development in 
general and are therefore not reported in further detail. With only one exception (i.e., during 
D1-D3, more positive feelings after the experiences now predicted less changes in implicitly 
measured extraversion from T1 to T2; b = -0.105, SE = 0.047, p = .025), these associations 
closely mirrored their counterparts in models on personality development in general. Notably, 
and consistent with previous research, lower self-rated traits at T1 consistently predicted 
stronger respective change goals (all βs ≥ -0.215, all ps < .01). In addition, the lower 
participants’ implicitly measured conscientiousness (β = -0.229, p < .01), extraversion (β = -
0.184, p < .01) and emotional stability (β = -0.137, p = .028), the stronger their according 
change goals. 
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Table 22 
Model Fit Indices for MSEMs Examining Associations of Change Goals with TESSERA 
Components and Long-Term Changes in Self-Rated and Implicitly Measured Big Five Traits 
 χ² CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
(within) 
SRMR 
(between) 
Openness       
Self-rating 1281.115 0.883 0.819 0.024 0.050 0.077 
IAT 428.893 0.957 0.929 0.015 0.016 0.085 
Conscientiousness       
Self-rating 617.105 0.925 0.884 0.015 0.025 0.098 
IAT 448.900 0.913 0.857 0.015 0.023 0.079 
Extraversion        
Self-rating 847.513 0.941 0.909 0.019 0.031 0.122 
IAT 465.290 0.964 0.941 0.016 0.014 0.098 
Agreeableness       
Self-rating 
636.110 / 
673.817 
0.945 / 
0.939 
0.916 / 
0.906 
0.016 / 
0.016 
0.028 / 
0.027 
0.078 / 
0.078 
IAT 
385.142 / 
397.716 
0.961 / 
0.957 
0.936 / 
0.929 
0.014 / 
0.014 
0.016 / 
0.017 
0.071 / 
0.073 
Emotional stability       
Self-rating 
1332.627 / 
735.848 
0.939 / 
0.950 
0.906 / 
0.923 
0.025 / 
0.017 
0.041 / 
0.030 
0.108 / 
0.115 
IAT 
404.784 / 
355.260 
0.984 / 
0.975 
0.973 / 
0.959 
0.014 / 
0.013 
0.018 / 
0.009 
0.095 / 
0.096 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. All models were calculated using maximum likelihood 
estimation with robust standard errors and scaled test statistics. CFI = comparative fit index; 
TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual. For agreeableness, values to the left of the slashes 
refer to models comprising sociality; values to the right refer to models comprising deception.   
For emotional stability, values to the left of the slashes refer to models comprising negativity; 
values to the right refer to models comprising adversity. 
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4.3.2.1 Openness. 
 Except for the CFI and TLI, model fit indices for self-rated openness demonstrated a 
reasonable to good fit of the applied MSEMs (Table 22). Although both CFI and TLI were 
below the recommended value of .90, they did not indicate a severe miss-specification, so that 
we decided to keep this model to allow for comparisons between traits. For implicitly 
measured openness, model fit indices were good to excellent (Table 22).  
 Testing associations of change goals at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components, 
results unexpectedly showed that, controlling for openness at T1, both stronger goals to change 
openness and higher perceived feasibility predicted less open behavior during D4-D5 (Table 
23). Only in models on implicitly measured openness, stronger change goals that were also 
perceived as more feasible predicted less open behavior during D4-D5 (Table 23). All other 
associations remained non-significant (Table 23, see also Table 15, Table A13).   
 Linking change goals with long-term development in self-rated openness, it showed 
that only higher perceived importance of change goals predicted stronger trait change for self-
rated openness from T1 to T2 (Table 23). In addition, change goals that were perceived both 
more important and more feasible, were associated with less changes in self-rated openness 
from T1 to T2 (Table 23). For implicitly measured openness however, no significant link 
between change goals and actual trait changes emerged (Table 23).   
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Table 23 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components and Long-term Development in Openness (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Intellect on change goals 0.017  
[-0.282; 0.316] 
0.033  
[-0.260; 0.326] 
Situation: Intellect on change goals × traits -0.025 
[-0.342; 0.291] 
-0.707 
[-1.623; 0.210] 
Situation: Intellect on importance -0.028 
[-0.190; 0.134] 
0.070 
[-0.073; 0.213] 
Situation: Intellect on feasibility 0.006 
[-0.167; 0.179] 
0.123 
[-0.028; 0.274] 
Situation: Intellect on importance × feasibility 0.052 
[-0.149; 0.252] 
-0.057 
[-0.416; 0.303] 
Situation: Intellect on change goals × importance 0.081 
[-0.358; 0.519] 
0.050 
[-0.291; 0.391] 
Situation: Intellect on change goals × feasibility -0.073 
[-0.421; 0.276] 
-0.021 
[-0.215; 0.173] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Open (D1-D3) on change goals 0.036 
[-0.111; 0.182] 
0.024 
[-0.123; 0.171] 
State: Open (D1-D3) on change goals × traits -0.089 
[-0.226; 0.049] 
-0.075 
[-0.447; 0.297] 
State: Open (D1-D3) on importance -0.023 
[-0.094; 0.047] 
0.016 
[-0.048; 0.080] 
State: Open (D1-D3) on feasibility 0.015 
[-0.061; 0.092] 
0.057 
[-0.014; 0.127] 
State: Open (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility 0.031 
[-0.061; 0.122] 
-0.005 
[-0.093; 0.082] 
State: Open (D1-D3) on change goals × importance 0.125 
[-0.061; 0.310] 
0.068 
[-0.093; 0.229] 
State: Open (D1-D3) on change goals × feasibility 0.022 
[-0.127; 0.171] 
-0.020 
[-0.166; 0.126] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Open (D4-D5) on change goals -0.137* 
[-0.241; -0.032] 
-0.131* 
[-0.237; -0.025] 
State: Open (D4-D5) on change goals × traits 0.002  
[-0.122; 0.126] 
-0.260† 
[-0.526; 0.007] 
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Table 23 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Open (D4-D5) on importance -0.001 
[-0.061; 0.058] 
-0.003 
[-0.053; 0.047] 
State: Open (D4-D5) on feasibility -0.071* 
[-0.132; -0.009] 
-0.069* 
[-0.123; -0.015] 
State: Open (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility -0.029 
[-0.100; 0.042] 
-0.025 
[-0.094; 0.044] 
State: Open (D4-D5) on change goals × importance -0.056 
[-0.203; 0.091] 
-0.045 
[-0.163; 0.074] 
State: Open (D4-D5) on change goals × feasibility -0.112† 
[-0.240; 0.017] 
-0.109* 
[-0.217; <-0.001] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.048 
[-0.220; 0.123] 
-0.040 
[-0.139; 0.059] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits -0.008 
[-0.138; 0.121] 
-0.066 
[-0.297; 0.165] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × open state (D1-D3) -0.033 
[-0.218; 0.151] 
-0.025 
[-0.129; 0.078] 
Change T2-T1 on importance 0.121* 
[0.047; 0.196] 
-0.014 
[-0.051; 0.022] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.046 
[-0.032; 0.125] 
-0.010 
[-0.056; 0.036] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility -0.112* 
[-0.194; -0.030] 
0.022 
[-0.034; 0.078] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance -0.153 
[-0.344; 0.038] 
0.034 
[-0.079; 0.147] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility 0.037 
[-0.131; 0.204] 
-0.049 
[-0.134; 0.037] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals -0.020 
[-0.200; 0.160] 
0.077 
[-0.030; 0.183] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits 0.013 
[-0.146; 0.172] 
0.079 
[-0.188; 0.345] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × open state (D4-D5) -0.120 
[-0.288; 0.047] 
0.028 
[-0.070; 0.126] 
Change T3-T2 on importance 0.025 
[-0.058; 0.107] 
0.007 
[-0.038; 0.052] 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility 0.003 
[-0.079; 0.085] 
0.035 
[-0.023; 0.092] 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility 0.005  
[-0.096; 0.106] 
-0.037 
[-0.100; 0.027] 
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Table 23 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance 0.016 
[-0.211; 0.243] 
-0.086 
[-0.211; 0.039] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility -0.049  
[-0.211; 0.113] 
-0.020 
[-0.117; 0.077] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals 0.035 
[-0.165; 0.234] 
-0.090 
[-0.204; 0.025] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits -0.164† 
[-0.329; 0.002] 
-0.166 
[-0.422; 0.090] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × open state (D4-D5) 0.107 
[-0.097; 0.312] 
-0.062 
[-0.185; 0.061] 
Change T4-T3 on importance -0.074 
[-0.169; 0.022] 
0.005 
[-0.043; 0.054] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility -0.023 
[-0.131; 0.085] 
-0.039 
[-0.095; 0.018] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility 0.090 
[-0.032; 0.212] 
-0.005  
[-0.067; 0.058] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.092 
[-0.170; 0.354] 
0.019 
[-0.123; 0.162] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility 0.040 
[-0.125; 0.206] 
0.016  
[-0.080; 0.113] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
4.3.2.2 Conscientiousness. 
 For both self-rated and implicitly measured conscientiousness, fit indices of MSEMs 
indicated an acceptable to good model fit, except for the TLI that lay slightly below the 
recommended value for conventional SEM of .90 (Table 22). As all other indices indicated an 
at least acceptable fit, we kept both models to allow for comparisons between traits. 
 Regarding associations of change goals at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components, 
results showed that only for implicitly measured traits, change goals predicted less 
conscientious behavior during D1-D3 while controlling for conscientiousness at T1 (Table 
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24). All other associations of change goals and subsequent TESSERA components remained 
non-significant (Table 24, see also Table 15, Table A13). 
 Unexpectedly, change goals at T1 predicted less actual change in self-rated 
conscientiousness from T2 to T3 and less actual change in implicitly measured 
conscientiousness from T1 to T2 (Table 24). Also, the stronger participants’ change goals and 
the higher their implicitly measured conscientiousness, the more they changed from T2 to T3. 
Importance of change goals at T1 was linked with more pronounced increases in implicitly 
measured conscientiousness from T1 to T2, yet this effect was reversed from T2 to T3 (Table 
24). Furthermore, higher perceived feasibility of change goals at T1 predicted more 
pronounced actual changes in self-rated conscientiousness from T1 to T2 (Table 24). 
Moreover, the stronger a change goal and the higher its perceived feasibility, the more 
participants’ changed in implicitly measured conscientiousness from T1 to T2, however with 
this association being reversed from T2 to T3 (Table 24).   
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Table 24 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components and Long-term Development in Conscientiousness (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Duty on change goals 0.044 
[-0.246; 0.335] 
-0.007  
[-0.287; 0.274] 
Situation: Duty on change goals × traits -0.061 
[-0.323; 0.201] 
0.193  
[-0.573; 0.958] 
Situation: Duty on importance 0.031 
[-0.153; 0.215] 
0.075  
[-0.104; 0.255] 
Situation: Duty on feasibility -0.046 
[-0.239; 0.146] 
0.000 
[-0.172; 0.172] 
Situation: Duty on importance × feasibility -0.019 
[-0.303; 0.266] 
0.066 
[-0.119; 0.250] 
Situation: Duty on change goals × importance -0.135 
[-0.497; 0.228] 
-0.140 
[-0.502; 0.223] 
Situation: Duty on change goals × feasibility 0.076 
[-0.111; 0.262] 
-0.014 
[-0.248; 0.220] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on change goals -0.069 
[-0.233; 0.096] 
-0.172* 
[-0.342; -0.002] 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on change goals × traits -0.060 
[-0.193; 0.073] 
-0.120 
[-0.553; 0.313] 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on importance -0.035 
[-0.129; 0.060] 
0.017 
[-0.078; 0.112] 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on feasibility -0.007 
[-0.108; 0.094] 
0.050 
[-0.050; 0.150] 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility 0.028 
[-0.067; 0.123] 
0.008 
[-0.089; 0.105] 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on change goals × importance 0.055 
[-0.123; 0.234] 
0.071 
[-0.112; 0.254] 
State: Conscientious (D1-D3) on change goals × feasibility -0.056 
[-0.206; 0.094] 
-0.043 
[-0.173; 0.086] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on change goals -0.003 
[-0.123; 0.118] 
0.002 
[-0.125; 0.128] 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on change goals × traits 0.034 
[-0.077; 0.146] 
0.058 
[-0.280; 0.397] 
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Table 24 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on importance 0.020 
[-0.056; 0.096] 
0.014 
[-0.059; 0.087] 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on feasibility 0.012 
[-0.070; 0.094] 
0.010 
[-0.068; 0.088] 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility 0.017 
[-0.057; 0.091] 
-0.035 
[-0.136; 0.066] 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on change goals × importance -0.026 
[-0.178; 0.126] 
-0.030 
[-0.183; 0.124] 
State: Conscientious (D4-D5) on change goals × feasibility -0.046 
[-0.168; 0.076] 
0.016 
[-0.058; 0.090] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.121 
[-0.267; 0.025] 
-0.079* 
[-0.144; -0.013] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits -0.036 
[-0.148; 0.075] 
-0.155  
[-0.346; 0.036] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals ×  
conscientious state (D1-D3) 
0.100 
[-0.023; 0.223] 
0.042 
[-0.015; 0.098] 
Change T2-T1 on importance 0.075† 
[-0.004; 0.153] 
0.049* 
[0.008; 0.091] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.133** 
[0.041; 0.225] 
0.008 
[-0.037; 0.052] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility -0.078  
[-0.163; 0.007] 
-0.004 
[-0.045; 0.037] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance -0.099 
[-0.286; 0.089] 
0.020 
[-0.063; 0.102] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility -0.039 
[-0.181; 0.103] 
0.081* 
[0.008; 0.154] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals -0.174** 
[-0.301; -0.046] 
0.007 
[-0.069; 0.084] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits -0.065 
[-0.202; 0.071] 
0.187* 
[0.009; 0.365] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals ×  
conscientious state (D4-D5) 
0.010 
[-0.109; 0.129] 
-0.009 
[-0.075; 0.056] 
Change T3-T2 on importance 0.018 
[-0.066; 0.101] 
-0.058* 
[-0.109; -0.007] 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility -0.072 
[-0.164; 0.020] 
-0.028 
[-0.081; 0.025] 
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Table 24 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility 0.011 
[-0.069; 0.091] 
0.024 
[-0.034; 0.082] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance 0.052 
[-0.086; 0.190] 
0.026 
[-0.080; 0.133] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility 0.095 
[-0.043; 0.233] 
-0.071* 
[-0.133; -0.008] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals 0.064 
[-0.080; 0.208] 
0.067 
[-0.009; 0.143] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits 0.106 
[-0.053; 0.264] 
-0.011 
[-0.234; 0.211] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals ×  
conscientious state (D4-D5) 
0.007 
[-0.138; 0.152] 
-0.007 
[-0.084; 0.071] 
Change T4-T3 on importance -0.034 
[-0.127; 0.058] 
0.027 
[-0.029; 0.083] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility 0.006 
[-0.094; 0.106] 
0.018 
[-0.037; 0.072] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility 0.085 
[-0.010; 0.180] 
0.036  
[-0.028; 0.100] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.122 
[-0.056; 0.300] 
0.073 
[-0.039; 0.184] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility -0.103 
[-0.271; 0.064] 
0.053 
[-0.038; 0.144] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
4.3.2.3 Extraversion. 
Except for SRMR (between), model fits for self-rated extraversion demonstrated an 
acceptable to good model fit. As SRMR (between) only slightly exceeded recommended 
values of .10, we kept this model to allow for comparisons between traits (Table 22). For 
implicitly measured extraversion, fit indices exhibited an acceptable to good model fit (Table 
22).  
For links of change goals at T1 and subsequent TESSERA components, results showed 
that higher perceived feasibility of goals to change extraversion predicted more extraverted 
Chapter IV: Momentary Processes and Goals to Change Personality 
  
201 
behavior during D1-D3 while controlling for extraversion at T1 (Table 25). Unexpectedly, all 
other associations of change goals and subsequent TESSERA components remained non-
significant (Table 25, see also Table 15, Table A12).  
Investigating associations of change goals and long-term trait development, it 
unexpectedly showed that the more participants wanted to increase in extraversion, the less 
they actually changed in self-rated traits from T1 to T2 (Table 25). Again as expected, more 
important change goals and change goals that were both stronger and more important predicted 
stronger increases in self-rated extraversion from T1 to T2 (Table 25). In contrast, the more 
feasible participants perceived a change goal, the less they actually changed in implicitly 
measured extraversion from T2 to T3 (Table 25).   
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Table 25 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components and Long-term Development in Extraversion (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Sociality on change goals -0.046 
[-0.297; 0.204] 
-0.074 
[-0.325; 0.177] 
Situation: Sociality on change goals × traits 0.080 
[-0.174; 0.333] 
0.205 
[-0.350; 0.761] 
Situation: Sociality on importance -0.016 
[-0.148; 0.116] 
0.002 
[-0.124; 0.128] 
Situation: Sociality on feasibility 0.019 
[-0.117; 0.156] 
0.059 
[-0.062; 0.181] 
Situation: Sociality on importance × feasibility -0.020 
[-0.141; 0.100] 
-0.028 
[-0.145; 0.090] 
Situation: Sociality on change goals × importance 0.058 
[-0.172; 0.287] 
0.057 
[-0.170; 0.285] 
Situation: Sociality on change goals × feasibility 0.038 
[-0.218; 0.295] 
0.102 
[-0.105; 0.309] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on change goals 0.087 
[-0.021; 0.196] 
0.060 
[-0.049; 0.169] 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on change goals × traits 0.021 
[-0.071; 0.113] 
0.067 
[-0.162; 0.296] 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on importance 0.002 
[-0.052; 0.057] 
0.020 
[-0.030; 0.070] 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on feasibility 0.063* 
[0.007; 0.118] 
0.090** 
[0.038; 0.143] 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility -0.030 
[-0.082; 0.022] 
-0.036 
[-0.089; 0.017] 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on change goals × importance -0.054 
[-0.153; 0.045] 
-0.053 
[-0.151; 0.045] 
State: Extraverted (D1-D3) on change goals × feasibility -0.009 
[-0.123; 0.104] 
0.024 
[-0.065; 0.113] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on change goals -0.027  
[-0.151; 0.097] 
-0.030  
[-0.148; 0.088] 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on change goals × traits 0.055  
[-0.053; 0.164] 
0.072  
[-0.170; 0.313] 
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Table 25 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on importance -0.017  
[-0.079; 0.044] 
-0.012 
[-0.070; 0.046] 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on feasibility -0.017  
[-0.082; 0.049] 
0.004 
[-0.056; 0.064] 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility 0.015  
[-0.042; 0.073] 
0.016 
[-0.041; 0.072] 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on change goals × importance -0.055  
[-0.161; 0.052] 
-0.046 
[-0.148; 0.057] 
State: Extraverted (D4-D5) on change goals × feasibility -0.063  
[-0.181; 0.055] 
-0.019 
[-0.113; 0.074] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.380* 
[-0.556; -0.205] 
0.006 
[-0.082; 0.094] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits -0.009 
[-0.148; 0.130] 
-0.166 
[-0.347; 0.015] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals ×  
extraverted state (D1-D3) 
-0.123 
[-0.359; 0.114] 
-0.030 
[-0.131; 0.070] 
Change T2-T1 on importance 0.096* 
[0.001; 0.190] 
0.000 
[-0.044; 0.043] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.090 
[-0.003; 0.183] 
0.039 
[-0.007; 0.086] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility 0.027 
[-0.054; 0.107] 
0.021 
[-0.022; 0.064] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance 0.184* 
[0.029; 0.339] 
0.002 
[-0.087; 0.091] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility 0.093 
[-0.097; 0.283] 
0.007 
[-0.073; 0.087] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals 0.029 
[-0.138; 0.197] 
-0.034 
[-0.127; 0.060] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits 0.015 
[-0.138; 0.168] 
0.151 
[-0.035; 0.337] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals ×  
extraverted state (D4-D5) 
-0.035 
[-0.195; 0.125] 
0.013 
[-0.082; 0.107] 
Change T3-T2 on importance 0.020 
[-0.058; 0.098] 
-0.003 
[-0.055; 0.050] 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility -0.014 
[-0.100; 0.071] 
-0.068* 
[-0.120; -0.017] 
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Table 25 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility -0.057 
[-0.133; 0.020] 
0.000 
[-0.049; 0.049] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance -0.080 
[-0.240; 0.079] 
-0.002 
[-0.102; 0.098] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility -0.034 
[-0.193; 0.125] 
0.013 
[-0.080; 0.106] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals -0.092 
[-0.255; 0.072] 
0.029 
[-0.078; 0.136] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits -0.025 
[-0.152; 0.101] 
0.032 
[-0.218; 0.283] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals ×  
extraverted state (D4-D5) 
0.093 
[-0.052; 0.238] 
-0.010 
[-0.119; 0.099] 
Change T4-T3 on importance 0.029 
[-0.045; 0.103] 
0.016 
[-0.040; 0.072] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility 0.036 
[-0.060; 0.133] 
0.013 
[-0.037; 0.064] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility 0.001 
[-0.075; 0.076] 
-0.007 
[-0.059; 0.044] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.011 
[-0.162; 0.183] 
-0.029 
[-0.131; 0.072] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility -0.022 
[-0.195; 0.152] 
0.009 
[-0.090; 0.108] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
4.3.2.4 Agreeableness. 
 Just like for personality development in general, we calculated two models each for 
self-rated and implicitly measured agreeableness, to test associations with sociality and 
deception in situations. For all four models, model fit indices demonstrated a good to excellent 
fit (Table 22). However, since models for sociality and deception did hardly differ in their 
results, we in Table 26 only report detailed results for deception in situations. For sociality in 
situations, detailed results are reported in the appendix (Table A15). 
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 As expected, while controlling for agreeableness at T1, goals to change agreeableness 
at T1 that were both perceived more important and more feasible were linked with more 
perceived deception of situations during D4-D5 (Table 26). In addition, for implicitly 
measured agreeableness, the more feasible participants perceived a change goal, the more 
agreeable behavior they reported during D1-D3 (Table 26, Table A15). Again only for 
implicitly measured agreeableness and sociality of situations, change goals that were 
perceived both more important and more feasible were linked with less agreeable behavior 
during D1 to D3 (Table A15). In contrast, for both self-rated and implicitly measured 
agreeableness, change goals that were both stronger and perceived as more feasible were 
linked with more agreeable behavior during D1-D3 (Table 26, Table A15). Again 
unexpectedly, change goals that were both stronger and perceived as more important were 
associated with less agreeable behavior during D4-D5 (Table 26, Table A15).  
 Regarding associations of change goals with long-term trait change, it showed that 
stronger goals to change agreeableness at T1 were linked with less actual change in self-rated 
agreeableness from T1 to T2 (Table 26, Table A15). Furthermore, both the stronger and the 
more important participants’ goals to change agreeableness, the more they changed in 
implicitly measured agreeableness from T1 to T2 (Table 26, Table A15).   
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Table 26 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components and Long-term Development in Agreeableness (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Deception on change goals 0.035 
[-0.115; 0.185] 
0.062 
[-0.079; 0.204] 
Situation: Deception on change goals × traits 0.073 
[-0.078; 0.225] 
-0.027 
[-0.531; 0.477] 
Situation: Deception on importance -0.042 
[-0.092; 0.009] 
-0.043 
[-0.092; 0.006] 
Situation: Deception on feasibility -0.034 
[-0.101; 0.033] 
-0.030 
[-0.091; 0.031] 
Situation: Deception on importance × feasibility 0.067* 
[0.008; 0.125] 
0.061* 
[0.005; 0.117] 
Situation: Deception on change goals × importance 0.099 
[-0.019; 0.218] 
0.101 
[-0.019; 0.221] 
Situation: Deception on change goals × feasibility -0.031 
[-0.195; 0.133] 
-0.034 
[-0.175; 0.107] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals 0.044 
[-0.078; 0.167] 
-0.004 
[-0.128; 0.120] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals × traits -0.082 
[-0.201; 0.036] 
-0.196 
[-0.515; 0.123] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on importance 0.017 
[-0.039; 0.072] 
0.052† 
[-0.004; 0.108] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on feasibility 0.017 
[-0.050; 0.085] 
0.079* 
[0.009; 0.149] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility -0.047 
[-0.113; 0.018] 
-0.062† 
[-0.128; 0.005] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals × importance -0.013 
[-0.136; 0.111] 
-0.001 
[-0.130; 0.128] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals × feasibility 0.204** 
[0.066; 0.343] 
0.203** 
[0.069; 0.337] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals -0.010 
[-0.145; 0.124] 
0.010 
[-0.122; 0.141] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals × traits 0.113 
[-0.025; 0.252] 
0.278 
[-0.069; 0.624] 
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Table 26 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on importance 0.028 
[-0.019; 0.074] 
0.031 
[-0.013; 0.075] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on feasibility -0.011 
[-0.069; 0.048] 
-0.012 
[-0.065; 0.042] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility -0.040 
[-0.092; 0.013] 
-0.047† 
[-0.098; 0.003] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals × importance -0.131* 
[-0.239; -0.023] 
-0.130* 
[-0.238; -0.022] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals × feasibility -0.109 
[-0.257; 0.040] 
-0.049 
[-0.179; 0.081] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.295* 
[-0.428; -0.162] 
-0.023 
[-0.092; 0.045] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits 0.031 
[-0.132; 0.193] 
-0.002 
[-0.246; 0.241] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals ×  
Agreeable state (D1-D3) 
-0.061 
[-0.295; 0.174] 
-0.067 
[-0.160; 0.026] 
Change T2-T1 on importance -0.005 
[-0.070; 0.060] 
-0.008 
[-0.040; 0.024] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.071 
[-0.006; 0.149] 
0.000 
[-0.034; 0.035] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility -0.109 
[-0.288; 0.071] 
0.013 
[-0.020; 0.045] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance -0.055 
[-0.197; 0.086] 
0.076* 
[0.010; 0.143] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility -0.007 
[-0.078; 0.065] 
-0.051 
[-0.130; 0.029] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals ×  
Agreeable state (D4-D5) 
0.176 
[-0.079; 0.431] 
0.054 
[-0.086; 0.193] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals 0.050 
[-0.113; 0.214] 
-0.036 
[-0.135; 0.062] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits -0.112 
[-0.326; 0.103] 
0.023 
[-0.252; 0.298] 
Change T3-T2 on importance -0.025 
[-0.101; 0.050] 
0.014 
[-0.030; 0.059] 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility -0.042 
[-0.123; 0.040] 
-0.009 
[-0.056; 0.039] 
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Table 26 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility 0.018 
[-0.064; 0.099] 
-0.017  
[-0.069; 0.035] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance 0.019 
[-0.126; 0.164] 
-0.057 
[-0.153; 0.039] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility 0.005 
[-0.193; 0.203] 
0.020 
[-0.087; 0.126] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals 0.099 
[-0.074; 0.272] 
0.030 
[-0.069; 0.130] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits 0.118 
[-0.077; 0.313] 
-0.081 
[-0.404; 0.242] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals ×  
Agreeable state (D4-D5) 
-0.113 
[-0.376; 0.151] 
0.096 
[-0.069; 0.261] 
Change T4-T3 on importance -0.006 
[-0.084; 0.072] 
-0.013 
[-0.055; 0.029] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility 0.004 
[-0.088; 0.096] 
0.006 
[-0.044; 0.055] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility 0.018 
[-0.066; 0.102] 
-0.026 
[-0.073; 0.022] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.054 
[-0.080; 0.189] 
-0.003  
[-0.092; 0.086] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility -0.001 
[-0.213; 0.210] 
-0.026 
[-0.073; 0.022] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
4.3.2.5 Emotional stability. 
 Again, we calculated two models each for self-rated and implicitly measured emotional 
stability to test associations for negativity and adversity in situations. Model fit indices for all 
four models demonstrated a good to excellent fit (Table 22). To maintain clarity, we in Table 
27 focus on results for negativity in situations because there were only little differences in 
model results for negativity and adversity. For adversity in situations, detailed results are 
reported in the appendix (Table A16). 
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 For associations of goals to change emotional stability at T1 and subsequent TESSERA 
components, results showed that participants who both expressed stronger change goals and 
were lower in self-rated or implicitly measured emotional stability at T1 experienced less 
adverse situations (Table A16). In addition, for self-rated emotional stability, more feasible 
change goals were linked with more negativity and adversity in situations (Table 27, Table 
A16). Unexpectedly, for implicitly measured emotional stability, the more participants wanted 
to increase in emotional stability, the less emotional stable behavior participants reported 
during D1-D3 (Table 27, Table A16). Also, both higher implicitly measured emotional 
stability at T1 and stronger change goals were associated with more emotional stable behavior 
during D1-D3 (Table 27, Table A16). Again as expected, the more important participants 
perceived a change goal, the more emotional stable behavior during D1-D3 they reported 
(Table 27, Table A16).  
 Linking change goals at T1 with long-term trait changes, for self-rated traits, it 
unexpectedly showed that the more participants wanted to change, the less they changed in 
self-rated traits from T1 to T2 (Table 27, Table A16). Also, stronger change goals that went 
along with more goal-relevant states predicted less actual changes in self-rated traits from T1 
to T2 (Table 27, Table A16). However, as expected, more feasible change goals were 
associated with more pronounced changes in self-rated traits from T3 to T4 (Table 27, Table 
A16).   
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Table 27 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components and Long-term Development in Emotional Stability (between-person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Negativity on change goals 0.088 
 [-0.058; 0.234] 
0.135† 
[-0.005; 0.275] 
Situation: Negativity on change goals × traits -0.054 
[-0.139; 0.031] 
0.097 
[-0.244; 0.439] 
Situation: Negativity on importance 0.058 
[-0.026; 0.141] 
0.043 
[-0.043; 0.128] 
Situation: Negativity on feasibility 0.125** 
[0.040; 0.210] 
0.070 
[-0.011; 0.152] 
Situation: Negativity on importance × feasibility -0.016  
[-0.106; 0.075] 
-0.029  
[-0.119; 0.062] 
Situation: Negativity on change goals × importance -0.106 
[-0.286; 0.074] 
-0.123 
[-0.303; 0.056] 
Situation: Negativity on change goals × feasibility 0.061 
[-0.062; 0.185] 
0.009 
[-0.107; 0.125] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals -0.070 
[-0.196; 0.056] 
-0.153** 
[-0.269; -0.037] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals × traits -0.023 
[-0.085; 0.039] 
0.487** 
[0.198; 0.776] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on importance 0.081* 
[0.011; 0.152] 
0.087** 
[0.019; 0.154] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on feasibility 0.034 
[-0.039; 0.106] 
0.062 
[-0.007; 0.131] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility -0.023 
[-0.085; 0.039] 
-0.032 
[-0.098; 0.034] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals × 
importance 
-0.034 
[-0.161; 0.092] 
-0.070 
[-0.203; 0.062] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals × 
feasibility 
0.022 
[-0.109; 0.153] 
-0.005 
[-0.110; 0.100] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals -0.036 
[-0.139; 0.066] 
-0.020 
[-0.123; 0.082] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals × traits -0.006 
[-0.080; 0.068] 
-0.096 
[-0.341; 0.149] 
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Table 27 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on importance -0.021 
[-0.090; 0.049] 
-0.014 
[-0.082; 0.053] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on feasibility 0.005 
[-0.066; 0.075] 
0.006 
[-0.058; 0.070] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility 0.017 
[-0.042; 0.075] 
0.021 
[-0.039; 0.080] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals × 
importance 
0.039 
[-0.082; 0.160] 
0.054 
[-0.070; 0.178] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals × 
feasibility 
-0.007 
[-0.116; 0.101] 
-0.004 
[-0.098; 0.089] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.279** 
[-0.436; -0.121] 
-0.047 
[-0.105; 0.010] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits 0.079 
[-0.033; 0.190] 
0.042 
[-0.143; 0.226] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals ×  
Emotional Stable state (D1-D3) 
-0.153** 
[-0.267; -0.040] 
-0.012  
[-0.050; 0.027] 
Change T2-T1 on importance 0.014  
[-0.083; 0.111] 
0.027 
[-0.013; 0.066] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.081 
[-0.015; 0.176] 
0.004 
[-0.030; 0.037] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility 0.005 
[-0.076; 0.086] 
-0.026 
[-0.060; 0.009] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance 0.064 
[-0.101; 0.230] 
-0.016 
[-0.079; 0.047] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility -0.060 
[-0.194; 0.075] 
0.017 
[-0.028; 0.063] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals -0.059 
[-0.225; 0.107] 
0.017 
[-0.059; 0.093] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits -0.073 
[-0.197; 0.051] 
0.027 
[-0.190; 0.243] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals ×  
Emotional Stable state (D4-D5) 
0.072 
[-0.070; 0.215] 
0.018 
[-0.039; 0.074] 
Change T3-T2 on importance 0.047 
[-0.052; 0.146] 
-0.006 
[-0.055; 0.043] 
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Table 27 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility -0.058 
[-0.145; 0.030] 
-0.009 
[-0.053; 0.035] 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility 0.017 
[-0.129; 0.163] 
0.013 
[-0.038; 0.065] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance -0.085 
[-0.279; 0.109] 
0.015 
[-0.077; 0.107] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility -0.030 
[-0.117; 0.058] 
-0.025 
[-0.079; 0.030] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals 0.152 
[-0.019; 0.323] 
0.027 
[-0.054; 0.107] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits 0.078 
[-0.057; 0.213] 
0.054 
[-0.188; 0.296] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals ×  
Emotional Stable state (D4-D5) 
-0.100 
[-0.253; 0.053] 
0.016 
[-0.050; 0.082] 
Change T4-T3 on importance 0.051 
[-0.064; 0.166] 
0.002  
[-0.046; 0.050] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility 0.110* 
[0.003; 0.217] 
-0.006  
[-0.056; 0.045] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility -0.005 
[-0.111; 0.102] 
-0.020 
[-0.067; 0.027] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.073 
[-0.154; 0.299] 
-0.025 
[-0.115; 0.065] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility -0.044 
[-0.208; 0.120] 
0.035 
[-0.046; 0.116] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
4.3.3 Control analyses. 
In the analysis focusing on personality development in general, traits at T1 were for 
the most part associated with subsequent corresponding self-reported behavior during D1-D3 
but not during D4-D5 when controlling for D1-D3. In addition, for self-rated 
conscientiousness, self-rated and implicitly measured extraversion and self-rated 
agreeableness, trait-relevant behavior during D1-D3 predicted subsequent trait changes (i.e. 
from T1 to T2), while behavior during D4-D5 failed to predict subsequent trait changes (e.g., 
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from T2 to T3, or T3 to T4). To investigate whether these non-significant findings for self-
reported behavior during D4-D5 resulted from strong associations between behavior during 
D1-D3 and D4-D5 (all βs ≥ 0.909, all ps < .01), we conducted several control analyses. First, 
we investigated trait changes in restricted models that only included T2 and T3 and momentary 
processes during D4-D5. As expected, except for openness (b = 0.056, p = .092), all self-rated 
traits as well as implicitly measured extraversion at T2 were associated with corresponding 
behavior during D4-D5 (all bs ≥ 0.101, all ps < .01, see online supplement). Although 
associations of self-reported conscientious and agreeable behavior during D4-D5 and 
subsequent trait changes were in the expected directions, they failed to reach statistical 
significance. For both self-rated and implicitly measured extraversion however, the 
association of behavior during D4-D5 with trait changes from T2 to T3 did not resemble its 
counterpart for earlier assessments in our main analysis (i.e., predicting changes from T1 to 
T2 by behavior during D1-D3) and dropped to zero. A closer inspection of latent changes in 
self-rated extraversion (i.e., latent difference scores) indicated that this effect could be due to 
variance restriction in trait change from T2 to T3 (i.e., the latent difference score showed 68% 
less inter-individual variance than the latent difference score for changes in extraversion from 
T1 to T2).  
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To test this assumption of variance restriction, we examined additional models that 
linked trait changes from T1 to T4 (e.g., 74% increase in variance for changes in self-rated 
extraversion compared to models including only T2 and T3) with momentary processes during 
D4-D5.18 Supporting the restricted variance hypotheses, self-reported extraverted (b = 0.330, 
p < .01) and agreeable (b = 0.312, p < .01), but not conscientious behavior (b = -0.014, p = 
.843) during D4-D5 predicted trait changes from T1 to T4. In addition, the more open behavior 
people reported during D4-D5 the more self-rated openness increased from T1 to T4 (b = 
0.164, p < .01). For implicitly measured extraversion however, this strategy only led to an 
18% variance increase and a still non-significant association of extraverted behavior during 
D4-D5 and subsequent trait change (b = 0.094, p = .124). In addition, except for self-rated 
openness (b = 0.054, p = .069), all self-rated traits at T1 predicted self-rated behavior during 
D4-D5 (all bs ≥ 0.075, all ps < .01). Although implicitly measured extraversion at T1 did 
predict self-rated behavior during D4-D5 only on a marginally significant level (b = 0.158, p 
= .096), emotional stability at T1 was still linked with corresponding states during D4-D5 (b 
= 0.392, p = .012). 
As additional control analyses for personality development in general, we included the 
sum of positively, neutrally and negatively rated life events participants experienced into the 
models. Specifically, we examined whether such life events predicted both momentary 
processes and long-term trait development, thereby rendering previously reported associations 
non-significant. With very few exceptions, controlling for life events did hardly change the 
                                                 
18 To investigate whether the shorter time-span of merely 20 days covered in D4-D5 compared to 30 days covered 
in D1-D3 may have resulted in a lack of power, we shortened D1-D3 by 10 days (i.e., by deleting D3) and 
conducted restricted models for conscientiousness extraversion and agreeableness in which D1-D2 predicted trait 
changes from T1 to T2. Speaking against a lack of power, results closely mirrored findings of our main analysis 
with conscientious (b = 0.150, SE = 0.056, p < .01), extraverted (b = 0.427, SE = 0.135, p < .01) and agreeable 
(for models comprising sociality b = 0.196, SE = 0.077, p < .05; for models comprising deception b = 0.198, SE 
= 0.075, p < .01) behavior during D1-D2 predicting subsequent trait changes. In addition, a more detailed attrition 
analysis that investigated whether participants who dropped out after T1, T2 or T3 differed in previously assessed 
conscientiousness, extraversion or agreeableness revealed no further attrition effects. Thus, selective attrition 
could not explain the non-significant associations of behavior during D4-D5 and subsequent trait change. 
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results: The effect of self-rated extraversion predicting sociality in situations during D4-D5 
decreased to b = 0.100 (SE = 0.057, p = .057). Also, the effect of implicitly measured 
conscientiousness predicting duty in situations during D4-D5 diminished (b = 0.839, SE = 
0.431, p = .051).  
Although we were not primarily interested in differences between younger and older 
adults or between students and non-students, we intended to also control for potential group 
differences by using multi-group MSEMs. However, for methodological reasons (i.e., lack of 
measurement invariance across groups) these control analyses could not be conducted. Wrzus 
et al. (2018b) provide further information on group differences in longitudinal trajectories of 
both self-rated and implicitly measured traits.  
In models on volitional personality development, we focused on two-times interactions 
of change goals, importance and feasibility. To additionally investigate whether stronger 
change goals that were perceived both more important and more feasible were linked with the 
experience of TESSERA components or long-term trait changes, we expanded previous 
models on volitional personality development by change goal × importance × feasibility 
interactions. Yet, across all 14 expanded models investigating a total of 84 additional three-
times interactions, only three significant effects emerged. Unexpectedly, for self-rated 
openness as well as both self-rated and implicitly measured emotional stability, stronger 
change goals that were perceived both more important and more feasible predicted less goal-
relevant behavior during D1-D3 (Table A17). In contrast, for conscientiousness, stronger 
change goals that were perceived both more important and more feasible predicted more 
conscientious behavior during D4-D5 (Table A17). Note that adding goals × importance × 
feasibility interaction terms led to worse model fits, especially regarding the TLI (e.g., for self-
rated traits, in 6 of 7 models, the TLI fell below .90; see table note of Table A17), maybe 
because most interactions remained non-significant predictors. Detailed results for all control 
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analyses are available at 
https://osf.io/k9wsv/?view_only=ac0c0b103fff4a61959ed1b893ddfcce. 
4.3.4 Summary of results. 
 Results were largely in line with Hypothesis 1. Thus, as expected, higher intellect, duty 
and sociality of situations predicted clearer expectations while however perceived deception, 
negativity, and adversity did not predict clear expectations. In addition, except for intellect, 
situational characteristics predicted situation-relevant behavior as expected. In line with our 
hypothesis, more intellect, duty, deception, negativity and adversity of situations was linked 
with feeling worse after the experiences. Again as expected, clearer expectations predicted 
more open, conscientious, extraverted, agreeable and emotional stable behavior, which in turn 
predicted feeling better after the experiences. More pronounced self-reported states, except for 
extraverted and emotional stable behavior, predicted more reflection on the experiences. 
Finally, as suggested, feeling worse after the experiences predicted more reflection on the 
experiences.  
 Second, our study replicated previous findings on the associations of self-rated traits 
and subsequent momentary experiences (i.e., TESSERA components). Hence, the higher 
participants rated themselves in Big Five traits at T1, the more trait-relevant situations they 
experienced and the more trait-relevant behavior they reported. We were able to extend 
previous findings by showing that implicitly measured extraversion and emotional stability 
predicted more trait-relevant behavior in daily life.  
 Finally, we investigated associations of TESSERA components with long-term 
development in self-rated and implicitly measured traits. As expected, self-rated 
conscientious, extraverted and agreeable behavior during D1-D3 predicted subsequent 
changes in matching self-rated traits from T1 to T2. Conversely our main analysis indicated 
that states during D4-D5 were not linked with subsequent changes in self-rated traits (i.e., from 
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T2 to T3 and T3 to T4). Control analyses however suggested that this finding could be due to 
variance restrictions in later trait changes. Also, reflection on behavior only predicted changes 
in self-rated conscientiousness from T1 to T2. Self-reported extraverted behavior during D1-
D3 and conscientious behavior during D4-D5 predicted changes in matching implicitly 
measured traits. Unexpectedly, reactions on states did not predict changes in implicitly 
measured traits.  
Regarding volitional personality development, results did hardly provide a consistent 
picture and were only partly in line with our hypotheses and previous research. Unexpectedly, 
change goals were not associated with experiencing goal-relevant situations. Yet, as expected, 
the more feasible participants perceived goals to change emotional stability and both the more 
important and feasible they perceived goals to change agreeableness, the more goal relevant 
situations they experienced. Surprisingly, change goals were, if at all, linked with experiencing 
less goal-relevant states. However, as expected, more important goals to change emotional 
stability were linked with the experience of more emotional stable behavior during D1-D3. 
Only for implicitly measured extraversion and agreeableness, more feasible change goals were 
associated with experiencing more goals-relevant behavior during D1-D3. Yet, for both self-
rated and implicitly measured agreeableness, change goals that were considered both 
important and feasible were linked with less agreeable behavior during D4-D5. Unexpectedly, 
both the more participants wanted to increase in agreeableness and the more important they 
perceived this goal, the less agreeable behavior they reported during D4-D5. Yet, stronger 
goals to increase in agreeableness that were also considered more feasible were associated 
with more agreeable behavior during D1-D3. 
Second, we examined associations of change goals at T1 with long-term development 
in self-rated and implicitly measured traits. Again, change goals were, if at all, linked with less 
actual trait changes, especially from T1 to T2. Similarly, participants who held stronger change 
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goals and experienced more goal-relevant states, if at all, showed less pronounced trait 
changes. However, as expected, more important or more feasible change goals at least in part 
predicted stronger trait changes for all traits except for agreeableness. Surprisingly, change 
goals that were considered both important and feasible predicted, if at all, less actual trait 
changes. Again as expected, for extraversion and agreeableness, the more participants wanted 
to change and the more important they considered these changes, the more they actually 
increased in traits from T1 to T2. Similarly, in implicitly measured conscientiousness, stronger 
change goals that were also perceived as more feasible, predicted stronger trait changes from 
T1 to T2, but less trait changes from T2 to T3. Control analysis revealed that three-way 
interactions (i.e., change goals × importance × feasibility) did hardly predict TESSERA 
components or long-term trait changes. We next discuss our findings.  
4.4 Discussion 
 In the current longitudinal multi-method study, we investigated momentary processes 
of daily experiences and their role in long-term development of explicit and implicit 
representations of Big Five traits. The study also represents a first empirical test of predictions 
derived from the TESSERA framework for explaining personality development. The findings 
offer unique insights into trait development by combining the extensive assessment of 
momentary processes in up to 50 daily diaries with a multi-method assessment of traits four 
times across two years. Next, we first discuss the implications of our findings on associations 
of momentary processes within TESSERA sequences. Then, we integrate our results on 
personality development in general into previous research on long-term development of traits. 
Thereafter, we discuss our findings on volitional personality development against the 
background of prior research. Finally, we outline limitations and future directions for both 
personality development in general and volitional development in particular. 
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4.4.1 Momentary processes can be generalized as TESSERA sequences. 
 This is the first study on personality development to investigate whether momentary 
processes can be generalized in terms of repeated sequences of Triggering situations, 
Expectancies, States & State Expressions, and ReActions (i.e., TESSERA sequences; Wrzus 
& Roberts, 2017). Previous studies of personality development focused primarily on 
momentary states, but did not comprehensively examine preceding situations and 
expectations, or subsequent reactions and reflective processes that elicit or follow these 
momentary states (e.g., Hutteman et al., 2015). Thus, the current study broadens previous 
perspectives on momentary processes of personality development by examining specific 
predictions on the associations of momentary processes as stated in the TESSERA framework 
(Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
Specifically, in line with H1a and previous theoretical suggestions (D. Wood & 
Denissen, 2015; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), higher perceived intellect, duty and sociality of 
situations were associated with clearer expectations on how to behave. Thus, a clear 
classification of a situations’ content may produce a clearer mental guideline for its 
requirements (D. Wood & Denissen, 2015; see also Rauthmann et al., 2014). Higher perceived 
deception, negativity and adversity however were not associated with clearer expectations. 
Since such situations seem to have a lower base rate (Rauthmann et al., 2014; see also Table 
13) and appear to be less structured, we suggest that people may be insecure about appropriate 
behavior and thus have less clear expectations (i.e., less pronounced if-then contingencies; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). In addition, more negative situations may imply less clear demands 
on people’s behavior, resulting in more spontaneous (i.e., less expectancy driven) behavior (J. 
H. Block & Block, 1981; Cooper & Withey, 2009; Lazarus, 1991; Murray, 1938; Rauthmann, 
Sherman, & Funder, 2015a).  
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Confirming H1b and earlier research (Rauthmann et al., 2014; Sherman et al., 2015), 
situations were in general linked with situation-relevant behavior. Hence, psychological 
properties of situations may reflect a key component in producing varying states in daily life 
(Roberts, 2017; D. Wood et al., 2015; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Exceptionally, higher 
perceived intellect of situations was not associated with more, but with less open behavior 
what could be the result of our less intellect-specific conceptualization of such open behavior 
(i.e., narrow-minded – open). For example, previous research showed strong associations of a 
situations’ perceived intellect with intellectual or cognitive demanding behavior (Rauthmann 
et al., 2014; Sherman et al., 2015), but not with open-minded behavior per se (e.g., displaying 
a wide range of interests, see Rauthmann et al., 2014).  
Also, as suggested in H1c, situations were by and large associated with specific 
affective responses (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). That is, more challenging or uncomfortable 
situations (e.g., higher perceived duty or adversity) seem to be directly linked with more 
negative affect (see for example Bolger et al., 1989; Bryson & MacKerron, 2017). In contrast 
to previous studies (David et al., 1997; Weinstein & Mermelstein, 2007) however, social 
situations were not associated to more positive affect. This could be due to the fact that within 
the DIAMONDS framework, the mere possibility of social interaction is asked for, but not 
actual social participation that may finally elicit more positive affect (Rauthmann et al., 2014; 
Rauthmann & Sherman, 2016). In addition, we did not assess whether the social interaction 
turned out as pleasant or unpleasant. Thus, future studies may examine the valence of social 
interactions as contributing factor to people’s subsequent affect. 
In line with H1d and the TESSERA framework, clearer expectancies appeared as an 
additional, more conscious pathway from situations to states (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Thereby, clearer expectancies seem to act like a preset for stronger states (Ajzen, 1991; Eccles 
et al., 1983; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Roberts & Wood, 2006; 
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D. Wood et al., 2015) maybe resulting from the perceived affordance character of a situation 
(Rauthmann et al., 2014). 
As expected, the more open, conscientious, extraverted, agreeable and emotional 
stable participants behaved, the better they felt afterwards (H1e). This is in line with the idea 
that such behavior is intrinsically and socially valued and rewarded (Dunlop et al., 2012; 
Roberts et al., 2008). The fact that more open, conscientious, extraverted, agreeable and 
emotional stable behavior receives such an immediate positive reinforcement further amplifies 
the importance of these states in the long-term development of corresponding traits (Roberts, 
2017; Roberts & Wood, 2006; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
In addition, as stated in H1f, more open, conscientious and agreeable behavior was 
associated with more reflections on the experiences. This is in line with the idea that people 
may want to actively integrate momentary experiences into their self-concept, especially when 
they show more pronounced trait-relevant behavior (Bem, 1972; Brandtstädter, 1989; 
Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). The finding that extraverted behavior 
was not significantly associated with reflections awaits replication, and a more fine-grained 
assessment of social behavior (e.g., regarding dominance, cooperativeness) might be needed 
to disentangle facet-specific effects on reflections (see for example Roberts et al., 2006a). The 
finding that less emotional stable behavior was associated with more reflections could have 
resulted from people thinking or ruminating especially about experiences that made them feel 
insecure. 
Finally, as suggested in H1g, negative affective reactions were linked to stronger 
reflections. This is in line with previous research indicating that negative information and 
associated negative affective reactions are more carefully processed (Baumeister et al., 2001; 
Baumeister et al., 2007; Bless et al., 1992; Mor & Winquist, 2002). Thus, by reflecting an 
unpleasant experience, people may be able to cope with their experience, for example by 
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considering adjustments in their future behavior, thoughts or feelings (Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017). 
One of the unique contributions of the TESSERA framework is that it highlights the 
importance of distinct momentary processes and makes specific predictions on their 
associations in daily life (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017; compare to for example Dweck, 2017; 
Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Wood, 2006). In conclusion, our findings 
indicate that, regarding personality development, momentary processes can indeed be 
generalized as TESSERA sequences and thus provide first support for a key proposition of the 
TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Importantly, we were able to closely 
replicate findings from first 30 daily diaries (i.e., D1-D3) within a second, time-delayed set of 
20 daily diaries (i.e., D4-D5), thereby bolstering the relevance of our findings. Next, we 
discuss our findings on a second central proposition of the TESSERA framework that 
addresses links between momentary processes and traits as well as trait development.  
4.4.2 TESSERA sequences partly predict long-term Big Five trait development. 
 Although momentary processes (e.g., experienced situations or states) and traits are 
frequently conceptualized to bidirectionally influence each other (e.g., Geukes et al., 2017; 
Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), to our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical study to comprehensively investigate such bidirectional associations in a 
longitudinal design. In addition, previous studies almost exclusively focused on momentary 
states as driving force of long-term development in explicit representations of traits (i.e., self-
ratings, see for example Hutteman et al., 2015; Wrzus et al., 2018a), thereby neglecting 
development in implicit representations of traits and its momentary processes (Rauthmann, 
2017). By testing central propositions of the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), 
the current study is the first to address these gaps and to examine specific processes in long-
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term development of explicit (i.e., momentary states and reflective processes) and implicit 
(i.e., momentary states and associative processes) representations of traits.  
 Results partly support our assumptions. Confirming previous empirical research and 
H2, both zero-order correlations and MSEMs demonstrated that in general, explicit 
representations of traits at T1 contributed to the experience of subsequent situations (see also 
Emmons et al., 1986; Rauthmann et al., 2015b; Roberts & Robins, 2004; Wrzus et al., 2016). 
This finding is even more striking, as trait assessments at T1 were still linked with the 
experience of situations more than 6 months later (i.e., during D4-D5). Thus, our results further 
support the idea that people are able to select or form environments in their everyday life based 
on their traits (Buss, 1987; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Rauthmann et al., 2015b; Roberts & 
Robins, 2004; Wrzus et al., 2016). For implicit representations however, results were less 
consistent providing merely first hints on associations of conscientiousness and extraversion 
with corresponding situations in daily life.  
 Also in line with H2 and previous research, explicit representations of traits were 
consistently linked with corresponding, subsequent states, thereby supporting the idea that 
traits may manifest in everyday behavior (Back et al., 2009; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & 
Gallagher, 2009; Mehl et al., 2006). For implicit representations of traits however, only 
extraversion and emotional stability were associated with corresponding states. These findings 
closely replicated previous research suggesting that, in contrast to other traits, both 
extraversion and emotional stability comprise affective dimensions (i.e., positive and negative 
affect) as well as approach-avoidance tendencies that contribute to impulsive or automatic 
behavior (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Back et al., 2009; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Schnabel et al., 
2006).  
 Partly supporting H3a, states were linked with according changes in explicit 
representations of conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness. This greatly extends 
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previous research (Hutteman et al., 2015; Wrzus et al., 2018a) and supports the idea that 
changes in momentary trait-relevant states (e.g., behavior) form the basis of long-term changes 
in explicit representations of traits (Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 2017; 
Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Specifically, in a more bottom-up fashion, 
when people’s self-perceived behaviors, thoughts and feelings change permanently (i.e., 
become habitual), their self-concept (e.g., traits) may also change in the long run (Back & 
Vazire, 2012; Buss & Craik, 1983; Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017). However, for openness and emotional stability, the examined momentary states may 
have been less relevant for corresponding trait changes. Specifically, the assessed open 
behavior may have been too vague and thus may have missed behavior relevant for long-term 
changes in trait openness (e.g., bringing up new ideas, engaging in artistic experiences). In 
turn, for long-term changes in emotional stability, the mere amount of secure behavior may be 
less relevant than for example people’s reactivity to stressful daily situations (Wrzus et al., 
2018a). The finding that primarily states during D1-D3 but not during D4-D5 were associated 
with subsequent trait changes may have resulted from variance restrictions in later trait 
changes (i.e., from T2 to T3 and T3 to T4; see section “4.3.3 Control analyses.”). These 
variance restrictions may have emerged because about one third of our sample consisted of 
younger freshmen who started to engage in the transition into college right after T1. 
Consequently, they may have experienced more pronounced individual differences in change 
from T1 to T2 that may have leveled off in the course of the study. 
Only for conscientiousness, more reflections on experiences with more pronounced 
trait-relevant thoughtful behavior were linked to greater long-term change in trait 
conscientiousness. This provides merely weak support for the importance of reflective 
processes in long-term trait change (Back et al., 2009; Bem, 1972; Brandtstädter, 1989; Caspi 
& Roberts, 2001; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Staudinger, 2001; Wrzus & Roberts, 
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2017). However, at least three cautionary remarks need to be made before the importance of 
reflective processes for personality development is dismissed. First, within the applied analytic 
strategy, for each combined set of diaries D1-D3 and D4-D5, only people’s average reflection 
on experiences with more pronounced states (i.e., average reflection × state interaction) could 
be modeled. Thus, for example, trait-relevant reflections on states within a specific experience 
(e.g., receiving negative feedback on a work performance) or a distinct set of experiences (e.g., 
starting to attend parties once a week) could have averaged out. Second, we only assessed how 
much participants reflected upon their experience in general, yet these reflections may have 
not only included adjusting but also confirming processes like using different comparison 
standards (e.g., comparison versus past or future self) or self-evaluation motives (e.g., self-
verification or self-improvement). Consequently, reflections may have also led people to 
confirm their current self-concept instead of altering it, thereby forming a barrier for trait 
change (Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Future research needs to disentangle both 
confirmative and adjusting aspects of reflective processes. Third, in our approach, we focused 
on reflective processes that took place during the day of the experience, although the 
TESSERA framework acknowledges that time-delayed reflections could be important, too 
(Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
Regarding hypothesis H3b on the development of implicit trait representations, only 
sociable and conscientious states were associated with subsequent changes in corresponding 
extraversion and conscientiousness. Yet, methodological challenges may have biased our 
results. Specifically, self-rated states may have only assessed the conscious, deliberate aspects 
of people’s states, but not the more unconscious, automatic aspects. Yet, especially the latter 
should contribute to the development of implicit representations of traits (e.g., through implicit 
learning or habit formation; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Amodio & Ratner, 2011; Seger, 1994; 
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W. Wood & Neal, 2007). Thus, future research may need to rely on more diverse assessment 
strategies (e.g., behavioral observation).  
Furthermore, we found no evidence for the importance of associative processes (i.e., 
affective reactions) for long-term development of implicit representations of traits. This could 
be again due to the time-delayed assessment of participants’ self-rated affective reactions. An 
immediate assessment of people’s reaction may identify more relevant affective responses that 
could determine future behavior more strongly, for example in terms of feedback loops 
(Wrzus, 2018). Also, we did not explicitly track slower, but gradual habit formation that could 
be based on reinforcement learning and may finally condense into long-term changes in 
implicit representation of traits (W. Wood, 2017; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017; Yin & Knowlton, 
2006). As this is the first study to investigate momentary processes of development in implicit 
representations of traits, our results certainly await replication and methodological expansions.  
4.4.3 Change goals hardly predict the experience of situations and states. 
 Regarding volitional personality development, this is the first study to 
comprehensively examine whether goals to change are associated with experiencing goal-
relevant situations and states in both explicit and implicit representations of traits as suggested 
by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In addition, this study expands 
previous empirical research (see for example Hudson & Fraley, 2015) by investigating links 
between goal importance, feasibility and a broad range of momentary experiences as suggested 
by theory (Hennecke et al., 2014; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015; for recent research focusing on 
extraverted and neuroticistic states, see Peters, 2015).  
 However, results were only partly in line with our assumptions and previous research. 
Specifically, in contrast to H4a, when controlling for current traits, stronger change goals were, 
if at all, associated with experiencing less goal-relevant situations and states. In addition, 
speaking against H4b, these associations hardly depended on people’s current trait levels. 
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Although these findings contradict theoretical suggestions (Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke 
et al., 2014; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) and some prior empirical research (Hudson & Fraley, 
2015; McCabe & Fleeson, 2012; Stevenson & Clegg, 2011), they are in line with another 
study, suggesting that associations of change goals and states can be attributed to shared 
variance with traits (Hudson & Roberts, 2014). In particular, change goals may not induce 
subsequent changes in people’s experienced situations or states, but instead may merely mirror 
people’s lower current level of trait-relevant behaviors, thoughts or feelings and thus 
ultimately, reflect their underlying lower trait levels (Hudson & Roberts, 2014). Supporting 
this interpretation, in MSEMs, lower trait levels were consistently linked with stronger change 
goals (see also Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Robinson et al., 2015). In 
addition, while on a zero-order level change goals were partly linked with experiencing less 
goal-relevant situations and states, these associations mostly diminished when trait levels were 
controlled for (i.e., in MSEMs).19 Another explanation on why change goals failed to guide 
people’s experience of situations and states as expected may be that long-term change goals, 
being measured on a broad trait level, are too abstract (see for example the abstractness of the 
item “I want to be original, come up with new ideas.”) to be successfully translated into 
subordinate but more concrete plans or short-term goals without psychological assistance 
(Bandura, 2001; Emmons, 1992; Gollwitzer, 1999; Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Magidson et al., 
2014; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011). Even if people are able to specify such short-term 
goals (e.g., to change goal-relevant thoughts; Baranski et al., 2017), they may finally fail to 
overcome their solidified habits and show new, contra-trait thoughts, behavior, or feelings 
                                                 
19 Moreover, Hudson and Roberts (2014) argued that non-significant associations of change goals and subsequent 
states may also occur because change goals need time to be implemented. However, as stronger change goals 
were not linked with more pronounced goal-relevant states after about six month (i.e., during D4-D5), this 
explanation seems unlikely. 
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(Gallagher et al., 2011; W. Wood & Neal, 2007; for a more detailed discussion of this issue 
see section "5.2 The Relevance of Volitional Personality Development"). 
 Yet, in line with H4c and H4d, for emotional stability and implicit representations of 
agreeableness and extraversion, change goals that were considered as more important or more 
feasible were at least in part linked with experiencing more goal relevant situations or states. 
These findings provide some support for the idea that more important change goals profit from 
higher goal commitment and increased efforts for their implementation while more feasible 
change goals for example benefit from higher perceived ability to successfully take concrete 
steps in the desired direction (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Gollwitzer, 1990; H. 
Heckhausen, 1991; Hennecke et al., 2014; Peters, 2015; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). Note 
however that associations of importance and feasibility with momentary experiences were not 
consistent a) within traits (e.g., for emotional stability, feasibility was linked with experiencing 
goal-relevant situations but not with states) and b) between traits (i.e., for openness and 
conscientiousness, importance and feasibility were not associated with situations and states as 
expected). To explain these inconsistent findings, it at first sight could be assumed that when 
people try to change their traits, more action-based traits (e.g., extraversion, 
conscientiousness) are perceived as more changeable than more emotion-based traits (e.g., 
emotional stability) and profit from an facilitated accessibility of goal-relevant situations or 
states–yet results contradict this idea. However, traits like extraversion or emotional stability 
may be highly socially desirable (e.g., in terms of experiencing more positive and less negative 
affect; Dunlop et al., 2012; Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009), putting more pressure (i.e., importance) 
and stronger external expectations on people to make efforts to increase in these traits (but see 
Table A12 for somewhat contradicting findings). In addition, although people may perceive 
goals to change openness or conscientiousness as feasible, they may in fact be unexpectedly 
hard to implement in terms of changes in everyday situations or behavior (e.g., because people 
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don’t know which situations are actually relevant to increase in openness; see also Baranski et 
al., 2017; Peters, 2015).  
Importantly, in contrast to H4e as well as previous theoretical suggestions (Hennecke 
et al., 2014; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015) and empirical findings (Peters, 2015), change goals 
that were considered both more important and more feasible were only for agreeableness 
linked with experiencing more goal relevant situations, albeit not states. Thus, a change goal’s 
importance or feasibility alone seems to differentially contribute to people’s momentary 
experiences. For example, only the importance of goals to change emotional stability affected 
subsequent emotional stable behavior, but not their feasibility or both importance and 
feasibility, probably because for such a highly functional and socially desirable trait (Dunlop 
et al., 2012; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015), a strong enough demand for a change is sufficient 
to find ways to change one’s behavior irrespective of how hard to implement this change is. 
Furthermore, this finding may imply that both high goal importance and feasibility are not 
necessarily linked with actual goal commitment or striving what would be a necessary 
prerequisite for actual goal implementation (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012).  
Given these considerations and the mostly non-significant associations of change goals 
with momentary experiences, it is little surprising that stronger change goals that were 
considered more important or more feasible were not linked with experiencing situations and 
states as proposed in H4f and H4g. Yet, collectively, results on H4 in general surely await 
replication in future research. 
4.4.4 Important or feasible change goals partly contribute to volitional 
personality development. 
So far, only a few studies investigated direct links between change goals and long-term 
trait changes, yet these studies produced inconsistent results and suffered from several 
limitations (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a; Robinson et al., 2015). By examining volitional 
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personality development in an age-heterogeneous sample using multiple trait assessments 
across two years, this study aimed to clarify these inconsistent results and tackle previous 
limitations. In addition, this is the first study to investigate if change goals also manifest in 
actual changes of implicit representation of traits. Finally, using a more naturalistic setting, 
this study greatly extends previous research by examining whether goal importance and 
feasibility contribute to volitional personality development as suggested by theory (Hennecke 
et al., 2014; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015; for research using an intervention to change 
extraversion and neuroticism, see Peters, 2015). 
However, in contrast to H5a, stronger change goals were, if at all, linked with less 
changes in explicit or implicit representations of traits. Although these results contradict some 
previous findings (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a), they are consistent with results presented 
by Robinson et al. (2015). Thus, to explain why change goals do not manifest in actual trait 
changes, at least three preliminary arguments can be made that are not mutually exclusive. 
First, since stronger change goals may merely reflect lower current trait levels (Quintus et al., 
2017), these lower trait levels may form a major obstacle for people to successfully implement 
the intended change in the first place (e.g., by not being able to show new goal-relevant 
behavior, see section “4.4.3. Change goals hardly predict the experience of situations and 
states.”; Robinson et al., 2015). Second, emerging from lower current trait levels, change goals 
may in the first place assess the social desirability of having higher trait levels, so that they 
hardly reflect a concrete goal that people really commit to (see also Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 
2012; Quintus et al., 2017). Third, when people actually try to implement their change goals, 
they may indeed fail to subsequently alter their behavior (see section “4.4.3 Change goals 
hardly predict the experience of situations and states.”; Hudson & Roberts, 2014) or to 
gradually change their self-concepts in daily life (e.g., because friends provide feedback on 
people still being less extraverted; Allemand & Flückiger, 2017; Hudson & Fraley, 2015; 
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Prochaska & Prochaska, 2010). Consequently, when people realize their failure, they may, in 
relation to their earlier change goals, indeed perceive a decrease in their trait level (i.e., self-
appraisal of failure, see Robinson et al., 2015).  
Currently, it can only be speculated on why one research group nevertheless repeatedly 
found that change goals contribute to actual trait change (Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a). 
Most likely, the repeated and relatively proximal assessment of both traits (i.e., once per week) 
and change goals (i.e., once every five weeks) may have facilitated a successful 
implementation of change goals, that was however probably due to overestimating of one’s 
own trait changes or consistency seeking with remembered change goals (Hudson & Fraley, 
2015, 2016a; see also, Robins & John, 1997; Wrzus, 2018). In addition, as pointed out by the 
current study, change goals, if at all, were only linked with less trait change within the 
subsequent months, but not in the long run. Thus, examining merely short-term effects of 
change goals (i.e., across a total of four months; Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 2016a) may provide 
favorable conditions for apparently successful volitional personality development.  
Contrary to H5b and H5c, direct associations of change goals and long-term trait 
change hardly depended on people’s current trait level or previously experienced states. These 
findings suggest that neither do people succeed in decreasing larger discrepancies between 
traits and change goals, nor do stronger change goals motivate them to integrate experienced 
states into their self-concept (but compare to Hennecke et al., 2014; Hudson & Fraley, 2015, 
2017; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
As suggested by H5d and H5e, more important or feasible change goals were at least 
partly linked with more pronounced trait changes from T1 to T2 for all traits except 
agreeableness. Again, this is in line with the idea that higher perceived importance or 
feasibility facilitate the successful implementation of change goals (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975; Gollwitzer, 1990; H. Heckhausen, 1991; Hennecke et al., 2014; Peters, 2015; D. 
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Wood & Denissen, 2015). Note however that for later trait changes from T2 to T3, results 
partly contradicted this idea, which might indicate that both importance and feasibility affect 
actual trait change only on the short run. As goals to change agreeableness were in general 
hardly linked with any successful changes in this trait, psychological assistance might be 
especially needed to achieve volitional changes in agreeableness (see for example, Hudson & 
Fraley, 2015; Magidson et al., 2014; Peters, 2015). 
In contrast to H4f, change goals that were perceived as both more important and 
feasible were not linked with more pronounced trait changes as suggested by previous research 
(Hennecke et al., 2014; Peters, 2015; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). Again, it seems that either 
importance or feasibility are by themselves differentially relevant for volitionally changing a 
trait (e.g., importance is relevant to achieve changes in openness; feasibility is relevant to 
achieve changes in conscientiousness). In addition, future research might assess actual goal 
commitment as contributing factor to volitional personality development (Gollwitzer & 
Oettingen, 2012).  
Finally, only for explicit representations of extraversion as well as implicit 
representations of conscientiousness and agreeableness, stronger change goals that were 
perceived as more important or feasible were partly linked with subsequent trait changes as 
expected in H4g and H4h. Although awaiting replication, this finding provides further support 
for the idea that primarily the importance and feasibility differentially contribute to volitional 
personality development, mostly independent from the strength of a change goal. 
4.4.5 Limitations and future directions. 
This study used an extensive, multi-method longitudinal measurement burst design 
(Nesselroade, 1991, 2004; Sliwinski, 2008) to investigate momentary processes and their 
importance for both personality development in general and volitional personality 
development of explicit and implicit representations of traits. In addition, although 
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participants’ burden was comparatively high (i.e., up to four IAT assessments and 50 daily 
diaries), we were able to maintain a high participation rate in daily diary assessments and 
personality trait assessments (e.g., almost 85% of participants continued for two years). At the 
same time, some limitations need to be considered.20 
First, our study covered a comparatively short time span of two years. Typically, large 
panel studies track personality development across a longer period of time (e.g., across four 
years, see Specht et al., 2014). Yet, these studies usually do not combine trait assessments and 
daily diaries, partly also for monetary or logistic reasons. However, to investigate personality 
development and its underlying processes across a longer time span, additional daily diary 
assessments (e.g., D6-D8) would have been necessary. This approach however would have 
presented both further organizational challenges and increased participants’ burden. 
Second, in our daily diary assessment, we asked participants to rate the most relevant 
experience of their day. This approach reflected a compromise between practicability (e.g., 
acceptable strains for participants) and the desire to gain insights into daily experiences, but it 
may also suffer from blind spots. For example, we may not have gained insight into rather 
minor daily hassles (e.g., arguments on housework) or changing daily routines (e.g., starting 
to work earlier) unless participants considered them as most important experience of a day. 
Also, we followed a fixed schedule with participants answering daily diaries not before the 
evening. Hence, when recalling the experience, participants may have suffered from some 
recall biases as well as self-enhancement or consistency seeking (see for example Robins & 
John, 1997). To overcome this limitations, future research may for example implement 
ambulatory assessments and passive observation of situations and behavior that allow repeated 
or close to continuous assessment of TESSERA components (e.g., after finishing a work-
related task, see also Mehl, 2017; Mehl & Wrzus, in press; Wrzus & Mehl, 2015). 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed discussion on limitations regarding recruitment strategy and sample see Chapter II. 
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Third, we solely relied on participants themselves to answer personality trait 
assessments (i.e., self-ratings or IAT) and to rate their daily experiences. The TESSERA 
framework however explicitly acknowledges the importance of additional levels of 
observation (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thus, future research could for example link other-
ratings of daily experiences (e.g., provided by romantic partners or friends) with long-term 
development in other-rated traits. Also, links between change goals and long-term 
development in other-rated traits could be examined (Hudson & Fraley, 2017). In addition, 
behavioral observation or biological functioning could be included (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
Fourth, in some traits, rank-order stability of about .30 for IATs appeared to be 
somewhat lower than in previous studies (across 11 studies, r = .51 ; Hofmann et al., 2005a; 
across 1 year, r = .47; Egloff, Schwerdtfeger, & Schmukle, 2005), making it harder to track 
reliable long-term trait changes and, in turn linking momentary processes with these changes. 
Fifth, regarding volitional personality development, this study examined trait changes 
in a naturalistic setting that did not provide participants with any psychological assistance to 
successfully implement their change goals. However, as outlined by previous research, such 
interventions may provide substantial and probably much needed support for successful 
volitional personality development (see for example, Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Peters, 2015).  
Sixth, we focused on goal importance and feasibility as contributing factors for 
successful goal implementation. Yet, both factors may not necessarily depict whether 
participants actually commit or strive for a goal so that assessing goal commitment provides a 
fruitful starting point for future research (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012; for a self-rating 
questionnaire on goal commitment, see Hollenbeck, Williams, & Klein, 1989). 
Finally, regarding personality development in general, for self-rated openness, 
conscientiousness and emotional stability, fit indices slightly exceeded conventional cut-off 
criteria for ordinary SEM. Regarding volitional personality development, this was true for 
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self-rated openness, conscientiousness and partly extraversion. As research has still to provide 
guidelines for MSEM, we recommend a careful interpretation of these models. Thus, future 
studies are needed to replicate our findings.  
4.4.6 Conclusion. 
In the current study, we examined central propositions of the TESSERA framework 
on momentary processes and long-term development of traits regarding both personality 
development in general and volitional personality development in particular (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017). First, we investigated the cascade of momentary processes that precede, elicit 
and result from trait-relevant states in daily experiences. By and large, it showed that 
momentary processes can be generalized as recursive sequences of Triggering situations, 
Expectancies, States & State Expressions, and ReActions (i.e., TESSERA sequences; Wrzus 
& Roberts, 2017). This suggests that momentary states (e.g., behavior) hardly stand for 
themselves but need to be considered as imbedded within for example other more motivational 
(e.g., expectations) or affective (e.g., reactions) processes. We therefore encourage researchers 
to model more complex associations of momentary processes to gain a more complete picture 
on underlying processes of long-term trait development. In addition, we extended previous 
research on personality development in general by linking momentary processes with long-
term development of explicit and for the first time implicit representations of Big Five traits. 
Explicit representations of traits provided a rather clear picture regarding their manifestations 
in daily life (i.e., experience of situations and states) and underlying processes of their long-
term development (i.e., experience of states and, partly, reflections on states), supporting 
propositions of the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In contrast, implicit 
representations of traits provided a more inconclusive picture with little evidence for their 
manifestations in daily life and for the importance of states or associative processes in long-
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term trait development. Thus, future research is needed to further clarify underlying processes 
of trait change in different representations of traits. 
Second, we extended previous research on volitional personality development by 
investigating whether change goals as well as their importance and feasibility shape the 
experience of situations and states as suggested by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017) and other theoretical research (e.g., Hennecke et al., 2014). While change goals 
where hardly linked with momentary experiences, importance and feasibility in part affected 
situations and states as expected for both explicit and implicit representations of traits. 
Furthermore, in the examined naturalistic setting, it unexpectedly showed that change goals 
were not directly associated with actual changes in explicit or implicit representations of traits. 
However, again, goal importance and feasibility, yet not their interaction, were partly linked 
with long-term trait changes. Future research needs to further clarify whether people actually 
commit to change goals and how much assistance (i.e., in terms of an intervention) is needed 
for their successful implementation. 
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The overall aim of the present dissertation was to investigate both macro-analytical 
factors and micro-analytical processes of personality development. Regarding macro-
analytical factors, the current research focused on the role of environmental factors for 
personality development as well as volitional aspects of personality development. To 
determine the role of environmental factors, this dissertation in Chapter II longitudinally 
examined whether age differences in personality development diminished when younger and 
older adults experienced a similar life transition (i.e., experiencing college life). In addition, 
this chapter compared if personality measured via self-ratings, other-ratings, and implicit 
measures exhibited a similar pattern of development. To shed light on volitional personality 
development, Chapter III in a first step investigated whether people’s current self- and other-
rated traits as well as a broad range of additional personality characteristics predicted people’s 
change goals. Finally, Chapter IV longitudinally examined if change goals, especially when 
they were perceived as more important and feasible, indeed manifested in actual changes in 
self-rated and implicitly measured traits.  
Regarding micro-analytical processes, Chapter IV provided a first empirical test of 
central propositions of the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) on whether 
momentary processes of personality development can be generalized in terms of recursive 
sequences of Triggering situations, Expectancies, States & State Expressions, and ReActions 
(i.e., TESSERA sequences; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Furthermore, Chapter IV tested if self-
rated and implicitly measured traits as well as change goals, especially when they were 
perceived as more important and feasible, shaped the subsequent experience of situations and 
states. Finally, this chapter examined the relevance of reflective or associative processes for 
translating TESSERA sequences (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) into actual trait changes. 
The current dissertation accomplished to address these different research questions by 
conducting a measurement burst study (Nesselroade, 1991, 2004; Sliwinski, 2008) that 
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combined multi-method longitudinal trait assessments with an extensive daily diary approach 
in an age-heterogeneous sample. In particular, across two years, participants completed up to 
four trait assessments (including self-ratings, other-ratings and implicit measures) and 
answered up to 50 daily diaries focusing on the most relevant experience of their day.  
 Next, the dissertation’s main findings on a) the importance of environmental factors 
for personality development, b) volitional personality development and c) processes of 
personality development will be summarized and integrated. Finally, this dissertation’s 
limitations will be addressed and potential implications for research and psychological 
practice will be outlined. 
5.1 Illuminating the Role of Environmental Factors in Personality Development 
To illuminate the role of environmental factors for personality development, the 
current dissertation examined personality development in the context of a life transition, 
namely the transition to college. While, due to biological and/or social constraints, most life 
transitions can be experienced only within a specific age (J. Heckhausen, 2000; Roberts et al., 
2005), the transition to college reflects a transition that, in principle, can be experienced by 
people of all age. Thus, using a quasi-experimental design, this dissertation was able to 
examine the effects of the transition to college on personality development in younger and 
older adults. In addition, the inclusion of age- and education-matched control groups allowed 
to distinguish personality development associated with the life transition from normative (i.e., 
age-typical) personality development.  
As expected, Chapter II showed that, except for implicitly measured openness and 
extraversion, younger and older adults and especially younger and older students did not differ 
in the development of self- or other-rated traits. Furthermore, in contrast to younger advanced 
students, younger freshmen increased in self-rated conscientiousness as well as implicitly 
measured extraversion and openness. In addition, they exhibited stability in self-rated 
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agreeableness as well as self- and other-rated extraversion while more advanced students 
decreased in these traits. Finally as expected, in contrast to older control group participants, 
older students increased in conscientiousness and agreeableness, yet the latter effect did not 
last across the entire study. Conversely, although older students started with somewhat higher 
levels of other-rated openness, they decreased in how others rated their openness whereas 
older control group participants did not.  
Taken together, these findings are largely in line with previous research on the 
transition to college (Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011) and other life transitions (Lehnart et 
al., 2010; Löckenhoff et al., 2009; Neyer & Lehnart, 2007; Specht et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 
2015), suggesting that life transitions in general may indeed contribute to the observed patterns 
of mean-level changes across the lifespan (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a). 
More specifically and especially in young adulthood, a broad range of at least partly normative 
life transitions (e.g., transition into a serious partnership, transition into college or first job) 
may finally account for personality maturation (i.e., in terms of the maturity principle; Roberts 
& Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008). For example, as highlighted by the current findings and 
previous research (Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011), the engagement in college life was 
associated with increases in conscientiousness, while the engagement in a serious partnership 
was in previous research shown to be linked with increases in emotional stability (Lehnart et 
al., 2010; Neyer & Lehnart, 2007; Wagner et al., 2015). In turn, the experience of such a broad 
range of life transitions, possibly even with slightly different onsets and intensities, may 
contribute to the observed lower rank-order stability in young adulthood (Caspi & Roberts, 
2001; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; Wortman et al., 2012). As life 
transitions become less frequent in older adulthood, rank-order may consequently exhibit 
higher stability (i.e., in terms of the cumulative continuity principle; Roberts & Wood, 2006; 
Roberts et al., 2008). Moreover, results further underline that life transitions foster such trait 
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changes that are helpful or functional for a successful mastery of the transition (Denissen et 
al., 2013; D. Wood & Denissen, 2015). For example, the observed increase of self-rated 
conscientiousness in younger freshmen may be functional to meet requirements of college life 
like self-organized learning and attending to lectures or courses. 
By investigating the transition into college in a quasi-experimental study on younger 
and older adults, this dissertation greatly extends previous research that merely examined life 
transitions in either younger or older adults (e.g., Löckenhoff et al., 2009; Lüdtke et al., 2011). 
Thereby, the current dissertation provides a more conclusive evaluation for previous 
considerations on underlying principles of personality development (Roberts & Wood, 2006; 
Roberts et al., 2008).  
In line with the social investment principle (Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005), 
younger and older students hardly differed in personality development. Thus, if people of 
different age are confronted with similar environmental requirements (e.g., managing college 
life), they may similarly invest in social roles (e.g., being a student) that help to meet these 
new requirements, for example by specifying social expectations (e.g., socializing after 
courses to get integrated into new social groups) or behavioral demands (e.g., preparing 
courses; Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005; see also Danish et al., 1980; Levinson, 
1978). The fact that, at least for conscientiousness and agreeableness, personality development 
in older students somewhat mirrored development of younger students as reported in previous 
studies (Bleidorn, 2012; Lüdtke et al., 2011) can be further interpreted in favor of the social 
investment principle (Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). Thus, experiencing life 
transitions and investing in corresponding social roles may be one of the driving forces in 
personality development (Bleidorn et al., 2013; Denissen et al., 2014; Helson et al., 1984; 
Roberts et al., 2005). 
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Moreover, the finding that over the course of the study, both younger freshman and 
older students showed a favorable development in self-rated conscientiousness and partly 
agreeableness, provides some support for the idea that keeping a social role (e.g., being a 
dependable student) may result in continuity of personality (see role continuity principle; 
Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). However, as in general, both younger and older 
adults did not exhibit large trait changes over the course of the study, it is hardly surprising 
that this dissertation found no support for greater consistency in personality development of 
older adults (see identity development principle; Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). In 
addition, the current dissertation found only mixed evidence for the idea that life transitions 
may deepen those traits that lead to their experience in the first place (see corresponsive 
principle; Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). On the one hand, speaking in favor of the 
corresponsive principle, in contrast to older control participants, older students were able to 
keep higher levels of self-rated conscientiousness. However, on the other hand, older students 
started at somewhat higher levels of other-rated openness, but were not able to maintain these 
higher other-ratings. Finally, supporting the plasticity principle (Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts 
et al., 2005), it altogether showed that personality traits were open systems that can be affected 
by environmental factors like the engagement in college in both younger and older adulthood 
(see also Baltes, 1987). 
By relying on self-ratings, other-ratings and implicit measures, this dissertation 
provides first empirical research on long-term personality development using different data 
sources to infer people’s traits. However, as findings on these three trait measures indicated 
diverging trajectories and hardly any correlated change, they support the idea that self-ratings, 
other-ratings and implicit measures assess different parts of people’s traits (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Göllner et al., 2017). Consequently, to examine the importance of 
environmental factors, and especially life transitions for personality development, using 
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different data sources may allow researchers to disentangle different patterns of development 
and their underlying causes (e.g., do stressful life transitions affect implicitly measured 
emotional stability differently than self-ratings?). However, if findings from different data 
sources indeed converge, this may provide a strong test for the underlying principles of 
personality development. For example, providing strong support for the maturity principle 
(Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005), older adults consistently showed higher levels of 
conscientiousness and emotional stability across all three measures.  
In sum, the current results further endorse the idea that environmental factors and 
especially life transitions play a crucial role for personality development across the entire 
lifespan (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008). The finding that both younger and 
older students showed a similar developmental pattern when they experienced a similar life 
transition contrasts earlier conceptualization of personality development that perceived 
personality development as being merely the result of intrinsic, biological maturation (Costa 
& McCrae, 1994; McCrae & Costa, 2008; McCrae et al., 2000).  
5.2 The Relevance of Volitional Personality Development 
 The current dissertation greatly expands previous research on volitional personality 
development by comprehensively examining why people set goals to change and if these 
change goals can be translated into actual trait changes. Specifically, extending previous 
research (e.g., Hudson & Fraley, 2016a; Hudson & Roberts, 2014) this dissertation provided 
first evidence on whether both self- and other-rated traits as well as a broad range of 
characteristic adaptations reflect predictors of change goals in both younger and older adults. 
In addition, using two-year longitudinal data, this dissertation was able to examine whether 
change goals, especially when they are perceived as more important and feasible, affect 
development in self-rated and implicitly measured traits (for somewhat inconclusive findings, 
see Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Robinson et al., 2015; see also Hennecke et al., 2014). 
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 As expected, findings presented in Chapter III suggested that both lower current self- 
and other-rated traits were associated with stronger change goals. Importantly, for traits more 
relevant in social interactions (i.e., extraversion, agreeableness and partly conscientiousness) 
it showed that also self-other agreement mattered in the prediction of change goals. In these 
traits, change goals were stronger when both self and others consistently rated the current trait 
level as low. Unexpectedly, characteristic adaptations were hardly linked with change goals 
when controlling for current trait levels. Surprisingly, results presented in Chapter IV 
suggested that change goals were not associated with more pronounced changes in both self-
rated and implicitly measured traits. However, more important and more feasible change goals, 
but not change goals that were considered both important and feasible, were at least partly 
linked with stronger trait changes. 
 Given this rather limited evidence in favor of the importance of change goals, the 
question arises whether volitional personality development is even relevant in the global 
picture of personality development in general. To address this question, I next discuss three 
positions, which are not completely mutually exclusive, that can be taken in regard to change 
goals.  
First, with the above-summarized rather disillusioning results in mind, one could argue 
that change goals as assessed in this dissertation may merely reflect a response bias resulting 
from lower current trait levels (e.g., “I previously rated myself low in extraversion, hence I 
now say that I of course want to increase in this trait”). Indeed, although with distracting tasks 
in between, change goals were captured within the same assessment as corresponding traits so 
that people may have remembered their previous answers and thus have been subject to a 
response bias. Following this argumentation, change goals would not represent a desired state 
that people actually seek to achieve (i.e., an actual goal; Emmons, 1996; R. M. Ryan et al., 
1996) and unsurprisingly, change goals would fail to provide a framework to successfully 
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shape people’s lives and actions, that would have led to actual trait changes (Carver & Scheier, 
1998; Klinger, 1977; Pervin, 1982). Yet, speaking against the idea that change goals reflect 
merely a response bias, for extraversion, agreeableness and partly conscientiousness, change 
goals were strongest when both self- and other-ratings agreed on lower current trait levels. In 
addition, suggesting that people wanted to adjust their trait levels to the perception of their 
significant others, for agreeableness and conscientiousness, change goals were stronger when 
other-ratings exceeded self-ratings. Thus, goals to change constitute more than a purely 
subjective phenomenon and can therefore be considered more than a bare response bias. In 
line with this conclusion, the finding that more important or more feasible change goals were 
at least partly linked with actual trait changes suggests that people do to some extent 
implement their goals to change. 
Second, it can be argued that, since both younger and older adults almost exclusively 
wanted to increase in their traits (see also, Hudson & Fraley, 2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 2014), 
change goals may first and foremost reflect people’s mere desire for more socially desirable 
trait levels (Dunlop et al., 2012; D. Wood & Roberts, 2006) and/or to develop a more mature 
personality (Roberts & Wood, 2006; Roberts et al., 2008). In fact, change goals primarily 
reflected people’s desire to overcome their self- and partly other-perceived shortcomings in 
current trait levels (see also, Hudson & Fraley, 2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 2014), but were 
somehow not associated with characteristic adaptations (e.g., life satisfaction, self-esteem) 
when controlling for current traits (see also, Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Kiecolt, 1994). Thus, 
aside from their links to current traits, change goals may represent a rather isolated 
phenomenon that seems to lack functional associations to other psychological constructs (e.g., 
in Chapter III, lower life satisfaction did not predict goals to change one’s extraversion; D. 
Wood & Denissen, 2015, but see Hudson & Fraley, 2016a for arguments against this idea). In 
addition, when people were in previous research asked to describe their change goals in terms 
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of open-ended responses, they did hardly formulate concrete goals, but primarily expressed 
more vague desires of having a different personality (i.e., sample desires for personality 
change start with phrases like “I would like to be […]”, “I wish I could […]”, see Table 1 in 
Baranski et al., 2016; see also Robinson et al., 2015). Consequently, change goals could be 
conceptualized as a different measure for desirability of higher trait levels, but not as actual 
goals that people actively commit to. Thus, advocates of this position would not be surprised 
by the current finding of change goals being hardly linked with the experience of goal-relevant 
situations and states. 
Yet, the finding that people were partly able to achieve trait changes if they perceived 
their change goals as either more important or feasible somehow contradicts this conclusion. 
Conversely, it could still be argued that change goals in general do merely reflect trait 
desirability and only grow to actual goals that people commit to if they were considered as 
highly important or feasible (see also Atkinson, 1964; Eccles et al., 1983; Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; H. Heckhausen, 1977; Vroom, 1964). 
Third, compared to for example more narrow developmental tasks (e.g., getting 
married; Havighurst, 1953; J. Heckhausen et al., 2010), change goals may be simply harder to 
implement, because they aim to alter rather broad personality traits (Baranski et al., 2017; 
Hudson & Roberts, 2014). Stated otherwise, with merely rather abstract higher-order goals on 
how to be in mind, people may be unable to form and pursue more specific, smaller scaled 
goals that ensure a successful implementation of these higher-order goals (Freund & Baltes, 
2000; Gollwitzer, 1996; Hoyle & Sherrill, 2006; Powers, 1973; see also Study 1 in Hudson & 
Fraley, 2015; Robinson et al., 2015). Indeed, more specific goals (e.g., “I will join Peter's 
birthday party and talk to at least one stranger.”; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; see also 
Study 2 in Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Robinson et al., 2015) should be linked with better goal-
related performance than rather vague do-your-best goals (e.g., “I want to be outgoing, 
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sociable.”; see also, Locke & Latham, 1990; Locke & Latham, 2002). Further impeding a 
successful implementation of change goals, they may set reference values (e.g., being 
outgoing, sociable) that are difficult to satisfy because they require people to maintain trait 
related actions across diverse situations and for a longer time period (i.e., in terms of dynamic 
goals; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973). Thus, change goals may be less likely to result 
in habitual changes (see also, Hennecke et al., 2014; Magidson et al., 2014; W. Wood, 2017; 
W. Wood & Neal, 2007). Taken together, this position argues that change goals were not 
linked with actual trait changes because people may simply lack the capability needed to 
successfully implement them.  
In line with this idea, the current results showed that if people perceived a change goal 
as more important and more feasible, they were partly able to achieve actual trait changes. In 
addition, if the third position holds true, then a successful implementation of change goals 
should be much more likely under the aid of psychological assistance that for example helps 
to translate change goals into more specific goals. Indeed, psychological interventions showed 
to successfully encourage volitional personality development (Allan et al., 2018; Hudson & 
Fraley, 2015; Magidson et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2014; Peters, 2015; Roberts et al., 2017). 
For example, by forming specific implementation intentions (i.e., “If I encounter situation X, 
then I will do Y,”; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997), the successful implementation of change 
goals was significantly boosted (Hudson & Fraley, 2015). 
With the current evidence at hand, it can be preliminary concluded that change goals 
reflect more than a mere response bias and likely do not only assess the internalized 
desirability of having higher trait levels (but see section “5.4 Limitations and implications for 
future research”). Yet, without further assistance, people seem to face considerable obstacles 
when they want to volitionally change their traits (for a further discussion of obstacles for 
volitional personality development, see Hennecke et al., 2014). However, concluding that 
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volitional personality development is irrelevant for personality development in general would 
be premature. Given that people’s goals to change themselves can be organized using the broad 
Big Five domains (Baranski et al., 2017) and that the vast majority indeed wants to change at 
least some aspects of their traits (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b; Hudson & Roberts, 2014), it is 
further sensible to assume that people themselves do consider volitional personality 
development in terms of the Big Five as possible. In addition, aside from goals that focus on 
specifically changing Big Five traits, both personality psychology (see Cross & Markus, 1991; 
Emmons, 1986; Gollwitzer, 1987; Higgins, 1987; King & Hicks, 2007; Markus & Nurius, 
1986) and developmental psychology (see Brandtstädter et al., 1999; J. Heckhausen et al., 
2010; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981; Lewin, 1934, 1943) stimulated numerous and fruitful 
research suggesting that people do not passively go through their lives but instead actively 
shape themselves, their environment and their long-term development (McAdams & Olson, 
2010). In light of this research tradition, future research has to determine whether volitionally 
changing one’s Big Five traits is possible under certain circumstances (e.g., increased goal 
specificity, see also section “5.4 Limitations and implications for future research”).  
Concerning such circumstances of successful goal pursuit, in contrast to a broad range 
of previous suggestions (Atkinson, 1964; Eccles et al., 1983; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; H. Heckhausen, 1977; Hennecke et al., 2014; Vroom, 1964), 
the current dissertation provided surprisingly little support for the idea that both more 
important and more feasible change goals promote more pronounced trait changes. Aside from 
a lack of goal commitment and the specific relevance of either importance of feasibility for 
particular traits (see section “4.4.4 Important or feasible change goals partly contribute to 
volitional personality development.”), this finding may have also resulted from a less than 
optimal assessment strategy. In particular, during the assessment of change goals, participants 
repeatedly commented that they found it difficult to rate the rather abstract change goals and 
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especially their importance and feasibility. Thus, ratings of importance and feasibility may 
have been somewhat distorted. For example, as indicated by medium to strong negative 
correlations between importance and feasibility (see Table A12), participants may have 
automatically inferred that more important goals should also be less feasible so that potential 
interaction effects could hardly be detected. Future research may for example link the assessed 
change goals with illustrative functional aspects to increase their vividness and thus reduce 
potential response biases for importance and feasibility (Hennecke et al., 2014; but see section 
“5.4 Limitations and implications for future research”). 
Before I next discuss the current dissertation’s findings on micro-analytical processes 
of personality development, it is important to note that the two macro-analytical factors (i.e., 
environmental factors and change goals) discussed above may jointly contribute to personality 
development across the lifespan (Hudson & Fraley, 2016b, 2017; Hudson & Roberts, 2014). 
For example, when experiencing the transition to college, people may internalize new social 
roles (e.g., being a student) and become aware of new, required behavior (e.g., need to 
unassisted learning) so that they actively want to change their corresponding traits (e.g., 
increase in conscientiousness, but see section “5.4 Limitations and implications for future 
research”).  
5.3 Investigating Processes of Personality Development 
Although frequently asked for (see for example Baumert et al., 2017), this dissertation 
represents the first research to empirically investigate smaller scaled series of steps (i.e., 
processes) that may underlie personality development. While previous studies primarily 
focused on single components of personality development (e.g., momentary states; Hutteman 
et al., 2015; Wrzus et al., 2018a), this dissertation provided a first but comprehensive empirical 
test of whether such single components can be further embedded into preceding and 
subsequent momentary experiences as proposed by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & 
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Roberts, 2017). In addition, using two year longitudinal data, the current research replicated 
and extended previous findings on associations of self-rated and implicitly measured traits as 
well as change goals with corresponding situations and states (e.g., Back et al., 2009; Hudson 
& Fraley, 2015; Mehl et al., 2006; Rauthmann et al., 2015b). Finally, this dissertation was able 
to provide unique insights into the importance of reflective and associative processes in long-
term personality development (see Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
 As expected, it in Chapter IV showed that with only very few exceptions, momentary 
processes could indeed be generalized as recursive TESSERA sequences consisting of 
Triggering situations, Expectancies, States & State Expressions, and ReActions (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017). Furthermore, self-rated traits were consistently linked with the experience of 
trait-relevant situations and momentary states whereas this was only partly true for implicitly 
measured traits. Unexpectedly, change goals were not associated with experiencing goal-
relevant situations and states. However, goals that were perceived as either more important or 
as more feasible were partly linked with the experience of corresponding situations and states. 
Finally, results indicated that momentary states were associated with subsequent changes in 
self-rated and partly implicitly measured traits. Conversely, results provided only very limited 
evidence for the relevance of reflective or associative processes in long-term development of 
self-rated or implicitly measured traits. 
 Collectively, these findings provide important empirical evidence for the idea that 
people’s traits shape momentary experiences (e.g., situations, states) and that the experiences 
people make in daily life in turn contribute to personality development across the life-span 
(Back et al., 2011; Dweck, 2017; Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 2017; 
Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thereby, the current findings may also 
help to move away from understanding the Big Five taxonomy as purely descriptive and 
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instead provide evidence helpful to understand how inter-individual differences come into 
being (see also, Baumert et al., 2017; J. Block, 1995; Denissen & Penke, 2008; Roberts, 2009).  
In line with previous theoretical suggestions (Back et al., 2011; Dweck, 2017; Geukes 
et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017) and first empirical findings (Hutteman et al., 2015; Wrzus et al., 2018a), especially 
momentary states seem to play an important role in explaining how such inter-individual 
differences emerge in the long run. Extending previous research (e.g., Back et al., 2009; Egloff 
& Schmukle, 2002; Mehl et al., 2006), the current results suggest that both self-rated and in 
part implicitly measured traits may manifest in closely corresponding short-term behavior, 
cognition and affect, partly even across a time lag of six months (see also, Cervone, 2005; 
Denissen & Penke, 2008; DeYoung, 2015; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; 
Fleeson et al., 2002; Fridhandler, 1986; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). More importantly however, 
the current findings support the idea that people may rely on their momentary states to infer 
their underlying traits (Back & Vazire, 2012; Buss & Craik, 1983; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009) 
so that prolonged shifts in such states (i.e., habit changes) may consequently alter people’s 
trait levels (Back et al., 2011; Dweck, 2017; Geukes et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014; 
Roberts, 2017; Roberts & Jackson, 2008; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017).  
 Yet, the current findings also suggest that, in everyday life, momentary states reflect 
no isolated phenomena but instead need to be conceptualized as being embedded in cascades 
of further momentary experiences (Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017, see also Baumert et 
al., 2017). Specifically, this dissertation provides a unique contribution to the identification of 
processes that may precede and thereby possibly elicit momentary behavior, thoughts or 
feelings. If such momentary states indeed form the building blocks of personality 
development, it is crucial to determine conditions under which people will most likely 
experience prolonged changes (or stability) in such states and thereby change (or maintain) 
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their traits in the long run (Baumert et al., 2017). The current results suggest that such 
conditions may cover the experience of trait-relevant situations and according expectancies on 
how to behave as proposed by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In 
addition, by showing that people’s reactions and reflections on a state vary with its strength, 
the current findings suggest that people indeed try to cope with their momentary behaviors, 
thoughts or feelings. However, the finding that both reflective and associative processes hardly 
contributed to trait changes at first sight speaks against propositions made by the TESSERA 
framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Yet, although not meant to immunize the TESSERA 
framework against potential falsification, it could well be the case that associative and 
reflective processes still contribute in a more complex way to the translation of momentary 
states into actual trait changes than modeled in the current research (i.e., in terms of a simple 
linear association, see Chapter IV). For example, the simple amount of reflection may be less 
relevant for personality development until several conditions are met. As such, the discrepancy 
between the present self-concept and the reflected state may need to be unpleasant while 
simultaneously changing the self-concept is perceived important and feasible (Hennecke et al., 
2014; Wrzus, 2018; see also Denissen et al., 2013). Future research may implement more 
advanced assessment strategies to clarify the importance of reflective and associative 
processes in personality development (but see section “5.4 Limitations and implications for 
future research”).  
Surprisingly, the current dissertation found hardly any support for the idea that, in order 
to implement their change goals, people may increasingly engage in goal-relevant situations 
and states (Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 2014; Hoyle & Sherrill, 2006; Morf, 2006; 
Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Again, this finding suggests that for example without the assistance 
of a psychological intervention (see for example Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Peters, 2015), 
change goals fail to affect momentary experiences. To support the implementation of change 
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goals in daily life, such interventions may a) help to translate change goals into reference 
values for subordinate “do”-goals (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Gollwitzer & Schaal, 
1998; Pervin, 1982) b) teach concrete skills on how to realize these “do”-goals (see for 
example, Hinsch & Pfingsten, 2007; Peters, 2015) and c) help people to determine when a 
change goal is successfully implemented (i.e., when reference value and the input correspond; 
see also Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2003; J. Heckhausen et 
al., 2010). 
 Although the rather complex modeling of momentary processes of personality 
development as presented in Chapter IV may appear somewhat daunting, it actually reflects a 
major strength of the current dissertation. To sufficiently explain a multi-causal phenomenon 
like personality development while simultaneously avoiding an inadmissible simplification, it 
is necessary to also apply more complex models (Baumert et al., 2017; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017). However, even with the current results at hand, empirical research on processes of 
personality development is still in its infancy. Consider for example the somewhat diverging 
findings on self-rated and implicitly rated traits. While states were rather consistently linked 
with self-rated traits and trait change, this was only true for extraversion and partly neuroticism 
in implicitly measured traits. Thus, although the current dissertation already provides a first 
glimpse into momentary processes of the development of implicitly measured traits, future 
research is needed to achieve a more profound insight. However, with respect to the TESSERA 
framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), this dissertation provided first but encouraging findings 
on central propositions – albeit future research is needed to tackle limitations of the current 
research in testing this framework. Next, I illustrate such limitations and outline potential 
starting points for future research.  
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5.4 Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
 Although the current dissertation realized a comprehensive measurement-burst design 
that provided unique insights into both macro-analytical factors and micro-analytical 
processes of personality development, some limitations need to be discussed that indicate 
several implications for future research. Although the findings presented in Chapters II-IV of 
this dissertation stem from the same research project, I next discuss limitations and future 
directions separately for environmental factors, volitional personality development and 
processes of personality development to allow for a better assignability of each discussed 
aspect. Note that limitations discussed here cover a broader scope, for example with respect 
to the applied research design, than limitations already addressed in Chapters II-IV. 
5.4.1 Environmental factors.  
 Regarding findings on the importance of environmental factors, at least five limitations 
and according implications for future research need to be considered. First, as already briefly 
outlined in Chapter II, it remains questionable whether a direct comparison of the effect of a 
life transition in different age groups is possible at all because older adults necessarily already 
collected more and surely more diverse experiences in life that may subsequently alter the 
effects of the life transition in question. Although future research may not be able to fully 
address or even overcome this limitation, a further comparison of life transitions in different 
age still provides a sensible research strategy to investigate underlying principles of 
personality development (see for example, Roberts et al., 2008). However, future research may 
for example examine more rare or extreme life transitions (e.g., inheriting or winning much 
money, death of a spouse or parents) in different age groups that are less prone to self-selection 
effects and more independent from previous life experiences (for first empirical research on 
these examples, see Gardner & Oswald, 2001; Specht et al., 2014; for a brief discussion on the 
nature of such experiences, see Hutteman et al., 2014). In addition, future research interested 
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in the effects of educational life transitions may monitor the transition into job retraining 
programs (and associated job changes), because such trainings should cover comparable 
conditions for each job and can be applied in both younger and older adults (Jacobson, 
Lalonde, & Sullivan, 2005).  
Second, although the current research tried to acquire a sufficiently divers and 
representative sample, the applied recruitment strategy also went along with some drawbacks. 
For example, to allow for a more valid comparison of the effects of the transition to college 
between older and younger adults, participants were required to have a rather high level of 
education (i.e., German Abitur or similar). This may have not only encouraged potential 
selection effects, especially in older adults (see Chapter II), but also limits the generalizability 
of the current findings. To overcome this limitation, future research needs to also investigate 
such life transitions that require a less homogeneous educational background but are still 
sufficiently comparable in age-heterogeneous samples (e.g., job retraining programs). 
Furthermore, with the applied recruitment strategy at hand, it was not possible to realize all 
planned contrasts because a sufficient number of younger control group participants as well 
as older freshmen in the greater area around Mainz could not be recruited. Thus, future 
research may be conceptualized as multi-center studies to reach a more satisfactory sample 
size in these groups. 
Third and relatedly, due to somewhat restricted sample sizes in the investigated transitions 
groups (e.g., only about 60 older students and 60 controls were recruited), this dissertation was 
not able to examine momentary processes relevant in the transition to college. Specifically, 
future research might examine whether momentary processes relevant for personality 
development during a life transition are comparable in different age groups (see, Baumert et 
al., 2017; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Again, a higher sample size is needed to test for differences 
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in for example single paths using complex MSEMs (e.g., see MSEMs as applied in Chapter 
IV). 
Fourth, in line with previous research (Roberts et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2005; see also 
Lüdtke et al., 2011), this dissertation assumed that experiencing college life is associated with 
changes in social roles and expectancies. However, the current research did not consider how 
much participants actually engaged in their social role as student (e.g., how much time they 
spent preparing their courses, how much they engaged in student life outside the university). 
Future research may examine whether the amount of actual investment into the social role 
associated with a life transition accounts for the observed similarities in developmental 
trajectories of younger and older adults. 
Fifth, this dissertation illustrated the importance of environmental factors for personality 
development by examining a life transition. However, to provide a more complete picture, 
future research may comprehensively examine the importance of more broad environmental 
factors like cultural (see for example, Bleidorn et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2004) or social 
contexts (see for example, Gerstorf et al., 2010; Hartup & Van Lieshout, 1995) in personality 
development. 
5.4.2 Volitional personality development. 
Although research on volitional personality development can already look back at a 
longer research tradition (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986), research on change 
goals is still in its infancies (Hudson & Fraley, 2017). Hence, there is comparatively much 
room for a further improvement of research and many questions still need to be addressed. 
However, to maintain clarity, I next focus on the four most important limitations and future 
directions that can be derived from the current dissertation.  
First, the present research design was limited to the investigation of volitional 
personality development in a more naturalistic setting and thus did not provide any form of 
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assistance for goal implementation (see Chapter IV). In addition, participants were only asked 
to rate their change goals but should not rate further goal specifications other than importance 
and feasibility. Hence, future research may in a first step examine such goal specifications to 
determine conditions under which volitional personality development might be possible. For 
example, researchers may ask participants to indicate a concrete time period in which they 
want to implement their goals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996), so that participants may express 
more realistic change goals and refrain from simply rating trait desirability. Needless to say 
that more long-term change goals would also require a longer period of observation. In 
addition, participants may indicate whether their change goals are functional to achieve other 
superordinate goals (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Denissen et al., 2013; Hennecke et al., 2014; 
D. Wood & Denissen, 2015) like fulfilling life goals (Bleidorn et al., 2010; Peters, 2015), 
social role expectations (D. Wood & Roberts, 2006) or broader needs (Dweck, 2017). By 
clarifying the functionality of change goals researchers may a) increase goal commitment and 
b) be able to identify determinants of successfully goal implementation (e.g., increases in 
conscientiousness could be more successful if people thereby want to achieve the life goal of 
graduating from university). In a second step, research may then examine whether further 
assistance is needed to successfully implement change goals. For example, providing 
participants with tailored reminders or feedback regarding their goal progress (e.g., after the 
second and third trait assessment) might significantly help them to judge whether they are on 
the right track and may additionally boost motivation for further goal pursuit (Locke & 
Latham, 1990; 2002; but compare to Study 1 in Hudson & Fraley, 2016). 
Second, although the current findings suggest that change goals reflect indeed more 
than mere desirability of higher trait levels, a direct test of this suggestion is still missing. 
Thus, to further clarify the nature of change goals, future research may separately assess 
change goals as well as trait desirability and compare their effects on long-term trait change. 
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In addition, providing participants with a fixed list of potential change goals as done by the C-
BFI (Hudson & Roberts, 2014) may have itself acted as an intervention that tempted 
participants to indicate change goals that would otherwise not have come to their mind and 
thus might have reflected trait desirability. To address this limitation, future research may 
compare change goals expressed in questionnaires with given items (Hudson & Roberts, 2014) 
and open-ended questionnaires (see also, Baranski et al., 2017; Hennecke et al., 2014) 
especially regarding their effect on long-term trait change. 
Third, the current dissertation did not investigate inter-individual differences in 
successful goal implementation. For example by using cluster analytical approaches, future 
research could clarify whether certain subgroups of people are indeed able to change their 
traits as desired. Potential properties of these subgroups may cover for example higher self-
efficacy (Locke & Latham, 2002; Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992), higher goal 
commitment (Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987; Locke & Latham, 2002), less conflicts with other 
motives and goals (Baumert et al., 2017) or a stronger general motivation to pursue potentially 
rewarding goals (Baumert et al., 2017; see also Corr, 2004, 2008). Finally, successors may 
understand change goals as rather specific means to the end of a successful individuation 
process (Koepke & Denissen, 2012).  
 Fourth, due to restrictions in sample size, this dissertation did not examine links 
between change goals and environmental factors (i.e., the transition into college). With a 
sufficient sample size, future research could examine whether people who for example 
experience a life transition may express stronger change goals especially for those traits that 
help to meet requirements put forward by changing environmental conditions (see Bleidorn et 
al., 2016).  
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5.4.3 Processes of personality development. 
 The current dissertation greatly extends previous research on processes of personality 
development and provides a promising starting point for future research. Importantly, such 
future research may benefit from both the present empirical research and previous theoretical 
groundwork like the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Yet, the applied 
research design also suffers from several drawbacks of which the four most important will be 
briefly discussed next.  
 First, although the current dissertation already applied an extensive measurement burst 
design, this research design was limited to provide only a first test of some, but not all, 
propositions made by the TESSERA framework. Specifically, albeit the current dissertation 
managed to examine a broad range of TESSERA components, it did not investigate potential 
moderators that may influence the size or direction of subsequent personality development 
(Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Thus, future research may for example examine the externality-
internality of TESSERA components to test whether more extrinsic social triggers or reactions 
as well as intrinsic expectations are linked with more pronounced trait changes (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017). In addition, this dissertation only examined TESSERA sequences by 
averaging the according daily experiences during different diary phases (e.g., during D1-D3), 
but did not model more complex associations between consecutive TESSERA sequences 
(Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). To provide a more comprehensive test of propositions 
made by the TESSERA framework, future research may apply more complex time-series 
analyses to additionally investigate whether TESSERA sequences and especially states can be 
conceptualized to occur within dynamic systems that also include previous as well as 
subsequent momentary experiences (e.g., in terms of dynamic networks or homeostatic 
processes; Wrzus, 2018). Furthermore, the current dissertation did not explicitly examine 
potential barriers of trait change as proposed by the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 
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2017) that may have at least partly explained the findings from Chapter IV. Applying a more 
fine-grained analysis of TESSERA sequences, future research may be able to tackle this 
limitation for example by focusing on those TESSERA sequences that indeed a) cover 
triggering situations that are perceived by participants themselves to be relevant for a trait, b) 
include states that do not already correspond to participants’ trait level and c) are sufficiently 
repeated (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
 Second, to maintain analyzability, the current dissertation focused on participants’ 
direct ratings of their experiences that were obtained using different, short rating forms. These 
ratings however may have only been able to cover parts of the experience, participants wanted 
to report about. In addition, as can be concluded from various support queries, participants 
may have had their difficulties to properly express their experience in terms of the applied 
questionnaires, especially regarding the DIAMONDS questionnaire (Rauthmann et al., 2014). 
To overcome this limitation, an in-depth analysis of participants’ open-ended descriptions of 
their experiences as also assessed in each daily diary (see section “4.2.3 Measures.”) may 
provide further fruitful insights into momentary processes of personality development. 
Third, the applied daily diary approach that required participants to rate their daily 
experiences in the evening may have itself acted as a trigger or intervention that may have 
fostered or even hindered personality development (Wrzus, 2018). For example, as indicated 
by direct feedback of participants, some looked forward to completing the daily diary because 
they perceived it as possibility to reflect on their day and learn something about their 
personality. Others however reported that the daily diary helped them to align their 
experiences with their current self-perception. Thus, future research may also use ambulatory 
assessments of daily experiences, which however pose their own challenges and drawbacks 
(Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus et al., 2017b).  
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Fourth, regarding volitional personality development, to maintain clarity, the current 
dissertation did not examine associations of change goals with reflective or associative 
processes. However, to actually implement their change goals, people may more actively try 
to integrate their momentary experiences into their self-concept or change their evaluation of 
certain experiences. In addition, by applying random slope MSEMs, future research may for 
example examine whether stronger change goals are also linked with stronger associations 
between TESSERA components (e.g., the more I want to change, the more I reflect on 
situations in which I showed stronger goal-relevant states). 
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5.5 Implications for Psychological Practice 
The current dissertation primarily aimed to provide researchers with unique insights 
into both macro-analytical factors and micro-analytical processes of personality development. 
However, the current findings may also help practitioners to support their clients in 
successfully developing their personality across the lifespan. 
With the current findings at hand, practitioners find further support for the idea that a 
clients’ personality development is not set in stone (e.g., due to a fixed schedule of intrinsic 
maturation) but remains plastic even in older age (e.g., due to changing environmental factors). 
However, the requirement to flexibly adjust one’s personality for example to environmental 
factors even in older age may provide a substantial struggle for some people. Thus, 
psychotherapists and psychological counselors may especially keep an eye on whether a client 
strives to deal with a life transition but still lacks those trait levels that are required for their 
successful management (e.g., conscientiousness may be needed to manage the transition to 
college or job). In a second step, the practitioner may support clients in increasing these traits. 
In addition, when working with clients who want to change themselves or have a distinct future 
self in mind, practitioners should feel encouraged to propose these clients to engage in such 
life transitions that foster the desired personality changes (e.g., by suggesting that an older 
client who wants to increase in conscientiousness or agreeableness engages in college life). 
Finally, the current results highlight that a successful personality development hardly only 
covers an altered clients’ self-rating but also needs to manifest in changed implicitly measured 
traits and reputation (i.e., other-reports). Consequently, measures need to be taken to ensure 
that change condenses in all three manifestations (e.g., encouraging clients to emphasize new 
behaviors, thoughts or feelings in social interactions with relevant others, but see, Back et al., 
2011; Seger, 1994; Vazire, 2010).  
 Chapter V: General Discussion 
   
263 
Regarding volitional personality development, the current findings suggest that in a 
more naturalistic setting, people can hardly implement their change goals into actual trait 
changes. However, as previous research suggests that psychological interventions may foster 
trait change in general (Roberts et al., 2017) and volitional trait change in particular (Allan et 
al., 2018; Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Martin et al., 2014; Peters, 2015), practitioners should feel 
encouraged to use available tools at hand to support their clients in volitional personality 
development (Allemand & Flückiger, 2017; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997; Hinsch & 
Pfingsten, 2007; Magidson et al., 2014). For example, by supporting self-reflections, 
practitioners may foster a clients’ insights into such beliefs and expectations that might hinder 
a successful volitional trait change (Allemand & Flückiger, 2017). Furthermore, especially in 
a therapeutic setting, therapists may support clients to develop and implement such change 
goals that help to ensure therapeutic success in the long run (e.g., increasing emotional stability 
to secure treatment success of generalized anxiety disorder). However, if change goals turn 
out to merely reflect a client’s desire for self-optimization that is for example driven by 
external social pressure, it could be more sensible to encourage self-acceptance and address 
potentially low or fragile self-esteem than to support actual goal implementation (Asendorpf, 
2018; see also Hardin & Larsen, 2014). 
The current findings also provide practitioners with further helpful insights into 
momentary processes of personality development. Specifically, based on the TESSERA 
framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), practitioners and their clients may together elaborate 
situations to engage in, potential own and other’s expectations, desired behaviors, thoughts or 
feelings as well as potential own and other’s reactions. Furthermore, practitioners may help 
their clients to build an altered self-concept by relying on these newly displayed momentary 
states. Although the reflective processes as assessed in this dissertation hardly contributed to 
personality development, practitioners may for example still encourage their clients to aim at 
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achieving accuracy but not consistency when reflecting about their momentary experiences to 
foster further personality development (Baumert et al., 2017; Wrzus, 2018; Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017).  
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Despite the above outlined limitations, the current dissertation provides much needed 
insights into both macro-analytical factors (i.e., life transitions and change goals) and micro-
analytical processes of personality development. By comparing a similar life transition (i.e., 
the transition into college) in younger and older adults, Chapter II provided strong evidence 
for the idea that environmental factors indeed substantially contribute to personality 
development across the lifespan. Acknowledging a more volitional perspective on personality 
development, Chapter III comprehensively examined factors contributing to people’s goals to 
change traits and showed that change goals primarily reflect people’s self- and other-perceived 
shortcomings in current trait levels. Unexpectedly, Chapter IV showed that change goals 
hardly manifested in actual changes in self-rated or implicitly measured traits. Yet, more 
important or feasible change goals were in part successfully implemented. Finally, regarding 
micro-analytical processes of personality development, Chapter IV provided a first but 
comprehensive test of central proposition of the TESSERA framework (Wrzus & Roberts, 
2017). It showed that momentary processes can be generalized in terms of repeated sequences 
of triggering situations, expectancies, states, and reactions and that traits and momentary 
experiences bidirectionally influence each other. 
Taken together, the current results can be condensed into two more broad conclusions. 
First, this dissertation suggests that the observed general patterns of personality development 
across the life-span (Lucas & Donnellan, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006a) can be at least partly 
explained by the experiences people make – be it in the context of larger-scaled life transitions 
or in terms of smaller-scaled daily experiences. Specifically, as suggested by previous research 
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(see for example, Bleidorn et al., 2016; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Hutteman et al., 2014), results 
provide evidence for the idea that a more consistent context (e.g., experiencing less life 
transitions) may at least in part account for less pronounced trait changes in older adults. In 
addition, although the current research found little evidence in favor of a successful 
implementation of change goals (see also, Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Peters, 2015; Robinson et 
al., 2015), it still provides helpful and unique insights into the importance of volitional aspects 
of personality development. As such, this dissertation substantially illuminated the nature of 
change goals (but compare to Hudson & Roberts, 2014; Robinson et al., 2015), 
comprehensively tested proposed conditions of volitional personality development (see 
Hennecke et al., 2014) and finally provided suggestions on further conditions that may need 
to be met for a successful implementation of change goals. Moreover, the current findings 
highlight that momentary experiences and especially momentary states provide a fruitful asset 
for explaining long-term personality development. 
Second, by combining an extensive measurement burst design (Nesselroade, 1991, 
2004; Sliwinski, 2008) with a multi-method assessment of traits (i.e., self- and other-ratings, 
implicit measures), this dissertation constitutes an important methodological advance in 
research on personality development. Although repeatedly called for (see for example, 
Hennecke et al., 2014; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), to my knowledge, this dissertation is one of 
the first to realize such a complex research design (but see Peters, 2015 for a similar but 
somewhat less comprehensive approach). Yet, such complex research designs are both 
necessary and expedient to empirically test newly developed, more comprehensive 
frameworks on personality development (e.g., Geukes et al., 2017; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
The current dissertation sends out an encouraging signal for future research suggesting that 
although extensive measurement burst studies may go along with somewhat increased effort 
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they at the same time reward researchers with unique and much needed insights into the 
complex phenomenon of personality development. 
It remains to be noted that although empirical research has in recent years made 
substantial progress in understanding personality development, much is still unknown about 
why and under which circumstances people develop their personality. Just as psychological 
research will have to further investigate personality development, this subject also does not 
fade in literature until today. Rooted in German literature of the 18th and 19th century (Keller 
1855/2008; Goethe, 1796/1986; Wieland, 1767/1986), in the 20th century, authors like Brecht 
and Hesse have pushed forward new aspects of personality development in their coming-of-
age novels that still inspire contemporary literature like “Die Blechtrommel” (Grass, 
1959/1994), “Das Parfüm” (Süskind, 1985) or even “Harry Potter” (Rowling, 1997/2000) to 
emphasize the development of their main character’s personality. 
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Table A1 
Fit Indices for Models with Different Levels of Measurement Invariance for Big Five Traits 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
Model χ² / df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR  χ² / df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR  χ² / df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Conscientiousness                
1 1.28 .996 .993 .026 .023  1.69 .990 .983 .041 .043  1.28 .989 .974 .030 .022 
2 1.20 .997 .996 .021 .023  1.67 .989 .984 .040 .046  1.32 .986 .972 .032 .026 
2b - - - - -  - - - - -       
3 - - - - -  - - - - -  1.28 .986 .975 .030 .027 
3b 1.17 .997 .996 .019 .023  1.73 .987 .982 .042 .047       
Agreeableness                
1 1.40 .993 .988 .030 .026  1.80 .987 .979 .043 .034  3.86 .935 .847 .090 .048 
2 - - - - -  1.70 .987 .982 .040 .036  3.41 .938 .872 .082 .050 
2b 1.32 .994 .992 .026 .027  - - - - -  - - - - - 
3 - - - - -  1.59 .989 .985 .036 .037  3.20 .936 .882 .079 .048 
3b 1.26 .995 .993 .023 .027  - - - - -  - - - - - 
  
II 
 
 
 
Table A1 continued 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
Model χ² / df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR  χ² / df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR  χ² / df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Openness                
1 0.91 1.00 1.00 .000 .019  1.765 .990 .984 .042 .022  1.31 .990 .977 .031 .021 
2 0.83 1.00 1.00 .000 .019  1.62 .991 .987 .037 .025  1.16 .995 .989 .021 .022 
2b - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - 
3 .87 1.00 1.00 .000 .020  1.52 .992 .989 .034 .026  1.15 .994 .989 .021 .023 
3b - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - 
Extraversion                
1 2.27 .985 .976 .055 .030  2.72 .975 .959 .063 .048  1.60 .990 .975 .041 .018 
2 2.26 .983 .976 .055 .037  2.59 .975 .963 .061 .051  1.48 .990 .979 .038 .020 
2b - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - 
3 - - - - -  2.43 .975 .967 .058 .052  - - - - - 
3b 2.23 .983 .976 .054 .032  - - - - -  1.48 .990 .980 .037 .021 
Emotional stability                
1 2.32 .983 .972 .057 .030  2.07 .984 .974 .051 .041  2.09 .973 .937 .055 .025 
2 - - - - -  1.88 .985 .978 .047 .040  2.01 .972 .943 .053 .027 
2b 2.25 .982 .973 .055 .035  - - - - -  - - - - - 
3 - - - - -  1.74 .987 .982 .042 .041  1.86 .973 .951 .049 .028 
3b 2.24 .981 .973 .055 .036  - - - - -  - - - - - 
III 
 
 
 
Note. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean 
square residual. 1 = Unconstrained model; 2 = Model with weak measurement invariance; 2b = Model with partial weak measurement invariance; 3 
= Model with strong measurement invariance; 3b = Model with partial strong measurement invariance. 
Partial strong measurement invariance for self-rated conscientiousness was achieved by freeing one parcel’s intercept at T3. Partial strong 
measurement invariance for other-rated conscientiousness was achieved by freeing one parcel’s intercept at T3.  
Partial weak measurement invariance for self-rated agreeableness was achieved by freeing one parcel’s loading at T3. Partial strong measurement 
invariance for self-rated agreeableness was achieved by freeing one parcel’s loading and intercept at T3. 
Partial strong measurement invariance for self-rated extraversion was achieved by freeing one parcel’s loading and intercept at T1. Partial strong 
measurement invariance for IAT extraversion was achieved by freeing one parcel’s intercept at T3. 
Partial weak measurement invariance for self-rated emotional stability was achieved by freeing one parcel’s loading at T3. Partial strong measurement 
invariance for self-rated emotional stability was achieved by freeing one parcel’s loading and intercept at T3. 
 
IV 
 
 
 
Table A2  
Correlated Change: Correlations between Latent Self-Rated, Other-Rated, and Implicit 
Intercept T2-T1 and T3-T2 Differences 
 Conscient-
iousness 
Agreeable-
ness 
Openness Extra-
version 
Emotional 
stability 
Initial correlation      
SRT1 with ORT1 .500** .403** .618** .619** .586** 
SRT1 with IATT1 .136 -.011 .104† .270** .216** 
ORT1 with IATT1 .180* .000 .110† .129* .048 
Correlated change      
SRT2T1 with ORT2T1 .008 -.005 .110 .177* .008 
SRT3T2 with ORT3T2 -.142 .065 .164* .005 .194† 
SRT2T1 with IATT2T1 -.190 -.077 .002 .153† .032 
SRT3T2 with IATT3T2 -.073 .045 -.022 .049 .115 
ORT2T1 with IATT2T1 .029 -.079 .050 -.020 -.142 
ORT3T2 with IATT3T2 -.018 .017 -.062 -.051 -.033 
Lagged change      
SRT2T1 with ORT3T2 .160 .137 -.023 -.089 -.051 
ORT2T1 with SRT3T2 -.048 -.011 -.077 .033 .017 
SRT2T1 with IATT3T2 .157 .127 -.052 -.070 .127 
IATT2T1 with SRT3T2 .040 .011 .067 -.284** -.081 
ORT2T1 with IATT3T2 -.029 -.019 .040 .127 .060 
IATT2T1 with ORT3T2 -.052 -.005 .065 .034 -.044 
Model fit      
χ² 413.18 379.407 342.584 435.478   347.440 
CFI 0.966     0.971     0.984     0.970     0.981 
TLI 0.959     0.965     0.981     0.964     0.977 
RMSEA 0.046     0.040     0.034     0.047     0.036 
SRMR 0.057     0.069     0.041     0.071     0.039 
Note. SR = self-rating, OR = other-rating, IAT = implicit association test. 
The model was calculated using maximum likelihood estimation with robust (Huber-White) 
standard errors and scaled test statistics.  
V 
 
 
 
Conscientiousness: Strong invariance was achieved for the implicit measure (IAT). Partial 
strong invariance for self-ratings was achieved by freeing one intercept. Partial strong 
invariance for other-ratings was achieved by freeing one loading and one intercept.  
Agreeableness: Strong invariance was achieved for other-ratings and IAT. Partial strong 
invariance for self-ratings was achieved by freeing one loading and intercept. 
Openness: Strong invariance was achieved for self-, other-ratings and IAT. 
Extraversion: Strong invariance was achieved for other-ratings. Partial strong invariance for 
self-ratings was achieved by freeing one loading and intercept. Partial strong invariance for 
IAT was achieved by freeing one parcel’s intercept. 
Emotional Stability: Strong invariance was achieved for other-ratings and IAT. 
Partial strong invariance for self-ratings was achieved by freeing one loading and intercept. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
VI 
 
 
 
Table A3 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time when Comparing Younger and Older Students 
 
Self-rating 
 
Other-rating 
 
Implicit measure (IAT) 
Trait 
Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 
Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
 
Difference in 
intercepts T1 
Difference 
in change 
T2 – T1 
Difference 
in change 
T3 – T2 
Conscientiousness -0.958** 0.027 -0.028  -0.908** 0.141 0.195  -0.06† -0.007 -0.04 
Agreeableness -0.116 -0.06 0.071  0.184 -0.063 0.043  -0.125** -0.014 0.014 
Openness -0.153 -0.091 -0.04  -0.051 0.108 -0.121  -0.101* 0.103* -0.012 
Extraversion -0.296† 0.011 -0.024  -0.637** -0.027 0.026  0.116* 0.082† -0.104* 
Emotional stability -0.421** -0.007 -0.002  -0.288† 0.102 0.15  -0.137* -0.033 0.005 
Note. Coefficients represent the unstandardized contrast effects for testing for group differences in intercepts or change scores. The contrast 
“Younger students vs. older students” was coded as -0.5 = younger students, 0.5 = older students.  
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table A4 
Group Differences in Initial Latent Level and Latent Change Over Time Controlling for the Number and Valence of Life Events. 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept 
T1 
Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
Model 1: Conscientiousness           
Sum positive 
life events 
0.087* 0.033 0.020  0.011 -0.026 0.033  0.010 0.006 -0.001 
Sum neutral life 
events 
-0.180* -0.044 -0.069  0.059 -0.034 -0.077  0.005 -0.039† 0.008 
Sum negative 
life events 
0.091† -0.080* -0.091*  -0.013 -0.057 -0.135*  -0.002 0.010 0.012 
Positive life 
events valence 
-0.083 -0.115† 0.026  -0.107 0.091† 0.088  -0.005 -0.011 0.048 
Negative life 
events valence 
0.189† 0.033 0.092  -0.102 0.015 0.007  -0.002 0.021 0.003 
Y vs. O -0.888* 0.092 -0.070  -0.869** 0.154† 0.120  -0.105** 0.020 -0.031 
YF vs. YAS -0.304* 0.242* 0.013  0.033 -0.083 -0.04  0.022 0.010 0.008 
OS vs. OC 0.061 0.288* 0.033  -0.022 0.042 -0.057  -0.054 0.015 0.049 
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Table A4 continued 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept 
T1 
Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
Model 2: Agreeableness           
Sum positive 
life events 
0.026 0.000 0.022  0.018 -0.020 0.033  0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
Sum neutral life 
events 
-0.076 -0.041 0.070  0.035 0.012 -0.112  -0.002 0.013 0.038 
Sum negative 
life events 
-0.016 -0.038 -0.072†  0.014 -0.057 -0.069  -0.007 0.015 0.000 
Positive life 
events valence 
-0.089 0.011 0.025  -0.069 -0.057 -0.011  -0.008 -0.023 0.003 
Negative life 
events valence 
0.098 -0.005 0.161*  0.101 -0.060 0.134  0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
Y vs. O -0.188† -0.005 -0.084  0.141 -0.082 0.037  -0.117** -0.009 0.003 
YF vs. YAS -0.012 -0.050 0.214*  -0.089 -0.014 0.087  0.003 -0.032 0.034 
OS vs. OC -0.051 0.269* -0.248†  0.084 -0.055 0.083  -0.028 0.074† -0.061 
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Table A4 continued 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept 
T1 
Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
Model 3: Openness           
Sum positive 
life events 
0.046 0.025 -0.021  0.098** -0.015 0.037  0.006 0.008 0.013 
Sum neutral life 
events 
-0.148 0.036 -0.099†  0.000 0.025 -0.171  0.009 -0.010 0.006 
Sum negative 
life events 
0.052 -0.014 -0.002  -0.006 -0.031 -0.105  -0.005 -0.016 -0.016 
Positive life 
events valence 
0.116 -0.025 -0.011  -0.084 -0.032 0.093†  -0.030 0.007 0.026 
Negative life 
events valence 
-0.032 0.054 0.086  -0.160† 0.041 -0.058  0.010 0.020 -0.076** 
Y vs. O -0.217† -0.081 0.000  -0.193† 0.041 -0.150  -0.108** 0.099** -0.056† 
YF vs. YAS -0.294* 0.042 0.110  -0.015 -0.076 0.082  -0.067† 0.067† 0.021 
OS vs. OC 0.065 -0.010 0.008  0.178 -0.265* -0.055  -0.051 0.007 -0.030 
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Table A4 continued 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
Effects on Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept 
T1 
Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
Model 4: Extraversion           
Sum positive 
life events 
0.122* 0.030 0.029  0.110** 0.001 0.048  0.011 -0.003 0.004 
Sum neutral life 
events 
-0.054 -0.098 0.071  -0.003 -0.029 0.161†  -0.036 0.002 -0.024 
Sum negative 
life events 
0.017 -0.069 -0.037  -0.029 -0.065 -0.146  -0.003 -0.007 0.029 
Positive life 
events valence 
-0.281* -0.027 0.013  -0.214* 0.064 0.045  0.023 0.020 0.037 
Negative life 
events valence 
0.293* 0.083 0.041  0.083 0.003 -0.044  0.036 0.005 0.005 
Y vs. O -0.255† -0.020 -0.022  -0.736** -0.030 0.001  0.123** 0.070 -0.118** 
YF vs. YAS -0.205 0.227* 0.089  -0.053 0.197† -0.024  -0.054 0.064 0.128* 
OS vs. OC 0.439* -0.043 0.091  0.163 -0.189 0.113  0.051 0.009 -0.048 
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Table A4 continued 
 Self-rating  Other-rating  Implicit measure (IAT) 
Effects on Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept T1 Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
 Intercept 
T1 
Change  
T2 – T1 
Change 
T3 – T2 
Model 5: Emotional stability           
Sum positive 
life events 
0.084† 0.016 0.036  0.013 0.017 0.038  -0.001 0.012 0.001 
Sum neutral life 
events 
-0.083 -0.027 0.024  -0.107 -0.141† 0.080  -0.009 0.006 0.079** 
Sum negative 
life events 
-0.231* -0.059 -0.103*  -0.187** -0.052 -0.080  -0.005 0.002 -0.011 
Positive life 
events valence 
0.073 -0.059 -0.037  0.007 -0.050 0.062  0.014 0.004 -0.013 
Negative life 
events valence 
-0.042 -0.031 0.124†  -0.231* -0.082 0.067  -0.012 0.027 0.040 
Y vs. O -0.481* 0.017 -0.067  -0.301* 0.006 0.059  -0.132** -0.039 0.024 
YF vs. YAS -0.105 -0.080 0.099  0.074 -0.142 0.164  -0.034 0.028 -0.092† 
OS vs. OC 0.111 0.134 -0.064  0.122 -0.140 -0.211  0.012 -0.045 0.045 
Note. Y vs. O = Contrast younger vs. older adults; YF vs YAS = Contrast younger freshmen vs. advanced students; OS vs. OC = Contrast older 
students vs. older controls. Life events were: New relationship, marriage, pregnancy, birth of a child, child moved out, personal success, job 
success, change at work, new job, layoff, retirement, financial change, relocation, separation or divorce, own illness, illness of partner, death of 
partner, illness of friends or family, death of friends or family, job failure, lawsuit. 
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Robust model fit indices conscientiousness: self-report were χ² = 227.520, CFI = 0.976, TLI = 0.971, RMSEA = 0.031, SRMR = 0.035; other-
report χ² = 212.838, CFI = 0.981, TLI = 0.978, RMSEA = 0.027, SRMR = 0.034; IAT χ² = 103.870, CFI = 0.974, TLI = 0.965, RMSEA = 0.019, 
SRMR = 0.031. 
Robust model fit indices agreeableness: self-report χ² =193.853, CFI =0.986, TLI = 0.984, RMSEA = 0.021, SRMR = 0.038; other-report χ² = 
218.554, CFI =0.979, TLI = 0.975, RMSEA = 0.027, SRMR = 0.036 and for IAT χ² = 177.370, CFI = 0.878, TLI = 0.839, RMSEA = 0.051, 
SRMR = 0.044. 
Robust model fit indices openness: self-report χ² =203.214, CFI = 0.988, TLI = 0.986, RMSEA = 0.023, SRMR = 0.041; other-report χ² = 220.943, 
CFI =0.981, TLI = 0.978, RMSEA = 0.028, SRMR = 0.037; IAT χ² =140.265, CFI = 0.917, TLI = 0.891, RMSEA = 0.038, SRMR = 0.037. 
Robust model fit indices extraversion: self-report χ² = 272.615, CFI = 0.967, TLI = 0.960, RMSEA = 0.041, SRMR = 0.039; other-report χ² = 
229.327, CFI = 0.975, TLI = 0.970, RMSEA = 0.031, SRMR = 0.048 and for IAT χ² = 115.828, CFI = 0.972, TLI = 0.963, RMSEA = 0.027, 
SRMR = 0.027. 
Robust model fit indices emotional stability: self-report χ² = 252.730, CFI = 0.968, TLI = 0.962, RMSEA = 0.038, SRMR = 0.039; other-report 
χ² = 202.354, CFI = 0.986, TLI = 0.983, RMSEA = 0.024, SRMR = 0.036; IAT χ² = 115.539, CFI = 0.958, TLI = 0.944, RMSEA = 0.028, SRMR 
= 0.031. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table A5 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Internal and External Locus of Control and Change Goals 
   Change goals 
Variable  M SD Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Internal locus of 
control  
4.06a / 4.21b 0.60 / 0.56 -0.07 / -0.14 -0.23* / -0.19* -0.03 / -0.18* -0.04 / -0.09 -0.14* / -0.06 
External locus 
of control 
2.34a / 2.18b 0.69 / 0.67 0.08 / 0.14 0.17* / 0.05 0.04 / 0.09 0.04 / 0.02 0.07 / 0.16 
Note. Values to the left of the slashes refer to younger adults; values to the right refer to older adults.  
Means with different subscripts within rows are significantly different at p ≤ .05 according to t tests for independent samples. 
* p < .05. 
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Table A6 
Regression Analysis Predicting Goals to Change from Age Group and Self-Reported Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, 
Extraversion, and Openness 
 Change goals 
Variable  
Emotional 
stability 
Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Age group -.15* -.31* -.07 -.17* -.09 
Emotional stability -.72* .03 -.06 .01 .04 
Emotional Stability ×           
Age Group 
.12* -.08 .01 .02 .00 
Conscientiousness .05 -.47* .11 .20* -.08 
Conscientiousness × 
Age Group 
.01 .08 -.11 -.12 .02 
Agreeableness  .19* .11* -.25* .11* .14* 
Agreeableness ×           
Age Group 
-.06 -.04 -.06 -.07 .14 
Extraversion .03 -.05 .11 -.61* -.05 
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Table A6 continued 
 Change goals 
Variable  Emotional 
stability 
Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Extraversion ×           
Age Group 
-.05 .02 -.04 .10 -.04 
Openness .10* .02 .05 .04 -.16* 
Openness ×           
Age Group 
-.03 .00 .06 -.05 -.10 
R² .42 .36 .08 .29 .07 
F(11, 366) 26.01 20.11 4.10 14.68 3.76 
p < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Note. All predictors are standardized. Age group = dummy-coded; belonging to age group with “older adults” is coded as 1 and “younger adults” 
is coded as 0. 
* p < .05. 
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Table A7 
Regression Coefficients and Derived Model Parameters for each Big Five Trait and Age Group for the Linear Interaction Model 
 Change goals 
  Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
b1 -0.32* -0.22* -0.23* -0.26* -0.02 -0.31* -0.35* -0.32* -0.10* -0.31* 
 [-0.37,-0.26] [-0.32,-0.13] [-0.35,-0.10] [-0.51,<0.00] [-0.14,0.09] [-0.45,-0.16] [-0.46,-0.25] [-0.46,-0.18] [-0.20,<0.00] [-0.50,-0.12] 
b2 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 -0.13* -0.11* 0.05 0.02 -0.16 
 [-0.08,0.06] [-0.14,0.08] [-0.05,0.13] [-0.35,0.05] [-0.11,0.11] [-0.28,-0.01] [-0.20,0.02] [-0.16,0.07] [-0.07,0.11] [-0.33,0.01] 
b4 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.12* 0.07* 0.05 0.01 0.10 
 [-0.05,0.04] [-0.05,0.08] [-0.15,0.02] [-0.09,0.17] [-0.15,0.02] [0.01,0.22] [0.02,0.13] [-0.01,0.11] [-0.05,0.07] [-0.03,0.24] 
a1 -0.33* -0.25* -0.19* -0.41* -0.03 -0.44* -0.46* -0.37* -0.08 -0.47* 
 [-0.38,-0.28] [-0.36,-0.15] [-0.33,-0.04] [-0.83,0.01] [-0.21,0.16] [-0.70,-0.19] [-0.59,-0.33] [-0.53,-0.20] [-0.22,0.06] [-0.80,-0.14] 
a2 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.12* 0.07* 0.05 0.01 0.10 
 [-0.05,0.04] [-0.05,0.08] [-0.15,0.02] [-0.10,0.17] [-0.15,0.02] [0.01,0.22] [0.02,0.13] [-0.01,0.12] [-0.05,0.07] [-0.03,0.24] 
a3 -0.30* -0.19* -0.27* -0.11 -0.02 -0.17* -0.24* -0.27* -0.12 -0.15* 
 [-0.42,-0.19] [-0.36,-0.01] [-0.44,-0.10] [-0.29,0.06] [-0.15,0.11] [-0.31,-0.03] [-0.39,-0.09] [-0.47,-0.08] [-0.25,0.01] [-0.29,-0.01] 
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     Table A7 continued 
 Change goals 
 Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
a4 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.06 -0.12* -0.07* 0.05 -0.01 -0.10 
 [-0.04,0.05] [-0.08,0.05] [-0.02,0.15] [-0.17,0.10] [-0.02,0.15] [-0.22,-0.01] [-0.13,-0.02] [-0.11,0.01] [-0.07,0.05] [-0.24,0.03] 
Note. Younger = younger adults, Older = older adults. 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors in brackets. b1 = self-reported 
trait; b2 = other-reported trait; b3 = self-reported trait²; b4 = self- and other-reported trait interaction; b5 = other-reported trait. The p-value 
corresponds to a test of whether the parameter was zero. 
* p < .05. 
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Table A8  
Regression Coefficients and Derived Model Parameters for each Big Five Trait and Age Group for the Full Polynomial Model 
 Change Goals 
  Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
b1 -0.31* -0.25* -0.22* -0.32* -0.02 -0.38* -0.35* -0.32* -0.07 -0.31* 
 [-0.37,-0.25] [-0.35,-0.15] [-0.35,-0.10] [-0.57,-0.07] [-0.15,0.10] [-0.54,-0.22] [-0.48,-0.22] [-0.49,-0.16] [-0.20,0.05] [-0.50,-0.12] 
b2 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.14 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13* 0.03 -0.03 -0.24 
 [-0.09,0.06] [-0.12,0.17] [-0.14,0.16] [-0.10,0.37] [-0.24,0.19] [-0.14,0.11] [-0.25,-0.02] [-0.18,0.26] [-0.16,0.11] [-0.50,0.01] 
b3 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 
 [0.00,0.07] [-0.07,0.06] [-0.05,0.10] [-0.08,0.10] [-0.03,0.10] [-0.08,0.08] [-0.05,0.10] [-0.17,0.02] [-0.09,0.03] [-0.02,0.12] 
b4 -0.04 0.07 -0.1 0.06 -0.11* 0.20* 0.03 0.14* 0.03 0.02 
 [-0.11,0.03] [-0.05,0.20] [-0.23,0.02] [-0.08,0.20] [-0.22,<0.00] [0.07,0.33] [-0.07,0.14] [0.07,0.22] [-0.06,0.13] [-0.11,0.14] 
b5 0.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.11* 0.03 -0.13* 0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.08 
 [-0.04,0.05] [-0.19,0.02] [-0.05,0.12] [-0.19,-0.02] [-0.07,0.12] [-0.22,-0.05] [-0.03,0.09] [-0.14,<0.01] [-0.06,0.09] [-0.02,0.18] 
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     Table A8 continued 
 Change goals 
 Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
 Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
a1 -0.33* -0.23* -0.21* -0.18 -0.05 -0.39* -0.49* -0.29* -0.10 -0.56* 
 [-0.38,-0.27] [-0.35,-0.11] [-0.36,-0.06 [-0.54,0.18] [-0.27,0.18] [-0.63,-0.16] [-0.61,-0.36] [-0.47,-0.10] [-0.25,0.05] [-0.93,-0.19] 
a2 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.09* 0.00 0.01 0.14 
 [-0.05,0.05] [-0.10,0.07] [-0.13,0.04 [-0.15,0.08] [-0.15,0.05] [-0.04,0.18] [0.03,0.15] [-0.07,0.07] [-0.06,0.08] [-0.02,0.30] 
a3 -0.29* -0.28* -0.23 -0.45* 0.00 -0.37* -0.22* -0.36* -0.05 -0.07 
 [-0.41,-0.17] [-0.50,-0.05] [-0.47,0.00] [-0.80,-0.14] [-0.27,0.28] [-0.54,-0.20] [-0.43,-0.01] [-0.70,-0.02] [-0.26,0.16] [-0.32,0.18] 
a4 0.07 -0.17 0.16 -0.16 0.18 -0.33* 0.02 -0.28* -0.06 0.10 
 [-0.06,0.20] [-0.41,0.08] [-0.07,0.39] [-0.42,0.10] [-0.04,0.39] [-0.58,-0.09] [-0.19,0.23] [-0.44,-0.13] [-0.25,0.14] [-0.11,0.32] 
Note. Younger = younger adults, Older = older adults. 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors in brackets. b1 = self-reported 
trait; b2 = other-reported trait; b3 = self-reported trait²; b4 = self- and other-reported trait interaction; b5 = other-reported trait². The p-value 
corresponds to a test of whether the parameter was zero. 
* p < .05. 
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Figure A1. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated emotional stability with goals to change emotional stability for each age 
group: (A) for younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease emotional 
stability) to +3 (increase emotional stability), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
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Figure A2. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated conscientiousness with goals to change conscientiousness for each age group: 
(A) for younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease 
conscientiousness) to +3 (increase conscientiousness), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
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Figure A3. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated agreeableness with goals to change agreeableness for each age group: (A) 
for younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease agreeableness) to 
+3 (increase agreeableness), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
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Figure A4. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated extraversion with goals to change extraversion for each age group: (A) for 
younger and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease extraversion) to +3 
(increase extraversion), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
 
  
A B 
XXIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5. Response surfaces for the association of self- and other-rated openness with goals to change openness for each age group: (A) for younger 
and (B) for older adults. Both predictors were centered on the scale midpoint. Change goals ranged from -3 (decrease openness) to +3 (increase 
openness), with 0 indicating no change desired. 
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Table A9 
Regression Analysis Predicting Goals to Change from Self-Reported Big Five Traits, Age Group, and Additional Personality Characteristics 
  Change goals 
  Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Trait -.73* -.42* -.19*  -.59* -.19* 
Age group  -.14* -.33* -.09 -.18* -.10 
Trait × Age Group  .17*  .06 -.08 -.07 -.09 
Life satisfaction .09 -.17* .03 -.04 .08 
Life Satisfaction ×  
Age Group 
-.10 .11 -.08 -.12 -.11 
Self-esteem -.04 -.02 .14 -.12 -.16 
Self-Esteem × Age 
Groupa 
.15* -.01 -.03 -.70 .06 
Locus of control .05 -.07 .00 -.03 -.14 
Locus of Control × 
Age Group 
.02 -.03 -.08 .10 -.01 
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Table A9 continued 
  Emotional stability Conscientiousness Agreeableness  Extraversion Openness  
Entity orientation -.09 .06 -.08 -.03 -.08 
Entity  
Orientation ×           
Age Group 
.03 .10 .05 .02 .00 
Optimism .00 .11 -.04 .16* .14 
Optimism ×            
Age Group 
-.07 .00 .09 -.01 .12 
Loneliness .06 -.01 .17 .00 .04 
Loneliness ×  
Age Group 
.11 .09 -.08 .04 .10 
R² .40 .37 .07 .29 .09 
F(15, 359) 17.47 15.35 2.84 10.95 3.58 
p < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Note. All continuous predictors are standardized. Age group is dummy-coded with 0 = younger adults, 1 = older adults. 
 a A simple slope analysis showed that the association between self-esteem and goals to change emotional stability was not significant for younger (β 
= -0.04, p = .597) or for older adults (β = 0.21, p = .061), when other characteristics and the Big Five traits were controlled for.   
* p < .05. 
XXVII 
 
 
 
Table A10 
Correlations for Self-Reported Big Five Traits, Life Satisfaction, Self-Esteem, Locus of Control, Entity Orientation, Optimism, and Loneliness 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Self-reported 
Traits 
          
1.  Emotional stability           
2.  Conscientiousness .03 / .29*          
3.  Agreeableness .18 */ .33* .13* / .22*         
4.  Extraversion .30* / .45* .29* / .45* .28* / .17        
5.  Openness -.02 / .35* .10 / .21* .00 / .16 .18* /.48*       
Other predictors           
6.  Life satisfaction .43* / .48* .28* / .37* .25* / .20* .50* / .47* .09 / .28*      
7.  Self-esteem .50* / .41* .29* / .40* .15* / .11 .35* / .39* -.01 / .21* .68* / .69*     
8.  Locus of control .32* / .37* .28* / .40* .16* / .10 .29* / .32* .01 / .07 .56* / .60* .52* / .48*    
9.  Entity  
     orientation 
.02 / -.05 .01 / -.08 -.07 / -.26* -.01 / -.02 -.09 / -.10 .01 / .04 -.01 / .12 .01 / .12   
10. Optimism .47* / .45* .22* / .32* .26* / .08 .37* / .38* .02 / .16 .66* / .72* .69* / .53* .50* / .65* -.03 / .10  
11. Loneliness -.43* / -.46* -.24* / -.39* -.31* / -.21* -.55* / -.49* .04 / -.17 -.69* / -.73* -.53* / -.59* -.42* / -.54* -.07 / -.00 -.52* / -.55* 
Note. Values to the left of the slashes refer to younger adults; values to the right refer to older adults. 
* p < .05. 
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Table A11 
Fit Indices for Models with Different Levels of Measurement Invariance for Big Five Traits 
 Self-rating  IAT 
Model χ² CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR  χ² CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Openness          
1 54.423 0.999 0.999 0.011 0.023  9.839 1.000 1.010 0 0.017 
2 55.651 1.000 1.001 0 0.022  12.778 1.000 1.009 0 0.024 
3 61.334 1.000 1.001 0 0.024  15.074 1.000 1.009 0 0.025 
Conscientiousness          
1 62.460 0.995 0.993 0.030 0.023  10.446 1.000 1.009 0 0.016 
2 67.787 0.996 0.994 0.027 0.027  13.894 1.000 1.006 0 0.022 
3 82.029 0.993 0.992 0.032 0.028  16.728 1.000 1.005 0 0.024 
  
XXIX 
 
 
 
 
Table A11 continued 
 Self-rating  IAT 
Model χ² CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR  χ² CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Extraversion          
1 58.893 0.998 0.997 0.023 0.020  14.876 0.998 0.996 0.021 0.014 
2 67.077 0.997 0.997 0.024 0.027  16.738 0.999 0.998 0.015 0.019 
3 96.591 0.992 0.991 0.040 0.029  30.780 0.989 0.984 0.042 0.026 
3b       22.289 0.996 0.993 0.027 0.022 
Agreeableness          
1 58.734 0.997 0.996 0.022 0.021  9.349 1.000 1.009 0 0.018 
2 82.562 0.991 0.988 0.036 0.042  12.922 1.000 1.006 0 0.024 
3 94.044 0.989 0.987 0.038 0.043  13.630 1.000 1.009 0 0.024 
Emotional stability          
1 76.663 0.993 0.990 0.039 0.022  15.710 0.996 0.990 0.027 0.019 
2 90.690 0.991 0.988 0.042 0.039  19.278 0.995 0.991 0.025 0.023 
3 102.567 0.989 0.988 0.043 0.038  21.042 0.997 0.995 0.019 0.024 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 
SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. 1 = Unconstrained model; 2 = Model with weak measurement invariance; 3 = Model with strong 
measurement invariance; 3b = Model with partial strong measurement invariance. 
Partial strong measurement invariance for IAT extraversion was achieved by freeing one parcel’s intercept at T3. 
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Table A12 
Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations of Change Goals, their Importance and Feasibility at T1 
Trait 
Change Goal 
M (SD) 
Importance 
M (SD) 
Feasibility 
M (SD) 
rCI rCF rIF 
Openness 3.48 (0.42) 3.33 (0.97) 3.59 (0.88) .033 -.555** 0 
Conscientiousness 3.65 (0.58) 3.49 (0.90) 3.30 (0.90) .241** -.581** -.315** 
Extraversion 3.41 (0.57) 3.34 (0.98) 3.51 (1.07) .194** -.579** -.233** 
Agreeableness 3.37 (0.44) 3.51 (1.03) 3.73 (0.88) .115* -.342** -.166* 
Emotional Stability 3.81 (0.61) 3.51 (0.98) 2.91 (1.10) .362** -.600** -.531** 
Note. rCI = correlation between change goals and importance at T1. rCF = correlation between change goals and feasibility at T1. rIF = correlation 
between importance and feasibility at T1. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table A13 
Correlations of Importance and Feasibility of Change Goals at T1 with TESSERA components 
 
 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional stability 
 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
Triggering situations 
Intellect 0.123* 0.096 0.086 -0.039 -0.018 -0.013 0.023 -0.087 0.026 0.052 
Duty 0.110* 0.006 0.163** 0.008 0.060 0.014 0.020 -0.094 0.122* -0.031 
Sociality 0.016 0.009 0.040 -0.051 0.001 0.127* 0.050 0.054 0.073 -0.048 
Deception 0.037 -0.018 0.068 -0.092 0.016 -0.063 -0.035 -0.134* -0.010 -0.037 
Negativity -0.013 0.030 0.066 -0.189** 0.031 -0.130* -0.014 -0.049 0.109* -0.168** 
Adversity 0.018 0.017 0.068 -0.132* 0.026 -0.077 -0.030 -0.056 -0.017 -0.065 
Own Expectations 0.105* -0.041 0.059 -0.023 0.102 -0.008 -0.048 -0.120* -0.015 -0.002 
States and state expressions 
Open 0.103* 0.086 -0.015 0.202** 0.004 0.268** 0.076 0.135** -0.065 0.179** 
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Note. CG Importance = Importance of change goals at T1; CG Feasibility = Feasibility of change goals at T1. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
Table A13 continued 
 
 
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Emotional stability 
 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
CG 
Impor-
tance 
CG 
Feasi-
bility 
States and state expressions 
Conscientious 0.122* 0.081 -0.002 0.201** 0.012 0.112* 0.044 -0.023 -0.003 0.112* 
Extraverted 0.009 0.044 0.074 0.139** 0.008 0.293** 0.088 0.109* -0.048 0.181** 
Agreeable 0.133* 0.086 -0.030 0.183** 0.016 0.205** 0.092 0.117* -0.021 0.108* 
Emotional stable 0.095 0.059 0.049 0.248** 0.039 0.215** 0.067 0.078 -0.058 0.237** 
Affective reaction 
after experiences 
0.094 0.051 -0.033 0.201** 0.026 0.182** 0.067 0.063 -0.095 0.207** 
Reflection on 
experiences 
0.024 0.024 -0.009 -0.017 -0.023 -0.042 0.004 -0.099 0.042 -0.153** 
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Table A14  
Associations of TESSERA components during D4-D5 (within-person level) 
 O C E A ES 
Association of 
TESSERA components 
Intellect  
- expectancy 
- open 
- reaction 
Duty  
- expectancy 
-conscientious 
- reaction 
Sociality  
- expectancy 
- extraverted 
- reaction 
Sociality  
- expectancy 
- agreeable 
- reaction 
Deception  
- expectancy 
- agreeable 
- reaction 
Negativity  
- expectancy 
- emotional 
stable 
- reaction 
Adversity  
- expectancy 
- emotional 
stable 
- reaction 
Situation  expectancy 0.106** 0.167** 0.123** 0.123** 0.029 -0.002 -0.007 
Situation  state  -0.057** 0.083** 0.308** 0.233** -0.256** -0.343** -0.210** 
Situation  reaction -0.100** -0.114** -0.063** 0.028† -0.385** -0.476** -0.329** 
Expectancy  state 0.078** 0.145** 0.032** 0.029** 0.069** 0.161** 0.161** 
State  reaction  0.677** 0.268** 0.709** 0.552** 0.502** 0.326** 0.564** 
State  reflection  0.100** 0.081** 0.032 0.120** 0.120** -0.120** -0.120** 
Reaction  reflection -0.230** -0.197** -0.199** -0.228** -0.228** -0.130** -0.130** 
Note. O = openness, C = conscientiousness, E = extraversion, A = agreeableness, ES = emotional stability. 
† p < .10. ** p < .01. 
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Table A15 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components (Sociality of Situations) and Long-term Development in Agreeableness for (between-
person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Sociality on change goals 0.031 
[-0.281; 0.344] 
0.037  
[-0.268; 0.342] 
Situation: Sociality on change goals × traits 0.073 
[-0.256; 0.401] 
-0.323  
[-1.193; 0.546] 
Situation: Sociality on importance 0.034 
[-0.082; 0.150] 
0.045  
[-0.066; 0.156] 
Situation: Sociality on feasibility -0.019 
[-0.161; 0.123] 
0.022  
[-0.118; 0.162] 
Situation: Sociality on importance × feasibility -0.007 
[-0.154; 0.140] 
-0.012  
[-0.154; 0.130] 
Situation: Sociality on change goals × importance -0.186 
[-0.450; 0.078] 
-0.158  
[-0.423; 0.107] 
Situation: Sociality on change goals × feasibility 0.126 
[-0.203; 0.456] 
0.119  
[-0.176; 0.414] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals 0.024 
[-0.101; 0.149] 
-0.024 
[-0.148; 0.101] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals × traits -0.081 
[-0.208; 0.045] 
-0.180 
[-0.482; 0.123] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on importance 0.009 
[-0.047; 0.066] 
0.045 
[-0.011; 0.101] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on feasibility 0.010 
[-0.056; 0.075] 
0.069* 
[0.002; 0.136] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility -0.037 
[-0.103; 0.028] 
0.160* 
[0.032; 0.288] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals × importance 0.012 
[-0.109; 0.133] 
0.021 
[-0.101; 0.142] 
State: Agreeable (D1-D3) on change goals × feasibility 0.158* 
[0.025; 0.291] 
-0.053 
[-0.118; 0.012] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals 0.012 
[-0.134; 0.159] 
0.029 
[-0.115; 0.173] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals × traits 0.110 
[-0.042; 0.262] 
0.258 
[-0.108; 0.624] 
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Table A15 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on importance 0.034 
[-0.015; 0.084] 
0.038 
[-0.008; 0.084] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on feasibility -0.003 
[-0.066; 0.059] 
0.000 
[-0.059; 0.058] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility -0.053† 
[-0.109; 0.004] 
-0.059* 
[-0.113; -0.006] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals × importance -0.161** 
[-0.276; -0.046] 
-0.158** 
[-0.272; -0.044] 
State: Agreeable (D4-D5) on change goals × feasibility -0.057 
[-0.216; 0.102] 
-0.002 
[-0.142; 0.138] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.286* 
[-0.421; -0.152] 
-0.022 
[-0.091; 0.047] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits 0.032 
[-0.129; 0.192] 
-0.004 
[-0.245; 0.238] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals ×  
Agreeable state (D1-D3) 
-0.046 
[-0.277; 0.185] 
-0.066 
[-0.158; 0.027] 
Change T2-T1 on importance -0.004 
[-0.069; 0.062] 
-0.008 
[-0.039; 0.024] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.071 
[-0.007; 0.148] 
0.000 
[-0.034; 0.035] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility -0.009 
[-0.080; 0.062] 
0.012 
[-0.020; 0.044] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance -0.065 
[-0.207; 0.078] 
0.075* 
[0.010; 0.141] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility -0.095 
[-0.276; 0.086] 
-0.047 
[-0.126; 0.033] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals 0.049 
[-0.114; 0.212] 
-0.037 
[-0.136; 0.062] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits -0.110 
[-0.325; 0.105] 
0.020 
[-0.254; 0.295] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals ×  
Agreeable state (D4-D5) 
0.174 
[-0.081; 0.429] 
0.054 
[-0.086; 0.194] 
Change T3-T2 on importance -0.025 
[-0.101; 0.050] 
0.014 
[-0.031; 0.058] 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility -0.042 
[-0.123; 0.040] 
-0.008 
[-0.056; 0.039] 
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Table A15 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility 0.018 
[-0.064; 0.100] 
-0.016 
[-0.068; 0.035] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance 0.018 
[-0.127; 0.164] 
-0.056 
[-0.152; 0.040] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility 0.004 
[-0.194; 0.202] 
0.017 
[-0.090; 0.124] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals 0.097 
[-0.076; 0.269] 
0.029 
[-0.070; 0.129] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits 0.118 
[-0.077; 0.313] 
-0.081 
[-0.405; 0.244] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals ×  
Agreeable state (D4-D5) 
-0.110 
[-0.373; 0.153] 
0.095 
[-0.070; 0.260] 
Change T4-T3 on importance -0.006 
[-0.084; 0.072] 
-0.013 
[-0.055; 0.029] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility 0.004 
[-0.088; 0.097] 
0.006 
[-0.044; 0.056] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility 0.017 
[-0.067; 0.101] 
-0.026 
[-0.074; 0.021] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.053 
[-0.082; 0.187] 
-0.003 
[-0.092; 0.086] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility -0.003 
[-0.214; 0.207] 
-0.027 
[-0.149; 0.095] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
  
XXXVII 
 
 
 
Table A16 
Associations of Change Goals, their Importance and their Feasibility at T1 with TESSERA 
Components (Adversity of Situations) and Long-term Development in Emotional Stability (between-
person level) 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting triggering situations during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Situation: Adversity on change goals 0.023 
[-0.138; 0.184] 
0.054 
[-0.115; 0.223] 
Situation: Adversity on change goals × traits -0.150* 
[-0.278; -0.021] 
0.383* 
[0.040; 0.726] 
Situation: Adversity on importance -0.036 
[-0.124; 0.051] 
-0.032 
[-0.123; 0.059] 
Situation: Adversity on feasibility 0.114* 
[0.021; 0.208] 
0.072 
[-0.011; 0.155] 
Situation: Adversity on importance × feasibility 0.040 
[-0.056; 0.135] 
0.019 
[-0.072; 0.110] 
Situation: Adversity on change goals × importance -0.039 
[-0.251; 0.172] 
-0.092 
[-0.305; 0.122] 
Situation: Adversity on change goals × feasibility 0.085 
[-0.064; 0.234] 
-0.055 
[-0.170; 0.060] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D1-D3 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals -0.060 
[-0.189; 0.068] 
-0.135* 
[-0.254; -0.016] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals × traits -0.025 
[-0.120; 0.069] 
0.451** 
[0.164; 0.737] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on importance 0.087* 
[0.016; 0.157] 
0.092** 
[0.024; 0.159] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on feasibility 0.038 
[-0.034; 0.110] 
0.064 
[-0.004; 0.132] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on importance × feasibility -0.021 
[-0.083; 0.041] 
-0.029 
[-0.095; 0.036] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals × 
importance 
-0.018 
[-0.144; 0.107] 
-0.053 
[-0.184; 0.077] 
State: Emotional Stable (D1-D3) on change goals × 
feasibility 
0.030 
[-0.101; 0.160] 
-0.002 
[-0.105; 0.102] 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals -0.035 
[-0.136; 0.066] 
-0.012 
[-0.112; 0.088] 
   
XXXVIII 
 
 
 
Table A16 continued 
 Self-rating IAT 
Predicting states and state expressions during D4-D5 by change goals, importance and feasibility 
at T1 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals × traits -0.009 
[-0.081; 0.064] 
-0.062 
[-0.311; 0.186] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on importance -0.018 
[-0.087; 0.051] 
-0.010 
[-0.077; 0.057] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on feasibility 0.011 
[-0.058; 0.079] 
0.006 
[-0.056; 0.069] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on importance × feasibility 0.017 
[-0.040; 0.074] 
0.019 
[-0.039; 0.077] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals × 
importance 
0.031 
[-0.085; 0.146] 
0.041 
[-0.076; 0.159] 
State: Emotional Stable (D4-D5) on change goals × 
feasibility 
-0.008 
[-0.113; 0.097] 
-0.011 
[-0.100; 0.078] 
Predicting difference in change T2 – T1 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T2-T1 on change goals -0.269** 
[-0.428; -0.111] 
-0.047 
[-0.103; 0.010] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × traits 0.078 
[-0.033; 0.189] 
0.043 
[-0.140; 0.226] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals ×  
Emotional Stable state (D1-D3) 
-0.155** 
[-0.268; -0.043] 
-0.012 
[-0.050; 0.027] 
Change T2-T1 on importance 0.009 
[-0.087; 0.106] 
0.027 
[-0.012; 0.066] 
Change T2-T1 on feasibility 0.080† 
[-0.014; 0.174] 
0.004 
[-0.030; 0.037] 
Change T2-T1 on importance × feasibility 0.007 
[-0.074; 0.088] 
-0.026 
[-0.060; 0.009] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × importance 0.069 
[-0.097; 0.236] 
-0.017 
[-0.080; 0.047] 
Change T2-T1 on change goals × feasibility -0.056 
[-0.192; 0.080] 
0.017 
[-0.029; 0.063] 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 by change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on change goals -0.065 
[-0.231; 0.101] 
0.018 
[-0.059; 0.094] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × traits -0.072 
[-0.196; 0.051] 
0.024 
[-0.191; 0.240] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals ×  
Emotional Stable state (D4-D5) 
0.073 
[-0.069; 0.215] 
0.017 
[-0.039; 0.073] 
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Table A16 continued 
 
Self-rating IAT 
Predicting difference in change T3 – T2 change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T3-T2 on importance 0.050 
[-0.048; 0.149] 
-0.005 
[-0.055; 0.044] 
Change T3-T2 on feasibility -0.056 
[-0.144; 0.031] 
-0.009 
[-0.053; 0.035] 
Change T3-T2 on importance × feasibility -0.030 
[-0.117; 0.058] 
0.013 
[-0.038; 0.065] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × importance -0.084 
[-0.279; 0.110] 
0.016 
[-0.076; 0.108] 
Change T3-T2 on change goals × feasibility 0.014 
[-0.132; 0.161] 
-0.025 
[-0.079; 0.030] 
Predicting difference in change T4 – T3 change goals, importance and feasibility at T1 
Change T4-T3 on change goals 0.153 
[-0.018; 0.323] 
0.028 
[-0.053; 0.109] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × traits 0.078 
[-0.056; 0.213] 
0.054 
[-0.187; 0.295] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals ×  
Emotional Stable state (D4-D5) 
-0.101 
[-0.254; 0.053] 
0.016 
[-0.050; 0.082] 
Change T4-T3 on importance 0.051 
[-0.065; 0.166] 
0.002 
[-0.046; 0.050] 
Change T4-T3 on feasibility 0.110* 
[0.003; 0.217] 
-0.005 
[-0.056; 0.045] 
Change T4-T3 on importance × feasibility -0.005 
[-0.111; 0.102] 
-0.020 
[-0.067; 0.027] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × importance 0.073 
[-0.153; 0.299] 
-0.025 
[-0.115; 0.065] 
Change T4-T3 on change goals × feasibility -0.044 
[-0.209; 0.120] 
0.034 
[-0.046; 0.115] 
Note. IAT = implicit association test. 95% confidence intervals are shown in brackets. 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
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Table A17  
Change Goals × Importance ×Feasibility Interactions predicting TESSERA components and Long-Term Trait Change (between-person level) 
 O C E A ES 
 
Intellect  
- expectancy 
- open 
- reaction 
Duty  
- expectancy 
-conscientious 
- reaction 
Sociality  
- expectancy 
- extraverted 
- reaction 
Sociality  
- expectancy 
- agreeable 
- reaction 
Deception  
- expectancy 
- agreeable 
- reaction 
Negativity  
- expectancy 
- emotional 
stable 
- reaction 
Adversity  
- expectancy 
- emotional 
stable 
- reaction 
Estimates for models on self-rated traits 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  situation D4-D5 
-0.288 
[-0.708; 0.132] 
-0.045 
[-0.256; 0.166] 
-0.142 
[-0.321; 0.037] 
-0.030 
[-0.282; 0.221] 
-0.030 
[-0.139; 0.080] 
0.049 
[-0.034; 0.132] 
0.045 
[-0.050; 0.139] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  state D1-D3 
-0.180* 
[-0.345; -0.014] 
-0.066 
[-0.181; 0.050] 
-0.038 
[-0.114; 0.039] 
-0.080 
[-0.192; 0.032] 
-0.082 
[-0.204; 0.039] 
-0.088* 
[-0.169; -0.007] 
-0.098* 
[-0.177; -0.019] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  state D4-D5 
-0.040 
[-0.166; 0.085] 
0.097* 
[0.009; 0.185] 
0.057 
[-0.031; 0.145] 
0.067 
[-0.032; 0.165] 
0.072 
[-0.021; 0.166] 
0.022 
[-0.047; 0.091] 
0.029 
[-0.039; 0.096] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  Change T2-T1 
-0.046 
[-0.248; 0.156] 
0.048 
[-0.062; 0.159] 
-0.026 
[-0.144; 0.093] 
0.018 
[-0.133; 0.169] 
0.019 
[-0.132; 0.170] 
-0.011 
[-0.104; 0.081] 
-0.006 
[-0.100; 0.088] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  Change T3-T2 
0.046 
[-0.136; 0.229] 
0.025 
[-0.096; 0.145] 
-0.009 
[-0.117; 0.099] 
0.006 
[-0.155; 0.168] 
0.007 
[-0.155; 0.168] 
0.024 
[-0.084; 0.133] 
0.023 
[-0.085; 0.132] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  Change T4-T3 
-0.056 
[-0.234; 0.122] 
-0.032 
[-0.153; 0.089] 
0.092 
[-0.025; 0.209] 
-0.081 
[-0.240; 0.077] 
-0.081 
[-0.240; 0.078] 
-0.039 
[-0.157; 0.079] 
-0.039 
[-0.157; 0.079] 
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Table A17 continued 
 O C E A ES 
 
Intellect  
- expectancy 
- open 
- reaction 
Duty  
- expectancy 
-conscientious 
- reaction 
Sociality  
- expectancy 
- extraverted 
- reaction 
Sociality  
- expectancy 
- agreeable 
- reaction 
Deception  
- expectancy 
- agreeable 
- reaction 
Negativity  
- expectancy 
- emotional 
stable 
- reaction 
Adversity  
- expectancy 
- emotional 
stable 
- reaction 
Estimates for models on implicitly measured traits 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  situation D4-D5 
-0.302 
[-0.711; 0.107] 
-0.036 
[-0.240; 0.168] 
-0.136 
[-0.313; 0.042] 
-0.017 
[-0.266; 0.232] 
-0.016 
[-0.124; 0.092] 
0.039 
[-0.046; 0.124] 
0.038 
[-0.053; 0.128] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  state D1-D3 
-0.139 
[-0.297; 0.020] 
-0.058 
[-0.181; 0.064] 
-0.036 
[-0.115; 0.042] 
-0.107 
[-0.225; 0.010] 
-0.109 
[-0.237; 0.019] 
-0.089* 
[-0.167; -0.011] 
-0.098* 
[-0.173; -0.022] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  state D4-D5 
-0.047 
[-0.171; 0.077] 
0.093* 
[0.007; 0.178] 
0.058 
[-0.025; 0.142] 
0.065 
[-0.035; 0.166] 
0.071 
[-0.024; 0.166] 
0.021 
[-0.047; 0.090] 
0.024 
[-0.042; 0.091] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  Change T2-T1 
-0.033 
[-0.110; 0.045] 
-0.055 
[-0.142; 0.011] 
0.028 
[-0.040; 0.097] 
0.024 
[-0.047; 0.094] 
0.025 
[-0.045; 0.096] 
-0.004 
[-0.043; 0.035] 
-0.004 
[-0.044; 0.035] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  Change T3-T2 
0.001 
[-0.106; 0.107] 
0.008 
[-0.065; 0.081] 
-0.007 
[-0.083; 0.068] 
0.023 
[-0.071; 0.117] 
0.022 
[-0.071; 0.116] 
0.012 
[-0.042; 0.065] 
0.012 
[-0.042; 0.065] 
Change Goals × Importance × 
Feasibility  Change T4-T3 
0.023 
[-0.078; 0.123] 
0.060 
[-0.006; 0.126] 
0.029 
[-0.054; 0.111] 
-0.061 
[-0.157; 0.034] 
-0.061 
[-0.157; 0.035] 
-0.040 
[-0.094; 0.013] 
-0.041 
[-0.095; 0.013] 
Note. O = openness, C = conscientiousness, E = extraversion, A = agreeableness, ES = emotional stability. 95% confidence intervals are shown in 
brackets.  
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Model fit indices openness: Self-rating, CFI = 0.877, TLI = 0.810, RMSEA = 0.025, SRMR (within) = 0.050, SRMR (between) = 0.086; IAT, CFI = 
0.947, TLI = 0.912, RMSEA = 0.016, SRMR (within) = 0.016, SRMR (between) = 0.090. 
Model fit indices conscientiousness: Self-rating, CFI = 0.907, TLI = 0.856, RMSEA = 0.017, SRMR (within) = 0.025, SRMR (between) = 0.105; 
IAT, CFI = 0.885, TLI = 0.810, RMSEA = 0.017, SRMR (within) = 0.023, SRMR (between) = 0.090. 
Model fit indices extraversion: Self-rating, CFI = 0.932, TLI = 0.895, RMSEA = 0.020, SRMR (within) = 0.031, SRMR (between) = 0.129; IAT, CFI 
= 0.951, TLI = 0.919, RMSEA = 0.018, SRMR (within) = 0.014, SRMR (between) = 0.108. 
Model fit indices agreeableness (sociality/deception): Self-rating, CFI = 0.941/0.934, TLI = 0.908/0.898, RMSEA = 0.016/0.017, SRMR (within) = 
0.028/0.027, SRMR (between) = 0.080/0.081; IAT, CFI = 0.956/0.951, TLI = 0.927/0.918, RMSEA = 0.014/0.014, SRMR (within) = 0.016/0.017, 
SRMR (between) = 0.075/0.077. 
Model fit indices emotional stability (negativity/adversity): Self-rating, CFI = 0.930/0.934, TLI = 0.892/0.899, RMSEA = 0.026/0.020, SRMR (within) 
= 0.041/0.030, SRMR (between) = 0.122/0.128; IAT, CFI = 0.956/0.951, TLI = 0.927/0.918, RMSEA = 0.014/0.014, SRMR (within) = 0.016/0.017, 
SRMR (between) = 0.075/0.077. 
* p < .05. 
 
 
  
  
Zusammenfassung 
Obwohl es der Forschung zur Persönlichkeitsentwicklung erfolgreich gelungen ist, 
Muster aus sowohl Kontinuität als auch Veränderung über die Lebensspanne hinweg zu 
identifizieren, bleiben zugrundeliegende Faktoren und Prozesse weitestgehend im Unklaren. 
Um diese Lücke zu schließen, untersuchte die vorliegende Dissertation zwei potentiell relevante 
makro-analytische Faktoren sowie eine Reihe theoretisch vermuteter mikro-analytischer 
Prozesse. Mit Blick auf den ersten makro-analytischen Faktor legt frühere Forschung nahe, dass 
Umweltfaktoren und insbesondere Lebensübergänge zur Persönlichkeitsentwicklung beitragen 
könnten. Die in höherem Erwachsenenalter zu beobachtenden weniger stark ausgeprägten 
Persönlichkeitsveränderungen könnten daher aus stabileren Umweltkontexten, d.h. weniger 
Lebensübergängen, resultieren. Wenn dementsprechend jüngere und ältere Erwachsene einen 
ähnlichen Lebensübergang erlebten, sollten beide Altersgruppen ähnliche 
Persönlichkeitsveränderungen zeigen. Ein entsprechend aussagekräftiger Test für die 
Bedeutsamkeit von Umweltfaktoren für die Persönlichkeitsentwicklung fehlt allerdings 
bislang. Mit Blick auf den zweiten makro-analytischen Faktor legte jüngste Forschung nahe, 
dass Menschen auch willentlich zu ihrer Persönlichkeitsentwicklung beitragen, indem sie sich 
Veränderungsziele setzen und diese verfolgen. Eine umfangreiche Untersuchung von Faktoren, 
die zu diesen Veränderungszielen beitragen, liegt jedoch bis heute nicht vor. Darüber hinaus 
erbrachte frühere Forschung widersprüchliche Befunde dazu, ob sich Veränderungsziele in 
tatsächlichen Persönlichkeitsveränderungen niederschlagen, und untersuchte kaum, welche 
Zieleigenschaften, z.B. Wichtigkeit oder Schwierigkeit, eine erfolgreiche Zielverfolgung 
fördern. Schließlich formuliert das kürzlich vorgestellte TESSERA Rahmenmodell (Wrzus & 
Roberts, 2017) spezifische Hypothesen bezüglich mikro-analytischer Prozesse der 
Persönlichkeitsentwicklung. Allerdings steht eine erste empirische Prüfung dieses 
Rahmenmodells noch aus. 
  
  
Um diese umfassende Agenda in Angriff nehmen zu können, wurde vorliegende multi-
methodale Studie mit intensiver Messwiederholung (measurement burst design) durchgeführt. 
Über einen Gesamtzeitraum von zwei Jahren absolvierten 382 jüngere (n = 255, MAlter = 21.57 
Jahre) und ältere Erwachsene (n = 127, MAlter = 67.76), die teilweise den Übergang an die 
Universität erlebten, bis zu vier umfassende Assessments von selbsteingeschätzten, 
fremdeingeschätzten und implizit gemessenen Big Five Eigenschaften sowie von 
selbsteingeschätzten Veränderungszielen. Zwischen den ersten drei Assessments wurden 
darüber hinaus momentane Prozesse mit Hilfe multipler Tagebuchphasen von bis zu 50 Tagen 
erfasst.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigten wie erwartet, dass sich jüngere und ältere Erwachsene, die einen 
ähnlichen Lebensübergang, d.h. den Übergang an die Universität, erlebten, kaum hinsichtlich 
der Entwicklung von selbsteingeschätzten, fremdeingeschätzten und implizit gemessenen 
Eigenschaften unterschieden. Außerdem legten die Befunde nahe, dass ältere Erwachsene, die 
am universitären Leben teilnahmen, partiell andere Muster an Persönlichkeitsveränderungen 
zeigten als solche, die diesen Übergang nicht erlebten. Darüber hinaus waren 
Persönlichkeitsveränderungen teilweise zu Beginn des Lebensüberganges, d.h. bei 
Studienanfängern, stärker ausgeprägt. Mit Blick auf willentliche Persönlichkeitsveränderung 
zeigte sich, dass vor allem gegenwärtige Big Five Eigenschaften zu Veränderungszielen 
beitrugen und dass diese am stärksten ausgeprägt waren, wenn Selbst- und 
Fremdeinschätzungen hinsichtlich einer niedrigen Eigenschaftsausprägung übereinstimmten. 
Unerwarteterweise legten die Ergebnisse nahe, dass sich Veränderungsziele kaum in 
tatsächlichen selbsteingeschätzten und implizit gemessenen Persönlichkeitsveränderungen 
niederschlugen. Allerdings stützten die Ergebnisse zum Teil die Vermutung, dass höhere 
Wichtigkeit und Machbarkeit eine erfolgreiche Zielverfolgung förderten. Abschließend zeigte 
sich bezüglich mikro-analytischer Prozesse der Persönlichkeitsentwicklung, dass sich 
momentane Prozesse als wiederholte Sequenzen aus auslösenden Situationen, Erwartungen, 
  
  
Zuständen, und Reaktionen, wie im TESSERA Rahmenmodell (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017) 
vorgeschlagen, generalisieren lassen. Zudem waren selbsteingeschätzte und teilweise implizit 
gemessene Eigenschaften, aber weniger Veränderungsziele mit dem Erleben entsprechender 
momentaner Situationen und Zustände verbunden. Überraschenderweise trugen lediglich 
momentane Zustände, aber weniger reflektive oder assoziative Prozesse zur langfristigen 
Persönlichkeitsentwicklung bei.  
Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Bedeutsamkeit von Umweltfaktoren für die 
Persönlichkeitsentwicklung über die Lebensspanne hinweg. Im Besonderen mag das Erleben 
von üblicherweise altersgradierten Lebensübergängen, z.B. Erleben des Übergangs an die 
Universität im jungen Erwachsenenalter, den unterschiedlichen Mustern von 
Persönlichkeitsentwicklung im jüngeren und älteren Erwachsenenalter zugrunde liegen, da ein 
solcher Übergang mit der Notwendigkeit verbunden sein kann, in neue oder veränderte soziale 
Rollen zu investieren. Obwohl Veränderungsziele scheinbar mehr als eine Antwortverzerrung 
oder die ledigliche Erwünschtheit von höheren Eigenschaftsausprägungen widerzuspiegeln 
scheinen, muss weitere Forschung untersuchen, ob volitionale Persönlichkeitsentwicklung 
ohne psychologische Unterstützung möglich ist und welche weiteren Bedingungen für eine 
erfolgreiche Zielverfolgung gegeben sein müssen, wie z.B. Zielspezifität oder Zielengagement. 
Schließlich zeigt die vorliegende Dissertation erste, aber ermutigende Ergebnisse mit Blick auf 
zentrale Annahmen des TESSERA Rahmenmodells (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). Allerdings ist 
weitere Forschung notwendig um die Bedeutsamkeit von reflektiven und assoziativen 
Prozessen für die Persönlichkeitsentwicklung zu untersuchen.  
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